Date: Tue, 25 Aug 1998 20:32:05 +0000 From: Saul-Paul Sirag Subject: [q-mind] Realistic vs. Pragmatic-idealistic Theories of Mind -- Henry Stapp MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Henry Stapp Subject: Realistic versus Pragmatic-idealistic Theories of Mind. Dear Jack, There are two important methodological issues that are basic to the entire field of mind-brain research, and which become manifest in the differences between our approaches. The most interesting and useful thing to do, I believe, is to identify these basic issues: get them out in the open. The various points of difference can then be seen in the context of the larger issues. The two issues are these: (1) How is mind to be introduced into the scientific study of the mind-brain system? (2) How are the useful concepts of classical physics to be introduced into the scientific study of the mind-brain system. Question (1) is essentially the question of whether it will be feasible and useful, in the the study of mind-brains, to follow the tactic that was followed by the founders of quantum theory, which was to introduce---at the ground level---into the scientific theory of the system under investigation "the observer's description of his experiences", and, if it is feasible, how the theory ties these descriptions of experiences into physical theory in a satisfactory way. After all, our measurements of neurological (and other brain activities), which inform us about what the brain is doing, are physical measurements that we understand and interpret in terms of the principle of physics, so we must, one the one hand, maintain some secure connection to these principles. On the other hand, the subject's experiences, are described in the way we describe our experiences, and these descriptions constitute half of the data. The basic problem, therefore, in formulating a scientifically useful theory of mind/brain systems is how to relate these two different kinds of description of data in way that is both rationally coherent and useful. Question (2) is whether the classical aspects of nature ought to be brought into the theory in the way the quantum theory does, which: (a) is in terms of the de facto classical character of our descriptions of our experiences pertaining to the "physical world", possibly abetted by the classical qualities of the coherent states of the electro-magnetic field, and (b) uses the fact that classical physics automatically re-appears in an idealized limit of the quantum description when some small parameter goes to zero. Or should we bring into the theory some intrisically classical element that is alien to "quantum theory" as that theory is formulated in pragmatic Copenhagen approach. Your approach is probably closer to what most scientists who work on the mind-brain problem prefer. You accept, as you correctly emphasize, an Einstein-realism-sort-of-view-point that there really is a physical reality out there, which you jimmy in order to make compatible with the nonlocal character of quantum theory. You correct the deficiencies of the strictly classical model by taking, basically, Bohm's model, which is intuitively very appealing to adherents to the realism-based approach because it brings back an "essentially" classical picture of the universe as a world line through "configuration space", which is a space of 3N dimensions, where N is the number of particles in the universe. In order to reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory [at least in the non-relativist limit---I note that worker's in the field, such as D. Duerr (Munich) and F. Faisal (Blielefeld) have, in spite of intensive and long-term efforts, not yet succeeded in making Bohm's idea work in Quantum Electrodynamics: Bohm's book does not achieve this.] you introduce Bohm's extra "quantum force". Then you add your "back-action field" in this 3N-dimensional space, and equate that field to "experience". I think your solution may be an ideal solution from the standpoint of someone inclined to the idea that classical physics, realistically interpreted, is basically OK---though in need of some fine-tuning, in order to make it agree with quantum phenomena---and who believe that "experience" ought to be *identified* with some aspect of the physical description, and that this aspect may perhaps ~emerge~ only under appropriately conditions of ~complexity~. Most scientists who work on the mind-brain system are probably inclined to accept these ~realist~ ideas, or the ~Emergentist~ position that there is probably a hierarchy of ~emergent~ levels of structure in the brain that block altogether the relevance of quantum theory to the problem of mind. I hope I have made it clear, in these remarks, that I think your idea is reasonable and rational, and is probably in line with the realist leanings of most scientists who work in the field, and also most of the philosophers who analyze it. But quantum theory opens up also another possibility, which I believe will eventually be more useful to these scientists, even though it pursues the pragmatic-idealist route, rather the realist one that they are now inclined to believe is the only, or in any case the best, way to do science. It starts with the idea that universe is basically idea-like, and that the basic realities idea-like events that are connected to each other by the mathematical rules specified by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen formulation quantum theory. All of the known "classical" aspects of our experiences pertaining to the world we see around us are neatly explained by this ontology, in spite of its essentially idealistic foundation. And these explanations are, from a computational point of view, very much simpler than, for example, those basically required by Bohm's model. A look at the wiggly trajectories so carefully plotted out for the single particle in a double-slit experiment shows that this model is probably not going to be of much use for studying the brain. Of course, the point of the model is that it reproduces all the predictions of the pragmatic Copenhagen approach, so that one does not really need to do any calculations based on the world-line. But this fact does, of course, raise the question of whether that single-real-world-line concept is really useful to the scientist at the basic level. I have strongly supported the idea that Bohm's model is a very useful heuristic tool. And the model certainly does show that, contrary to the apparent expectations of the founder's of quantum theory, a realistic model is possible, if locality conditions are abandoned. But the more useful model, computationally, is the "idealistic" one that directly relates descriptions of experiences to descriptions of other experiences. In the case of experiments on the mind-brain connection the pragmatic-idealistic theory relates descriptions of experiences issued by the subject to descriptions of the outcomes of measurements made upon the brain of the subject. This gets directly to the core of the scientific study of the mind-brain connection, and in a way that provides also an ontological model of the universe, albeit a one that is built around our experiences, as we describe them. It has also the Bohm "information field". construed however as a representation of an objective state of knowledge, to which every increment of knowledge contributes. Each such increment is associated with some physical system, in a mathematically specified way. So the entire structure, though based on knowledge rather than substantive matter, is very physical: it is imbedded in an evolving physical state of the universe that is a structure defined over spacetime, in the field-theoretic sense. Since this computational structure has no trace in it of Bohm's singled-out world line, and since all practical computations will surely be in terms of the general quantum concepts, rather than in terms of the working out of world lines in the configuration space of the brain, I strongly suspect that the pragmatic-idealist will turn out to be more useful, practically, than a Bohm-based approach. Of course, if a strong case could be made that the world "really is like" what the Bohm model claims, then there would be a reason to pursue it. But I do not believe that a strong case can be made for it. Since the classical aspects of our experiences can be explained by the pragmatic-idealistic model, without bringing in the preferred world line of Bohm, there is probably no reason to believe the world "really is basically like Bohm's model of it." I doubt that Bohm would claim otherwise. In the pragmatic-idealistic approach the "physical description