From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Wed May 16 15:37:33 2001
Date: Wed, 16 May 2001 15:29:59 -0700 (PDT)
From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
To: Chris Wilson <chriswilson2000@earthlink.net>
Cc: John R. Searle 
Subject: Re: QT, Consciousness, and Free Will. (fwd)

On Fri, 11 May 2001, Chris Wilson wrote:

> Dear Henry:
> 
> On the question of reasons as causes, philosophers generally acknowledge 
> that reasons can be considered causes (or antecedents of 'regularities') 
> only to the extent that the reasons are physically realized (instantiated, 
> represented, embodied, implemented) in the brain. The problem is trying to 
> find a neural correlate for a mental state containing a 'reason', such that 
> the reason can become a ('real', 'physical' ) cause.
> 
> Searle would agree that the real problem is the connection between the 
> psychological and physical processes. He would also agree that the main 
> problem is the mind-matter problem. The way he sees it, however, is that 
> there is a causal gap at the psychological level but not at the neural 
> level (his "Hypothesis 1") or there is a causal gap at both levels 
> ("Hypothesis 2"). He doesn't see how either hypothesis can be true. The 
> only way he can see for H2 to be true is if there is some form of quantum 
> "indeterminism" in brain processes, that gives the unlawlike behavior of 
> humans.
> 
> This is where you came in to the seminar, and why he said he was hoping QT 
> would explain the brain-mind relation. To your most recent response, he 
> might reply that he agrees that we currently have no choice but to use both 
> our physical cause vocabulary and our psychological vocabulary as 
> appropriate. What he was hoping for, however, was more along the lines that 
> you have suggested in your paper: that in the VNSQT, the line between mind 
> and matter became blurred, with the result that matter became more mental 
> and the mind became more material. That is, you seemed to hold out the 
> promise that instead of two irreducible and incommensurable vocabularies 
> (which is 'property dualism'), we could end up with a single 
> mental/physical vocabulary.
> 
> I guess I would ask on my own behalf whether, in your view, such a merged, 
> or reinterpreted, or unified vocabulary is possible?
> 
> Chris
> 

Dear Chris,

Good question.

VNSQT features two descriptions that are probably mergable.

We need two descriptions because the primary data, for us, is  described
in the language that we use to describe our  experiences, but the
theoretical model that best describes the evolution of the known lawful
connections between our experiences is the mathematical model given by
quantum theory. But, as I emphasized, the "physical world" described by
this QT model is, ontologically, midway between mind and old matter: it is
basically an informational structure that consists of a cloud of possible
classical worlds, none of which is real. Each  "event" is a mental 
grasping of a whole informational structure, and the injection of this
structure into the state of the universe. This  injection is implemented
or realized by a resetting of the cloud of possibilities to a new form
such that the change in the cloud is supposed to be an exact image of the
informational structure that is grasped by the mental event. This
correspondence creates a dual language that describes one single growing
informational structure in two ways.

QT in its present form has two elements of freedom: nature's choices which
conform to statistical regularities, and human choices that are "free", as
far as the known laws of physics are concerned. But the human choices
seem to be influenced by "feelings" and "reasons". So there can be lines
of causation not yet developed or understood. Although these lines of
causation might best be described in terms of psychological language, 
the influence might also be describable in terms of the closely associated 
brain activities. But the known quantum laws would need to be augmented
in order to bring in these psychological factors.

I might mention that Pauli thought that the problem was to find a neutral
language, neither experiential nor physical. But I think VNSQT with its
two different but tighly logically linked descriptions of a single
informational process is the ideal solution, because we need both of these
descriptions in scientific practice.

Henry

> At 06:44 PM 5/1/01 -0700, you wrote:
> 
> 
> >---------- Forwarded message ----------
> >Date: Tue, 1 May 2001 11:41:12 -0700 (PDT)
> >From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
> >Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
> >To: John R. Searle 
> >Subject: QT, Consciousness, and Free Will.
> >
> >Dear John,
> >
> >I understand that you are suggesting that according to my approach
> >QT does not explain consciousness, but rather consciousness
> >explains QT.
> >
> >I would say that according to my approach QT does "explain"
> >consciousness in the sense that VNSQT (von Neumann Stapp QT)
> >gives a putative description of a reality that has:
> >1) physical aspects, described by the mathematics of QT,
> >2) the observer's stream of conscious events, and
> >3) dynamical laws that give a two-way causal connection between them.
> >
> >Of course human consciousness is, in a certain unavoidable sense,
> >primary in human science, since all empirical data and all of our
> >theories reside there. But the VNSQT is a putative objective
> >(though partial) description of a world containing both consciousness
> >and a physical aspect, and conditions on the two-way interaction between
> >them, and this seems to me be what a theory of consciousness
> >ought to do.
> >
> >
> >About Freedom, I have brought the dynamics to a point where
> >"consent/veto" is the place where Human Free Will enters.
> >The choice is Free, in the sense that it is not bound by
> >any known law of nature. Thus one can say that the choice
> >is made  "freely, by the person", since this choice is not
> >constrained by the laws of physics. This seems to me to be
> >a close-to-ideal disposition of the problem of free will.
> >Scientist and metaphysicians can try to dig deeper from their
> >own points of view, but it may never be possible to distinguish
> >cleanly, an the basis of empirical data, whether the
> >the valuations behind our "consents/vetos" operate in
> >the realm of the physical or the realm of feelings/ideas,
> >or in some realm that partakes of both. Indeed, the
> >basic message from VNQT is that these two realms are
> >closely entwined, so a decision between these worlds
> >in explaining "consent/veto" may not be achievable.
> >
> >Henry
> >-------------------------------------------------
> >Dear Chris,
> >
> >I missed Searle's earlier talks, but it seems to me that
> >we can and do  speak about the "reasons" for  our actions
> >as "causes", and that such causes do not appear to be coercive,
> >or sufficient to determine unequivocally the action. This
> >seems to me to be a rather trivial observation, though it may
> >be a helpful trivial observation in the tangled web of
> >philosophical discourse on these matters.
> >
> >But the ideas that laws are sufficient to determine all
> >motions, and actions, refers to physical laws, not
> >psychological "reasons".
> >
> >The important issue, it  seems to me, is the nature of the
> >connection between the psychological "causal process"
> >and the physical one.
> >
> >I do not think it too important whether one uses for
> >the physical connections the word "cause" or
> >"regularity": physicists do not much care which
> >terminology is used; whether one thinks  `cause'
> >or thinks `regularity.
> >
> >I guess I am not appreciating the depth of the
> >confusion that surrounds these issues in philosophy,
> >and   hence cannot appreciated the importance
> >of these tiny steps, when the big issue of the
> >mind-matter connection is staring us in the face.
> >
> >As you see from my note to Searle, above,
> >I am adopting the ecumenical attitude, that
> >we do not know at  present whether the
> >causes of our consents/vetos are best understood
> >in physical or psychological terms, but I
> >suspect that in the end the best solution will be a mixed
> >solution, in which both elements play a non-eliminable
> >role. I guess that makes me a DUALIST.
> >
> >Henry
> 
> 
> Chris Wilson
> chriswilson2000@earthlink.net
> 

I guess my position described above (reality is one evolving informational
structure with two logically linked descriptions) is less dualistic.
You will recall that at John's seminar, before he arrived, someone asked
whether I was  a DUALIST, and I replied that I start out dualistic, but
eventually get to a more monistic position. Perhaps I should be classified
as a MONIST, where the stuff is information, which can be described in either
experiential terms as  a  grasping of an informational structure or in
physical terms as the equivalent change in the physical state. 

HPS