Subject: Re: Quantum Theory of the Human person On Mon, 28 Oct 2002, Sidney mirsky wrote: > Thanks for your response. I have some additional comments and questions. > > Please see below: > > > On Tuesday, October 22, 2002, at 02:24 PM, stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov wrote: > >>> > >>> QUANTUM THEORY OF THE HUMAN PERSON > >>> > >>> > >>> It was discovered during the twentieth century that the concepts of > >>> classical > >>> physics that had prevailed since the time of Isaac Newton were > >>> incompatible > >>> with the emerging body of empirical facts. Werner Heisenberg found > >>> out > >>> that > >>> the older theory could be rescued by converting "numbers" to > >>> "actions." > >>> However, this revision effectively changed the location of every > >>> particle to a cloud-like structure: the motion of each particle, > >>> and also the motion of the center of every visible object, was > >>> described no > >>> longer by a simple trajectory in space and time, but instead by an > >>> evolving cloud that tended to expand to a size that could extend over > >>> meters, > >>> or kilometers, or more, in conflict with experience. This difficulty > >>> was > >>> resolved by the founders of quantum theory by introducing into > >>> physics > >>> the > >>> participating observers, and an associated dynamical process that was > >>> governed, at least in part, by these agents. This second process was > >>> formalized by John von Neumann as his famous Process I, which > >>> functions as a > >>> top-down action of the agent's mind upon his brain. It is not > >>> controlled, > >>> even in principle, by any yet-known law of physics. This feature > >>> undercuts > >>> the conclusion of classical physics that we are robotic automata > >>> completely > >>> controlled by local mechanical processes. > >> > >> > >> Is von Neumann's Process I not just another way of saying what the > >> Idealists like Amit Goswami have said, viz. that "Consciousness is the > >> ground of all being" ? > >> > > > > Von Neumann's Process I is a mathematically specified process that > > expresses in mathematical terms a process that appears to be needed > > to relate the quantum mathematics to human experience. It arise from > > physical requirements: from the need to tie the mathematical formulas > > to human experience. It does bring human consciousness into physics > > in an explicit way, but more on a par with the mathematically described > > aspects than as the primary reality. > > > [Sid] As a non mathematician I find this to be very interesting. You > are trying to tie the mathematical formulas to human experience, but if > you say that mathematics is dependent upon empirical data and if human > experience and consciousness is not in itself empirically explicit, > then I fail to understand how these can be reconciled? Empirical means experiential: resting on experience. It is the basis of science. But science has also a second part, which consists of theories, or models. Now of course a theory must be experienced to be useful or available to scientists, and perhaps/probably even to exist at all. So in some sense all aspects of science reside in human experience. But it seems to be possible to make, at least at some idealized level that is good enough for science, a distinction between the experiences of individual human beings, and a shared theory that purports to describe aspects of a reality that accounts for the repeated appearance in our streams of conscious experiences of such a thing as the sensation of "seeing that red table over there" whenever I look there, even though there are long gaps in my experience when there is no sensation of "seeing that red table over there." It seems as if there are parts or aspects of nature that are not human experiences; and scientists and philosophers, and for that matter every one of us, creates theories to account for these "persistency" aspects of our experiences. To a very good first approximation the theory can take the form that nature has two kinds of things, objective realities that exist and persist independently of whether they are experienced by anyone or not, and human experience, which is under certain conditions is able know about those things. Since human experiences presumably came into being only after human beings did, it would appear that the objective aspects are more fundamental, even though science is based on experience. But human experience is certainly real: my stream of consciousness exists, and I am willing (after a certain amount of cogitation) to accept as my working theoretical hypothesis the assumption that your stream of consciousness also exist (although maybe Daniel Dennett's and Paul Churchland's do not.) The mind-brain or mind-matter problem is to explain the connection between the "objective aspects" of nature described by our basic physical theory and our streams of consciousness which are the basis of all science. I have spelled out these trivial things in order to get our language into proper alignment. > > > > >> Substitute the word "Mind" with "Consciousness" and the concepts > >> appear > >> to be equivalent. > >> > >> In this sense, how much more explanatory power do either of the above > >> perspectives have over the "God" theory? > >> > > > > God can presumeably do whatever he wants to do. Quantum theory is about > > mathematically specified conditions and constraints that have been > > uncovered