in spacetime" is a mathematical representation of objective knowledge, and of objective tendencies for new knowings to occur. Hence there is no conceptual problem in relating an "experience" to its physical counterpart: the later is a reduction of the prior state of knowledge to the part that is compatible with the increment in knowledge provided by the new experience. A hierarchy of "emerging" levels of structure in biology could be compatible with the basic quantum ontology outlined here, in spite of the need FOR US to bring in new principles to aid our human ability to comprehend complex structures in useful ways. But it it is also true that our high-level knowings can be only the tip of an iceberg of "experiences-in-some-far-more-general-sense" that extends down far below what we human beings experience. These more primal "experiences" could conceivably be associated with lower levels of emergent phenomena that actually do require some addition to the basic dynamical structure analogous to the actualization process associated with our human experiences. There is, in my thinking, one outstanding reason [beyond its failure so far to accommodate quantum electrodynamics] why the Bohm model, as extended by you to include conscious experience, cannot in my opinion be regarded as a satisfactory description of reality itself. I believe it is not satisfactory to say that an experience IS identical to a warping of a field defined over the configuration space associated with the brain. Such a field has essentially a infinite amount of information in it, which the experience does not have. An experience is a felt quality that has feelings of intentionality, which is essentially a feeling pertaining to the experiential quality of its successor, in a causal chain of experiential events. But there is in the concept of a field defined over configuration space no logical need for it to be a felt experiential quality. It is therefore, in my opinion, logically more satisfactory to take experiential-type qualities as the basic building blocks of nature, and take the laws of nature to be expressed as mathematical relationships between them. A natural framework for doing this is provided by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen formulation of quantum theory. I hope these brief remarks begin to deliniate the nature of the profound methodological differences that separate our two approaches. Best regards, Henry ************************************************************ Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1998 13:24:56 +0000 From: Saul-Paul Sirag Subject: [q-mind] Pragmatic Approach to Mind-Brain -- Henry Stapp MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Henry Stapp Subject: Pragmatic Approach to Mind-Brain. Perhaps an explanation of this approach would be helpful. The basic idea is that we human beings need ways to deal in practically useful ways with whatever it is that we are a part of, and which acts back on our experience in response to our conscious acts upon it. To deal practically with such matters we need a practically useful theoretical model of how our experiences are connected to whatever it is that our experiences are part of. An excellent model was provided by classical physics. But it suffers two defects: (1) it does not work at the atomic level, although it is based essentially on the idea that the physical world is built of atomic particles that obey the laws it specifies; and (2), the connection between that `physical' world and "our experiences" is unclear: originally it was proposed that the two kinds of things interact inside our pineal glands, but that idea did not mesh well with the principles of classical physics, which if taken seriously seemed to say that there is no two-way interaction, but only a one-way cause from the physical. So the basic idea of the pragmatic approach---namely that we need a model for predicting how our conscious choices of how to act will affect our subsequent experiences---seems to make no sense. But quantum theory, as formulated by its founders, is exactly in line with the pragmatic ideal: it is exactly about making predictions about what our future experience are likely to be, under various options pertaining to how we will now choose to act. How does this apply to the mind-brain system? To give a concrete example, I consider the following exchange between Mark Germine and Jack Sarfatti: [Mark} The connection between the focus of attention and consciousness is a very robust phenomenon with lots of evidence behind it. What happens is that a particular focus in the brain becomes activated, and remains the stable focus of activation for a period of time ranging roughly from 0.1 to 1 second, after which the focus rapidly shifts to another location. [Jack]: What is the operational meaning of "focus of attention". This shifting of focus in my theory is simply the movement of X(t) from one basin of attraction on the landscape to another. This movement is actually a co-evolution in which the movement of the brain state X(t) is co-evolving with the morphing of the active basin of the Q* field that the brain state X(t) is occupying. So this focus stuff is trivial to picture in my post-quantum theory with BIASED Dirac choices fused with the Heisenberg choices in the creative strange loop of conscious intent. The psychiatrist, Mark, speaks of something experiential: "focus of attention". The physicist, Jack, regards this as too vague: he says that focus of attention is *simply* [something described terms of brain structure, and an information field]. I compare three approaches to this situation: the simple Bohm model, the pragmatic theory, and Sarfatti's theory, In the simple Bohm model there would probably be these basins of attraction, as I have described in some of my works, and fatigue effects in neurons that would cause each such temporary basin to lose its basin status: Bohm's world line would soon be pushed out of any basin that it is in, and forced it to find some other basin. Each of these basins in an alert brain could be supposed to correspond to a certain state of consciousness, which would be a "feeling" of some sort, and which could perhaps initiate some activity that would eventuate in a verbal or other kind of report of some feature of this state of consciousness. Thus one has a satisfactory-to-a-physicist picture of what is going on, and how the brain states corresponding to conscious states generate brain/bodily behaviour appropriate to the so-called "state of consciousness". The model is basically a classical model, tweaked by Bohm's quantum force to make it compatible with quantum theory. The model is completely deterministic in principle, but in practice it would be statistical, because there is, in the Bohm scenario, no way for us to know exactly where the actual Bohm world line is, so we are, in practice, due to the presence of critical bifurcation points, forced to fall back onto the statistical predictions of quantum theory, which make no use of the notion of classical world lines that Bohm's theory is based on. The weaknesses in the model from a practical point of view are: (1) It places the classical world line at the center of the ontology, but gives that world line no role in the practical predictions, which are done using only the part of theory recognized by orthodox quantum theory; (2) It places the experiential aspects of the mind-brain system probably beyond the effective reach of the model: one might try to contend that "someday" the in-principle-account that it provides for behaviour at the marco and micro levels will account for all experiential qualities, but that is debatable in principle [How can the greeness of a greenness experience be deduced?] and certainly is, at best, far in the future. But we know that experiences occur in conjunction with human bodies: and they are the primary things of ultimate interest to us. The pragmatic approach is to accept them as real elements, right from the outset, and to build up our theory of the mind-body around them. This is not to say that they are left dangling, outside the physical world. They are conceived of as integral aspects of mind-body systems, closely linked to contemporary physical theory in its most accurate, complete, and lean form. The psychiatrist is able to use his language, and the results of his research, expressed in the language that human beings use to describe their experiences, to describe the experiential aspects of mind-body systems without waiting for the day that a complete understanding of their connection into the physical representation of the body has given these descriptions scientific respectability. For they are the primary realities, and the physical theory MUST account for them if it is to be adequate for its assigned task. It is the job of the physical scientists to figure out how this is to be achieved, not to banish our experiences to some limbo outside of science because the needed understanding has not yet been attained. Rather, the empirical data pertaining to the progressions of our conscious states, in the flow of consciousness, are key inputs into the developement of an adequate theory: theory development can proceed from top down as well as from bottom up. The key question in connection with Sarfatti's theory is whether it will actually be useful to introduce, relative to the structures needed to do the practical calculations that give the usual predictions of quantum theory, two additional ontological elements, namely the Bohm actual world line and the "warping" of the quantum wave function that he calls experience, or whether, alternatively it will be possible to stay within the austere framework of orthodox quantum theory, in which experiences, described in the language we normally use to describe our experiences, are taken as a basic realities in their own right, linked to one another via the physical world as it is represented in quantum theory, namely as a matrix of relationships between possible experiences: is it enough to use just quantum theory itself in the way provided by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the Copenhagen pragmatic formulation of quantum theory. At this point I introduce a message recently sent to me by T. Smith, with my interleafed reply: From: Henry Stapp To: Tony Smith Subject: Re: pragmatic-idealist route On Wed, 26 Aug 1998, Tony Smith wrote: Henry, you said: "... the pragmatic-idealist route ... starts with the idea that universe is basically idea-like, and that the basic realities idea-like events that are connected to each other by the mathematical rules specified by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. ..." Can you identify "basic realities idea-like events" with specific mathematical objects, [Henry] Suppose you are walking in the jungle and a shadowy figure jumps out at you, and you must decide whether to `fight'or `flee'. Your brain will take the clues, and a lot of other information comming from previous experiences, and start computing what you should do. If its a close call, then quantum uncertainties will lead to a superposition of, let us say, two brain states, each corresponding to the wave function being localized in a basin of attraction, where the first state corresponds to the experience "I shall fight!", and the the other corresponds to the experience "I shall flee!". According to the theory, a question will be asked of nature: "Will experience e occur?" where e will be either "I shall fight!" or "I shall flee!". I assume that each of possible experiences, e, being a possible real thing that can actually occur in nature, will have a mathematical description, and be a possible mathematical object: it will be a `functional property of an entire possible quantum state of the brain' that has the property that it will become an "actual experience" if the associated brain state is actualized by a YES response from nature. [Tony] and can you identify "the mathematical rules" with specific mathematical relations among those objects? [Henry] The experience e is associated with a projection operator P_e in the Hilbert space associated with your body/brain: the transformation S-->(P_e S P_e)=S_e eliminates from the state S the parts of the superposition of possibilities other than the one specified by e. If the (Heisenberg Choice) question put to nature is: "Will experience e occur?", then the probability in state S that the answer is YES is Trace S_e/Tr S. [Tony] If you combine the objects and their relations, do they form a specific mathematical structure for example, can they be regarded as the elements and the sum-and-product rules of division algebras (real, complex, quaternion, or octonion)? If not division algebras, perhaps Clifford algebras? If not those, then what, specifically, are they? [Henry] They are the rules of quantum theory, which are formulated as relationships between the operators in Hilbert space that represent possible increments in our knowledge. [End of message to Tony Smith] The fact that each possible experience is assumed to be a definite mathematical object does NOT mean that our recollections of such fleeting things in subsequent experiences are veridical. As William James emphasized, "Introspection is difficult and fallible: and ... the difficulty is simply that of all observation of whatever kind." I reiterate, here, what I said in my recent reply to Stan Klein, namely that in situations in which the various possiblities for the "next experience" in a sequence are represented by "overlapping states", so that the Heisenberg Choice is important, then I posit this Heisenberg Choice will be determined by the direction of attention specified by the preceding experience(s). This gives attention a causal power that is outside what is specified by the deterministic causal process specified by the Schroedinger/Heisenberg equations of motion in combination with the random (Dirac Choice) choices on the part of nature. This development gives my answer to Chalmers' objection to my theory, which was that consciousness, per se, was not in the causal loop: this attentional effect does put consciousness per se into the causal mind-body loop, as explained in the target article (Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory of Mind) I emphasize that even possible experiences are not something disconnected from the associated body/brain: they are functional attributes of various superposed components of body/brain states that, if actualized, become actual causal agents. These words are not just poetry: they describe features of the causal structure specified by the quantum rules. Note that "possibility" is now represented within the physical description itself: it is not some abstract nonreality. No Platonic realm is called for. ****************************************************** Date: Sat, 29 Aug 1998 09:35:50 +0000 From: Saul-Paul Sirag Subject: [q-mind] Reply to Verhey: Physical Mind -- Henry Stapp From: Henry Stapp Subject: Physical Mind On Thu, 27 Aug 1998, Jan Pieter Verhey wrote: I found this an intriguing post of Henry Stapp. What makes sense to me, is that he chooses to work entirely within the context of experience, by relating experiences with other experiences. I find this more realistic then idealistic, since experience is THE reality for us. So that's always a good starter. What is however not clear to me, is how Henry actually sees the mind-brain relationship. What is "mind-brain research" ? Whereas Jack Sarfatti is pretty clear about his mind-brain relationship, in Henry Stapp's approach it is unclear what it could be in effect. How do brain and mind relate? What is it that relates? If ideas, or thought-like qualities, are the building-blocks of reality, then there seems to be an in-built risk that at some point one may attribute to reality whatever one thinks is real, [Stapp] I start from basic physical theory: from a commitment to the notion that, in accord with the basic idea of Newton and of Maxwell, nature is built out of interacting particles and fields that evolve in accordance with some mathematical laws that we scientists are in the process of trying to discover. But how do I recocile this completely physics-based position with what is, from a classical point of view, its exactly opposite, the pragmatic-idealistic position that I claim to be pursuing? The essence of what I, as a quantum physicist, am saying is these two views are not opposites, but are rather alternative descriptions the very same theory. This claim of the identity of what seems, from a classical standpoint, to be opposites is not some mystical incantation: it is clearly explainable. Quantum theory lays the whole situation out plainly for us to see, if one takes the trouble to look. To understand this clearly one can begin by accepting the physical Newton-Maxwell assumption that the world is built out of particles and fields that evolve according to fixed mathematical laws, which science is in the process of uncovering. No mysticism! No mysterious "emergent properties" at the basic level! All there is is the physical world, completely represented by mathematical quantities defined over spacetime, and evolving in accordance with mathematical laws. This does not mean that