only with great attention to empirical findings. > > > > [Sid] On a further point of clarification, are you saying therefore, > that QT and it's attendant mathematics is constrained by empirical > findings? > The theory is design to account for the structure that we find to exist in our streams of consciousness. > > > > >> To me they all seem to be mysterious and exhibit top-down action. The > >> "Mind" is as nebulous and undefined as is god or consciousness. They > >> all are proposed as a result of unexplained anomalous behavior and are > >> top-down in their action. > >> > > [Sid] What I was trying to say is that I understand your use of the > word 'Mind' to be an undefined entity, in the same way that we have > struggled with the meaning of 'Consciousness'. > > If 'Mind' is not an epiphenomenon of matter, and is undefined, and acts > upon matter, then it must surely be a top-down influence? > "Mind" means "stream of consciousness", and your stream of consciousness is what you know best, because it is all that you know. It does contain theoretical ideas. But the "objective physical world" purportedly described by classical physical theory, is supposed (imagined) to change in time in a way completely controlled by local mechanical interactions, with no reference to the experiential realities that it was designed to explain: within that theory experiences enter only as effects, not as dynamical causes (even though our desire to explain certain persistency aspects of experiences was the motive for creating the theory.) > > > >> > >> Regarding the cloud-like explanation, do you really mean to imply that > >> the motion and center of a particle preempts its 'spread' --- "an > >> evolving cloud that tended to expand" ---- or is it more likely that > >> the cloud-like structure is primary and the center or 'visibility' > >> evolves inwardly as it tends to be observed? Would this perspective be > >> more in line with "Schroedinger's Collapse"? > >> > >> > > I do not understand you, but I guess that shows that I was far less > > understandable than I had imagined. > > > > [Sid] You were understandable on surface but I ask these questions to > tease out deeper meaning. I will try to rephrase my question: > > With regard to your cloud-like explanation you imply a center or locus > of the cloud-like structure represents the particle and that the > cloud-like property appears to be "secondary" because you refer to it > as "an evolving cloud that tended to expand". This statement would lead > me to the conclusion that you mean that the particle preempts the cloud > of uncertainty? > > As I understand it, Schroedinger's equation requires that the cloud or > 'spread-outness' preempts the particle, thus implying that the locus or > particle would "evolve" inwardly (collapse?), rather than expanding > outwardly? > I think you were not understanding my use of the word "center". A physical object such as apple is "spread out" in the sense that its various parts are located in different places. However, the "center-of-mass" of the apple, or any other well-defined "center-point of the apple" will, according to classical physics, lie it some particular POINT at each instant of time. I want to discuss this CENTER-POINT, and not the other points in the apple, which are obviously "spread-out" around the center-point. But in the quantum theoretic description of the apple THE CENTER-POINT OF THE APPLE IS SMEARED OUT! This is superficially akin to the fact that in classical statistical mechanics the center point is smeared out: a statistical weight or probability, is given to each possible location of the center point, and the set of points where the probability is significant is generally spread out over some region. This analogy gives you a first ideas of what the quantum state represents, and it is this idea that is exploited by David Bohm's model. That is what makes Bohm's model so attractive: its simple intuitive connection to classical statistical mechanics. > > > >> > >> > >> > >>> > >>> > >>> Theme 2 is that this basic problem is the nature of the causal > >>> connection > >>> between the experiential (phenomenal) aspects of nature and the > >>> physical (geometrical) aspects . > >>> > >>> Theme 3 is the core of the talk: Von Neumann's quantum theory has two > >>> distinct > >>> processes. This contrasts with the single dynamical process that > >>> governs > >>> everything in classical physics. These two quantum processes, von > >>> Neumann's > >>> Processes I and II, constitute, in the context of the study of human > >>> beings, > >>> genuine "top down" and "bottom up" causal connections, respectively. > >>> > >>> The terms "top down" and "bottom up" are often used in discussions of > >>> the > >>> causal structure of a system. A `bottom up' connection is one in > >>> which > >>> macroscopic processes are controlled by microscopic processes: > >>> a `top down' process is one in which macroscopic processes control > >>> aspects > >>> of the microscopic processes. > >>> > >>> Roger Sperry (of split brain fame) uses the motion of a wheel to > >>> illustrate > >>> the idea of a top down causal connection: the overall large-scale > >>> motion of > >>> the wheel controls certain aspects of the motions of the atoms that > >>> make up > >>> the wheel. However, in classical physics this top down causal > >>> connection > >>> is a redundant re-expression of the bottom up causal connections: > >>> it is