we scientists may not need to create new concepts to aid us in understanding complex (e.g., biological) phenomena: it only means accepting at the *basic level* the essential idea of physical theory that has reigned since the time of Issac Newton (or at least since the time of his immediate successors---Isaac himself allowed some tinkering by God, to keep things in good working order). Newton stressed that science was an ongoing process: he did not believe he was at the end of it all. The contemporary form of the Newton-Maxwell presumption is the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen formulation of quantum theory: the entire world of particles and fields is represented by the quantum mechanical generalization of the classical-physics concept of the state of the physical universe. According to this most direct and simple development of the Newton-Maxwell thesis, the universe is completely described by the deterministically evolving quantum state of the universe. But what is the nature of this beast? What about the quantum jumps? According to Heisenberg, what is really happening in quantum process are transitions from the `potential' to the `actual'. The actual things that are directly known to us are our experiences: our increases in knowledge. The central idea of the Copenhagen interpretation as it was laid down in the Solvay conference of 1927 is that the basic realities which the theory is about are increments in our knowledge. [See "Xth Max Born Symposium" or "Knowings" on my website for details and documentation, and also my 1972 Amer, J. Phys, article "The Copenhagen Interpretation", reprinted in my book]. This aspect is carried into the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization, where each increment in knowledge is represented in mathematical form as a reduction S--> {P_e S P_e) of the prior state S [of the brain/body, and consequently of the entire universe] to the part of the prior state that is compatible with the knowledge contained in the experience e. But one thing must be made absolutely clear: When one takes the entire state of the universe to be represented by the physical state one does not squeeze experience out. Just the opposite! Mind is essentially an aspect of the body, and hence when von Neumann and Wigner bring the body/brain into the physical universe they bring experience INTO the physical universe: they do not squeeze it out! This is exactly opposite to what the Copenhagen formulation does! The Copenhagen approach pushes mind out of the physically described universe, onto the "other side of the Heisenberg Cut". The Copenhagen formulation enshrines Descartes' separation of mind from matter, and makes a quantum theory of mind unattainable. The glory of the full quantum theory, as expressed by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization, is that the acceptance of the thesis that the entire physical world should be represented in terms of the concepts of physics brings mind back INTO the physical universe, thereby resolving the dilemma posed by classical physical theory, which excluded mind from the physical universe from the outset, and had no rational way to bring it back. It all comes down to understanding the nature of this beast: what IS the physical universe, as it is represented in the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology. How is this physical state to be conceived. We know its mathematical properties, or at least enough of them to make practical computations possible in many cases. But what words do we use to allow us to "understand" what this physical universe is? Heisenberg put his finger right on it when he said that what is really happening is transitions from the potential to the actual. The evolution of the physical state is punctuated by actual events, some of which are experiential increments in human knowledge. The whole process of the unfolding of reality is expressed in terms of the evolution of the quantum state, which is the representation of all the particles and fields in the universe, as they are represented in quantum theory. But the laws governing this unfolding constitute the laws that govern the generation of a sequence of actual events. Some of which these actual events are of special importance to us: they are the experienced increments in human human knowledge that are the basis of Bohr's epistemological considerations, and also the basis of our entire endeavor to create an understanding of the universe of which these experiences are some small part. The key point is that the physical state constitutes a potentiality for an experiential event to occur. The experiential aspect is not some alien form. It is the foundational element, in the sense that what the potentiality IS is the potentiality for an experience to occur. A potentiality makes sense only as a potentiality for something. And that something, according to the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology, is an experiential event. Of course, most events are not high-level human-type experiences. We must work out, from the knowledge supplied by those those special events, the form of the general rule that specifies the conditions on physical systems, as they are represented in the physical state of the universe, under which events occur. Newton and Maxwell did not try to explain "why" there were particle and fields: those elements were taken as given, at that stage in the development of science. Nor does the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology try to explain "why" the physical state should evolve in accordance with the particular laws that it does: that is taken as empirically given. Von Neumann did not know why the fine structure constant is "1/137", nor do physicists yet know. So I am not at all suggesting that we now know the exact form of the laws, or why these laws are just what they are and not something else. But the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology does specify the form of the mathematical structure, firmly rooted in physics, that describes the evolving universe as an evolving set of potentialities for the occurrence of a sequence of events, some small subsequence of which consists of experiential increments in human knowledge. [Verhey continues] A side-farce: another fundamental problem that is not met in Stapp's theoretical thinking, ..... is that it leaves out the whole question of self, i.e. of *individual* self-consciousness. Not the homunculus regression enigma (another non-problem imo), ... There is a much deeper and fundamental mystery to consciousness-and-self, and so far the scientific and philosophical thinking about the issue has just started. ... The "view from no-where and no-when", the Utmost Objective Scientific Theory of Everything, is a suicide-theory in terms of consciousness. [Stapp] I deal extensively with "self" in my book: it is the basis of my model of how the mind/brain system functions. Examination of the twenty-six references to William James would be a good starting point for a study of what I say about "self". That theory of the functioning of mind/brain systems lays heavy stress on the intentional and attentional aspects of the conscious thought: of how these aspects arise out of the interplay between the efficacious aspects of our thoughts, as they are represented in this quantum theory, and the feed back that the thoughts elicit from the body and its environment. All of that development relating to self, intention, attention, representation, mental models, and interactive interplay between the experiential and ``material" aspects of the mind/body complexlies at the base of everything I am saying here I would certainly not claim that all these issues have been settled in my theoretical thinking, but it is inaccurate to say that they are "not met". Henry P. Stapp ****************************************************************** From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Mon Aug 31 21:32:21 1998 Date: Sat, 29 Aug 1998 19:10:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry Stapp To: quantum-mind Cc: kleinlist , bdj10@cam.ac.uk, brings@rpi.edu, brucero@cats.ucsc.edu, chalmers@paradox.ucsc.edu, ghrosenb@ai.uga.edu, hameroff@u.arizona.edu, hpstapp@lbl.gov, "jeffery m. schwartz" , keith@imprint.co.uk, klein@adage.berkeley.edu, patrickw@monash.edu.au, phayes@ai.uwf.edu Subject: Mental Force and Level of Causation Mental Force and Levels of Causation An interesting discussion has been occurring on a mini-forum originally created by Stan Klein, and consisting of a few philosphers, cognitive scientists, and quantum physicists: and recently expanded to include the clinical psychiarist Jeffery Schwartz, from UCLA. Jeff and his colleagues have developed an effective way of treating obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD). The discussion is aimed at the heart of the mind-body problem, and hence is worth bringing to the attention of the q-Mind forum. Jeff's successful mode of treatment is sophisticated, in that it involves PET-scan studies of the brains of patients before and after treatment. Those studies show that certain specific kinds of changes in brain behaviour occur, in connection with OCD symptoms, in patients who show clinical improvement. The treatment involves using this scientifically acquired information about the brain to make the patient see his problem as a "brain malfunction", which can be fixed by a "mental effort" to behave in a new prescribed way when the compulsive urge to do some irrational act arises. This mental effort must combat, and over-rule, a very strong urge, arising out of a mechanical defect in the brain. So the successful therapy involves the language and conceptual framework of thinking in terms of the influence mind on matter. This way of talking to patients and thinking is clinically successful. Members of the forum were quick to point out that this proves nothing: It does not PROVE that anything like mind over matter is really happening. And Jeff was pressed to produce any reason that he might have for thinking that there was anything in the clinical evidence that could be construed as indicating that anything was occurring that was not completely in line with a view of the brain as an essentially mechanical system that acts in accord with the microscopically interpreted ordinary laws of physics as they apply in biological-neurological sytems. I shall not describe the argumentation, which was inconclusive. Rather I dwell on one point: levels of causation. The "ordinary" account needs to explain this "feeling" that mind can, by force of will, i.e., by volition, act against, and over-rule, what "seems to be" a differerent kind of compulsion, which is arises, unbidden, and outside one's control. Since the subject's impression is that there is, in this clinically well controlled situation, two quite different and distinguishable types of causation that are in conflict, an adequate theory of mind-brain ought to explain how this subjective impression arises. There are ways several in which this might be done: (1) Claim that this impression is basically an illusion. Assert that there is one unitary causal process, and explain how this illusion arises, much as science explains the mirage of a lake in a hot desert. (2) Claim that there are in fact two causal chains in the brain, which come into conflict, and compete for dominance, and that these two chains are associated with different experiential qualities, for well explained reasons, and that this whole process involving the two differently experienced competing processes is explained in a certain particular classical neuro-physiological way. One causal chain will presumably go via a high-level processing route, the other via a lower-level route, and the competition will be decided by some sort of winner-take-all (of the immediately available energy resources) process. (3) Claim that (2) is essentially correct, but that: (a) The classical approach cannot really give well explained reasons for the occurrence of experiential qualities associated with the two alternative causal paths, because the classical concepts do not entail the occurrence of experiential qualities. (b) The quantum model of the brain/mind automatically provides different levels of causal influence, one of which naturally gives experiential qualities an efficacious role in the flow of brain events that accords with the subjective impression of the efficacy of volition. A brain scientist might naturally say: why worry about quantum theory (beyond the need to use it to explain the local chemical processes) until the classical model is clearly shown to be inadequate. I would reply: because quantum theory provides a more rationally coherent understanding of mind/brain systems, one in which experiential qualities, per se, automatically occur and play an important causal role. I emphasize that relinquishing the classical picture does not mean accepting some mysterious thing, consciousness, that stands outside the physical universe. Consciousness does stand outside the physical universe in the classical picture, in the sense that it is not logically entailed by the classical concepts: that is exactly the problem with the classical conception. Moreover, consciousness stands outside the physical system in the Copenhagen interpretation: that is essentially the problem with it. But the mind that is brought into physical theory_by the Copenhagen interpretation, but is left out of the physical system, because the brain of which it is an aspect is left out of the physical system, is, by that same token, brought into the physical universe by the orthodox interpretation. In the orthodox theory (this is Wigner's designation of it) three levels of causal influence can be identified: 1) Essentially classical, in which the succession of experiences are effectively controlled by the deterministic evolution in accordance with the Schroedinger equation, with essentially no significant uncertainties due to quantum effects. 2) Essentially classical+random, in which the deterministic evolution in accordance with the Schreodinger equation generates a set of disjoint (non-overlapping) branches, each corresponding to a different experience. In this situation the "Heisenberg Choice" of which question to ask `next' plays no effective role. 3) Essentially quantum, in which the possible experiences correspond to a set of strongly overlapping states. Then the dynamical evolution can depend strongly on the Heisenberg Choices, which are, however, not determined by the normal deterministic or statistical rules of quantum theory. If one posits that the otherwise completely loose Heisenberg Choice of what to attend to (which question to ask of nature) is controlled by the experiential quality felt as `direction of attention' in earlier experiences associated with this brain, then the chain of experiences will be cohesively structured by a persisting attentional quality of the experiences along the chain in a way that allows this structure to "over-rule" the causal influences carried by levels 1) and 2). [That was what was shown in my paper "Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory of Mind".] The point of this posting is to bring into focus the key issue in the whole field, within a fairly clear-cut clinical situation, involving the concepts and language used in clinical practice, and brain studies by modern techniques. This issue is whether the classical conception of the brain---which really makes conscious experience either an epiphenomal bye-product of a completely self-sufficient classical physical description, or something that is not in principle specified by all the trajectories of all the particles in the world, together with all the values over all space-time of all the local fields, ---really does adequately account for what is so clearly felt as the power of mind, if exerted, to control its own flow, against lower-level forces. One is not rationally obliged to accept the notion that this classical account MUST work, if the principles of science are to be maintained. For, there is an alternative possibility that does not go outside contemporary scientific theory, but that is in fact, from a purely theoretical standpoint, more in line with modern theory, and that does not import conscious experience and tack it onto a framework that has no place for it. Within this quantum ontology there is a clear distinction between the more-passive flow of experience controlled by the automatic level 2) process, and the less-passive flow controlled by the attention-driven level 3) process. ********************************************************** From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Mon Aug 31 21:33:41 1998 Date: Sun, 30 Aug 1998 15:58:42 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry Stapp On Sun, 30 Aug 1998, Dimiter G. Chakalov wrote: > From: Dimiter G. Chakalov > RE: Stanley Klein, Reply to Stapp on Will, Q-Mind Digest 29 Aug 1998 > > [Stan] > It may be useful to have Stapp's quantum ontology that allows one to > have a mind that is outside the unitary time evolution operator. > The nice thing about that ontology is that modern physics shows that it is > more correct than the classical ontology