not genuinely different from the botton up connections. On the > >>> other > >>> hand, von Neumann's Process I is a top down process that IS genuinely > >>> different > >>> from the bottom up process II: Process I is a not determined, > >>> controlled, > >>> or governed by Process II! > >> > >> This is the point where my confusion expands exponentially. :-) > >> > >> Do I understand you to mean that the 'Bottom-up' explanation is a > >> self-contained one in that it requires or implies that there is no > >> 'controlling' dynamic? that the process is self determined by virtue > >> of > >> the individual component properties and their inherent propensities to > >> interact (for example their physical states and their surrounding > >> environment, of which they are a part and also which they in their > >> 'spreadoutness', constitute)? > > > > Yes, I do mean by "bottom up" a process that is determined wholly by > > local > > (i.e., microscopic) rules. > >> > >> Am I to understand that Process I 'requires' an extraneous, undefined > >> agent in order to initiate and control the "Top-Down" process? > >> > >> If so then I am still at the original sticking point! > >> > > Process I involves "something" beyond the mechanical "bottom-up" > > preocess II. > > > > > > [Sid] Would you care to expand on your "something"? Please explain? > > The "bottom-up" Process II generates the "Spreading Cloud" quality that is analogous to the "Spreading Cloud" of a probability distribution in classical statistical mechanics. But experience locates the "center of the object" to be in some much smaller region. "Something" must account for this difference between what the physical description specifies as the location and what experience says/reveals. In classical statistical mechanics that "something" is the real physical world, as contrasted to the "mere" statistical description provided by stat. mech.. In Bohm's model it is a second part of physical reality---besides the evolving cloud-like reality, which Bohm (unlike stat. mech>) takes to be part of physical reality---. This second part of reality is a classical-type physical world, which, however, moves in accordance with new laws, which involve the cloud-like part of reality, and also instantaneous action at a distance But Bohm's model has not, in spite of intensive effort, been extended to include relativity theory, and it does involve instantaneous action at a distance. The "something" introduced by von Neumann is Process I. It does not involve long-range instantanous action at a distance, but is rather a highly constrained action of mind upon brain. Now the introduction of "mind" (i.e., streams of human consciousness) is hardly a drawback, or anything to be criticized. Streams of human conscious are certainly aspects of reality: they are the primary realities of science, and really ought to be included in our scientific theory of nature. Nor can the fact that they influence the physical world be criticized: the essential difficulty with classical physics was that our thoughts seemed to be impotent bystanders. But then there is no way to understand why they should exist, and be so closely connected to our high-level decisions, and should have evolved in close coordination with our brains. William James spoke eloquently about these problems. We NEED a theory that accomodates our streams of conscious thoughts, and that gives them a specific role to play! > > > >> Is there any room in any of these theories for a third explanation, > >> possibly involving some aspects of emergence (spontaneous or > >> hierarchical) that arises from within and throughout the complex > >> system > >> of the agent and it's environment? > > > > Yes. But what is your definition of emergence? Are locomotives > > emergent. > > Would locomotives be Emergent even if they were designed and built by > > pure > > robots? Are weather patterns "emergent?" There could be a great deal of > > heirarchical structure in a purely classical mechanical world. I am > > speaking about something very different. > > [Sid] I would suggest that "Emergence" might be an event or process > that occurs in the quantum or spread-out state: > If the "spread-outness" state preempts the observed 'particulate' > state, then it is conceivable that emergence could occur as a result of > 'unobserved' interaction within the spread-out states. > If so, then it is conceivable that the "emergence" of novelty is not > governed by top-down or bottom-up factors but rather "emerges" as a > result of interaction within the uncollapsed (Quantum state) prior to > observation or discovery (collapse). > This, I suggest, might account for observed and unexplained or > unpredictable anomalies especially in complex systems, for example, in > solitons, tornados and in speciation. > > Might this be somewhat akin to the "something very different" of which > you speak? I think one must be careful with the word "emergent," and in particular distinguish "trivial emergence" in which new relationships appear as a consequence of old laws because new conditions or circumstances come into being, and "genuine emergence" in which something new appears that is not covered by trivial emergence. But I suspect that there is no case of genuine emergence, in which case the concept of "emergence" is more obscuring than enlightening. But I certainly am open to attempts to illuminate the causal roots of Process I. > > > > > Cordially, > Sid >