used by most philosophers of mind. > [Dimi, question to Stan] > Stan, can you prove mathematically that in Stapp's quantum ontology > there is an entity called 'mind' that is OUTSIDE the unitary time > evolution operator? > > Henry claims that the dynamical evolution can depend strongly > ("strongly" needs to be clarified quantitatively, please!) on the > Heisenberg Choices, which are, however, not determined by the normal > deterministic or statistical rules of quantum theory. > > Please specify in mathematical terms what you personally understand by > "outside" and "strongly". > > xxxxxx > > [Dimi, question to Henry] > Henry, WHAT is that "quantum demon of choice" who/which is outside the > unitary time evolution operator? > > Q1. Is the free will some quale from some "quantum demon of choice", > like the quale from EM waves that we call "color"? > > OR > > Q2. Is the free will some entity that does NOT have a quale but is > simply an immaterial agent a la Eccles? > In my theory the chooser is a functional aspect of the brain that has been actualized by a reduction of the prior state of the brain to a component that has this functional feature. Following the basic precept of the Copehagen interpretation, which is carried over to the vonNeumann/Wigner formulation, the quantum state is a representation of knowledge, and of potentialities for experienced increments in knowledge to occur. The experienced "knowing", in regard to experienced intention, is the experience of initiating the action that the actualized functional aspect of the brain tends to initiate. This experience can, according to my postulate, act not only in the traditional way, via the unitary evolution specified by the Schroedinger equation of the actualized state of the brain that has this functional aspect, but also to resolve something not specified by the usual rules of quantum theory, namely the issue of which possible experience e will be placed in the question "Will e occur or not?" that is put to nature, in order to allow the quantum process to proceed according to the known rules. I think this largely answers also the questions you put to Stan. Henry On Mon, 31 Aug 1998, Dimiter G. Chakalov wrote: > On Sun, 30 Aug 1998 15:58:42 -0700 (PDT), Henry Stapp wrote: > > > In my theory the chooser is a functional aspect of the brain that > > has been actualized by a reduction of the prior state of the > > brain to a component that has this functional feature. > > I do know your theory; I've been reading your papers since 1986. > > > Following > > the basic precept of the Copehagen interpretation, which is carried > > over to the vonNeumann/Wigner formulation, the quantum state is a > > representation of knowledge, and of potentialities for experienced > > increments in knowledge to occur. The experienced "knowing", > > in regard to experienced intention, is the experience of initiating > > the action that the actualized functional aspect of the brain tends > > to initiate. This experience can, according to my postulate, act not > > only in the traditional way, via the unitary evolution specified by the > > Schroedinger equation of the actualized state of the brain that has this > > functional aspect, but also to resolve something not specified by the > > usual rules of quantum theory, > > Okay, let's call it "experience", not "quantum demon of choice". > > My two questions above remain unanswered. > > The answer is neither Q1 nor Q2. I have explained what the chooser is, according to my theory, It is a functional property of the brain (and more specifically an intentional functional property) that has been actualized by a prior collapse. The brain is an aspect of the state of the universe, which represents, according to quantum theory, "knowledge" and "potentialities for increments of knowledge to occur": when such an increment occurs the state changes to a new form compatible with the new knowing. in accordance with the usual quantum rules. The intentional aspect of the new actualized state evolves via the Schroedinger equation, and tends to fulfill the intention. I have devoted a lot of attention in my book to the details of how I think this works. But I am suggesting now that if the intention of the thought is 'to attend to a certain possible experience e (such as my idea that I am holding up this heavy object)' then the presence of this intension in my present thought to attend to that experience e will tend to put this particular experience e into the question being put to nature: "Will e occur?" My paper shows how this influence of the intentiality of the present thought on the choice of the next question can cause the brain to behave in a way that is in accord with that intention? It is all pretty mechanical, since it follows from the quantum equations. But since experiences per se enter into quantum theory, and according to vonNeumann/Wigner, in a way closely linked to the brain, the experience per se can, according to the theory, influence the beheviour of the brain, and in this rather direct way. I hope these added words will be helpful. Henry ******************************************************************************** From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Mon Aug 31 21:35:26 1998 Date: Mon, 31 Aug 1998 17:46:01 -0700 (PDT) To: quantum-mind Cc: kleinlist , bdj10@cam.ac.uk, brings@rpi.edu, brucero@cats.ucsc.edu, chalmers@paradox.ucsc.edu, ghrosenb@ai.uga.edu, hameroff@u.arizona.edu, hpstapp@lbl.gov, "jeffery m. schwartz" , keith@imprint.co.uk, klein@adage.berkeley.edu, patrickw@monash.edu.au, phayes@ai.uwf.edu Subject: Reply to Brian Flanagan Brian Flanagan's posting enables me to address a point of historical accuracy and terminology that had been beginning to worry me. I first read von Neumann's book in 1959 in Zurich, shortly after the the death of Pauli, with whom I had been working. I wrote there an essay entitled "Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics", and have been thinking and working intermittently on this problem, ever since. I hope that forty years of reflection and serious work on this issue have allowed me to improved in some small ways upon what von Neumann said already in 1932. What I have recently been calling the vonNeumann/Wigner formulation certainly does contain an overlay of my own thinking. It is, I believe, "basically" vonNeumann and Wigner, and I want to give them all the credit they deserve. On the other hand, I believe I can now express it in a basically better way, by shifting slightly the words that go along with their basic mathematical structure. I am reluctant to call mine something so much theirs, and I worry that physicists would find it close to plagerism to claim that what I am doing is really other than their theory, expressed slightly differently, and pushed a bit further. But I fully agree with Brian that I am pushing the wording, and hence the philosophy, forward from the way von Neumann said it. This issue touches upon a difference in how Stan Klein and I have been using von Neumann. Stan emphasizes a point that is certainly very central in von Neumann's work, name the fact that one can shift the boundary between the part of nature that is described in "physical" terms---by means of the mathematical machinery of quantum theory---and the part that is described in psychological terms. But I consider the "vonNeumann/Wigner" theory to be the form in which one goes to the limit, where the entire physical world is on the physical side of this boundary. A natural thing to suppose is that when one goes to this limit one pushes mind outside the physical universe. Indeed, that is how I myself have been interpreting vonNeumann/Wigner for lo these many years. A "quantum jump" in my own thinking has recently allowed me to see that this is not necessarily how one has to view this limit: it is much more satisfactory from both the philosophical and scientific viewpoints to interpret their theory by saying that if one puts the entire brain into the physically described world then one does not push mind out of the physically described world but rather brings mind in, along with brain, I actually think that vonNeumann and Wigner would welcome this way of putting things. But their words are insufficiently precise on this point to allow me to assert that this is really what they were thinking. Indeed, I had not understood this viewpoint to be expressed in their writing, and so do believe/admit, that I am adding a significant bit of clarification on this paricular point of how one should understand the limit situation in which the entire physical world is placed on the physical side of the cut. The key point that makes the way I speak possible, and fully rational. depends on "the nature of the beast". If the physical description were a classical-type description of particles and fields, then it would, in my opinion, be unsatisfactory to assert that bringing brain into the physical description also brings in mind. This is because conscious experience is not logically within the classical conception of the physical universe. But the situation is completely different if the "physical description" is a mathematical description, embedded in space-time, of "knowledge, and the potentialities for experienced increments in knowledge to occur". If these experienced increments in knowledge are expressed within this physical description by actualizations of brain states having functional properties that match the experienced intentionalities, in the way that I have spelled out, at least in overall terms, in many works, then I believe it is reasonable and rational to say that bringing in the brain brings in the mind with which it is, according to the basic precepts of the theory, inextricably dynamically intertwined. The brain, as part of the physical universe, IS a set of potentialities for certain experienced increments of knowledge to occur, and is also the growth in knowledge, hence knowings, that these potentialities become if they occur So in comparing my words with von Neumann's one must be careful to distinguish whether he was speaking about the very important aspect of his work that is about the movability of the cut---which Stan Klein uses---or about placing the cut at the limit in which the entire brain, and everything else, is placed on the physical side. This latter limit of von Neumann's theory is what I call the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology. With this distinction made clear, I think Brian and I are in agreement. But further clarifications arise by considering Brian's explicit points. I shall identify my comments on points in his posting by a # on the left margin. From: Brian Flanagan Subject: Reply to Stapp on Physical Mind (q-mind:28-29 Aug.) I am pleased to note a good degree of parallelism between Henry Stapp's biases and my own. I should like to flag some points of agreement between us, as well as a few important areas of conflict. [Jan Pieter Verhey wrote previously:] I found this an intriguing post of Henry Stapp. What makes sense to me, is that he chooses to work entirely within the context of experience, by relating experiences with other experiences. [Brian John Flanagan] I like this move as well, which strikes me as both philosophically sound and theoretically economical (Occam). The strict attention to *what is observed* or experienced, is at the heart of both quantum theory and the broader empirical tradition of science. Moreover, I believe that this approach is thoroughly consonant with the 'algebra of observables' approach contemplated in contemporary mathematical physics. [Stapp (q-mind: 29 Aug)] I start from basic physical theory: from a commitment to the notion that, in accord with the basic idea of Newton and of Maxwell, nature is built out of interacting particles and fields that evolve in accordance with some mathematical laws that we scientists are in the process of trying to discover. [Flanagan] Just so. Except that the standard ontology of Newton and Maxwell is incomplete in that not every 'element of reality' (EPR) is represented within traditional field theory. # Exactly so! In the classical standard ontology experiences are #left out. One possible interpretation of vonNeumann/Wigner #would say that experience is pushed out. But I take the other #interpretation, which claims that bringing the brain in brings also #the mind in, because in the quantum ontology that I am adopting #the physical reality itself, which is mathematically represented by a #structure imbedded in space-time, IS "a growing body of knowledge". [Stapp] But how do I reconcile this completely physics-based position with what is, from a classical point of view, its exactly opposite, the pragmatic-idealistic position that I claim to be pursuing? The essence of what I, as a quantum physicist, am saying is these two views are not opposites, but are rather alternative descriptions the very same theory. This claim of the identity of what seems, from a classical standpoint, to be opposites is not some mystical incantation: it is clearly explainable. [Flanagan] I am in close agreement here; any differences would amount almost to quibbling. (I believe Bohr, with his ideas on complementarity, would approve of this move--and so perhaps we should not be too harsh on Copenhagen.) # But Bohr did leave our brains outside what was to be represented # in the quantum formalism, while putting experiences in. [Stapp] Quantum theory lays the whole situation out plainly for us to see, if one takes the trouble to look. [Flanagan] Yes, it is quite remarkable, and still generally not understood, how the mathematics of field theory is mirrored in the structure and processes of the mind/brain. Pribram understood something like this years ago, and so with Pellionez and Llinas, as well as the late Umezawa. #Absolutely! Some educational project is needed. [Stapp] To understand this clearly one can begin by accepting the physical Newton-Maxwell assumption that the world is built out of particles and fields that evolve according to fixed mathematical laws, which science is in the process of uncovering. [Flanagan] Right again, except that, once again, physics is EPR-incomplete in that it does not represent the secondary properties of observation. # In the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology it does, according to my preferred # interpretation. [Stapp] All there is is the physical world, completely represented by mathematical quantities defined over spacetime, and evolving in accordance with mathematical laws. This does not mean that we scientists may not need to create new concepts to aid us in understanding complex (e.g., biological) phenomena: it only means accepting at the *basic level* the essential idea of physical theory that has reigned since the time of Isaac Newton ... [Flanagan] With reservations--bearing on issues of ontology, entanglement and locality--I agree. # Yes, One must use the quantum-updated version. [Stapp] The contemporary form of the Newton-Maxwell presumption is the von Neumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen formulation of quantum theory: the entire world of particles and fields is represented by the quantum mechanical generalization of the classical-physics concept of the state of the physical universe. [Flanagan] I cut my teeth on v. Neumann's *Mathematical Foundations of QM*, and am a great admirer of Wigner on many fronts. Let's have a look at an excerpt from [v. Neumann's *Foundations*:] ... it is inherently entirely correct ... [Flanagan] One of the most loaded phrases in the history of the universe. # Yes, this assertion by von Neumann is indeed wonderfully loaded. [V. Neumann] ... that the measurement or the related process of the subjective perception is a new entity relative to the physical environment and is not reducible to the latter. Indeed, subjective perception leads us into the intellectual inner life of the individual, which is extra-observational by its very nature (since it is taken for granted by any conceivable observation or experiment) ... [Flanagan] This is where a mind/body dualism slips in. Sense data theory, together with Einstein, Weyl and, I think, Stapp, would have us understand that the elements of our 'subjective perception' are just what we immediately observe. So how are they 'extra-observational'? #Right! [von N.] Nevertheless, it is a fundamental requirement of the scientific viewpoint-the so-called principle of the psychophysical parallelism ... [Flanagan] But 'psychophysical parallelism' is *not* a fundamental requirement of the scientific viewpoint. This is a simple error, which I would trace directly to a fair amount of ignorance of the philosophical literature on the part of von N. # Right! # We do not really need a "parallelism" between two different realities. # That's a disaster. [von N.] ... that it must be possible so to describe the extra-physical process of the subjective perception as if it were in reality in the physical world-i.e., to assign to its parts equivalent physical processes in the objective environment, in ordinary space. # What we do need is a way of understanding, in a rationally coherent # and potentially useful way, how it is that the mathematical description # in space-time is a description of connections between experiences. # For this one does need some sort of connection between the two kinds # of descriptions. The way I propose to deal with this basic problem, # in a way that avoids a basic dualism, is to assert that the ontological # nature of the physical universe, `the nature of the beast', is # epistemological: what exists is knowledge that grows. This physical # universe is expressed mathematically in the way that quantum theory # specifies, with experienced increments in knowledge expressed, just as # quantum theory specifies, by reductions of the prior state of knowledge # to one that incorporates just the experienced increment. In order for # us to use this understanding of the nature of the universe we must develop # our human understanding of the nature of the way that knowledge is # represented in this mathematical description. I assume that nature has # principles that resolve this. We can approach an understanding of the # the way nature does it by using a little imagination, a little induction, # and a lot of experimental work. I have indicated in earlier postings, # and briefly above, how I think it works. [Flanagan] We see again the unquestioned assumption that perception is an 'extra-physical process' though this is what the Materialists and Monists flatly deny. And our science has been long informed by materialistic notions of what constitutes 'matter'. Now, these notions are mistaken in turn, but remain nearly unquestioned assumptions in physics and in science generally. # Yes. But maybe our words here will help get things on track. [von N.] (Of course, in this correlating procedure there arises the frequent necessity of localizing some of these processes at points which lie within the portion of space occupied by our own bodies. But this does not alter the fact of their belonging to the "world about us," the objective environment referred to above.) In a simple example, these concepts might be applied as follows: We wish to measure a temperature. If we want, we can pursue this process numerically until we have the temperature of the environment of the thermometer, and then say: this temperature is measured by the thermometer. But we can carry this calculation further, and from the properties of the mercury, which can be explained in kinetic and molecular terms, we can calculate its heating, expansion, and the resultant length of the mercury column, and then say: this length is seen by the observer. Going still further, and taking the light source into consideration, we could find out the reflection of the light quanta on the opaque mercury column, and the path of the remaining light quanta into the eye of the observer, . . . and then in the end say: these chemical changes of his brain cells are perceived by the observer. But in any case, no matter how far we calculate-to the mercury vessel, to the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we must say: and this is perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer ... # This is the Movable Cut idea. [Flanagan] That pesky dualism, again. We have scarcely moved. We are right back where we started, with Russell: "We suppose that a physical process starts from a visible object, travels to the eye, there changes into another physical process, causes yet another physical process in the optic nerve, and finally produces some effect in the brain, simultaneously with which we see the object from which the process started, the seeing being something 'mental', totally different from the physical processes which precede and accompany it." #Yes, this movable cut idea does not really get us beyond dualism. #Stan's licence plate is "Duality": maybe he will now change it to # "Qunity". [Getting back to Stapp] According to this most direct and simple development of the Newton-Maxwell thesis, the universe is completely described by the deterministically evolving quantum state of the universe. [Flanagan] Whereas Schroedinger explicitly says, apropos the perception of yellow, that the 'yellow' is not in the physicist's picture at all. (http://www.freeyellow.com/members/sentek/light.html) #Schroedinger never got to the bottom of it. [Stapp] According to Heisenberg, what is really happening in quantum process are transitions from the `potential' to the `actual'. The actual things that are directly known to us are our experiences: our increases in knowledge. The central idea of the Copenhagen interpretation as it was laid down in the Solvay conference of 1927 is that the basic realities which the theory is about are increments in our knowledge. [Flanagan] What Bohm and Hiley, among others, have criticized as the 'epistemological' approach, though I believe Bohm would very likely approve the discussion of the potential v. the actual, which seems to echo his own writings concerning the implicate order, where we move back and forth between the implicate (potential) and the explicate (actual). Which movement is guided by a nonlocal 'pilot wave' such as he and De Broglie considered. #I completely agree with Bohm and Hiley that the Copenhagen #formulation is not good enough: it is good in practice, and #Bohr did a great service to science by creating a rational #way of thinking that allows scientists to do experiments and #tie them to theory in a way that does not get them embroiled #in the questions that we are dealing with. Bohm's causal theory #had something to hook onto: it had to reproduce the well defined #unambiguous predictions specified by the Copenhagen interpretation. # But I agree with Einstein, and Bohm and Hiley, that we ought not # forego a search for a comprehension of nature that goes beyond the # set of very useful rules that the Copenhagen interpretation supplies. # Bohm has given his "essentially" classical ontology: I am pursuing # a different line that is an extension of the Copenhagen interpretation # in that it brings our human experiences into the theory as basic # realities, related by the mathematical formulas of quantum theory. # Although I believe Bohm's model is very useful to physicists in many ways, # I do not believe either that nature really is built on a classical # world-line, or that this idea will be of practical use in understanding # the mind-brain connection: it is tied to an idea that is too far removed # from practice. Quantum theory opens the door to a much more profound and # ontologically austere way of bringing consciousness neatly into science # in a more direct way. [Stapp] The key point is that the physical state constitutes a potentiality for an experiential event to occur. [Flanagan] I am in close agreement here, and would like to point out the possibility that the space of secondary qualities might just be Bohm's quantum potential ... but that is a topic for another time. # If you buy into Bohm's theory then you buy into this idea of # the really existing classical worldline: I doubt that Bohm himself # would recommend taking this idea as literally true. [Stapp] The experiential aspect is not some alien form. It is the foundational element, in the sense that what the potentiality IS is the potentiality for an experience to occur. A potentiality makes sense only as a potentiality for something. And that something, according to the vonNeumann/Wigner ontology, is an experiential event. [Flanagan] (Hurray!) Our only disagreements here amount to technicalities. # Good. [Einstein ("Physics and Reality" in Ideas and Opinions, p.291)] I believe that the first step in the setting of a "real external world" is the formation of the concept of bodily objects and of bodily objects of various kinds. Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally and arbitrarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes of sense impression (partly in conjunction with sense impressions which are interpreted as signs for sense experiences of others), and we attribute to them a meaning--the meaning of the bodily object. Considered logically this concept is not identical with the totality of sense impressions referred to; but it is an arbitrary creation of the human (or animal) mind. On the other hand, the concept owes its meaning and its justification exclusively to the totality of the sense impressions which we associate with it. # Einstein was a very clear thinker: he really understood what # science is about! However, he did cling to the idea that the causal # structure of nature conformed fully to the basic idea of the theory # of relativistic, namely that causal influences act always into forward light # cones, and that made it impossible for him to integrate quantum # phenomena satisfactorily into his thinking.