Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2001 14:45:42 -0700 From: John R. Searle To: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Subject: Many Thanks Dear Henry, You did a great job presenting your ideas, and everybody was grateful, especially me. I think we are going to have more conversations about this. Best wishes and thanks again, John From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Thu Apr 19 10:18:20 2001 Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 10:17:03 -0700 (PDT) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: John R. Searle Subject: Primitive, Emergent, and Free. Dear John, I greatly enjoyed talking to you and your group, There were a few unresolved points between us, which I would like to comment upon here.. I said mind was "primitive" in Copenhagen QT, because according to that approach, science is a human endeavour: physical theories are "tools" that we scientists use to make prediction about what we will observe under certain kinds of conditions. Thus the experiencing minds of the human beings are the BASIC REALITIES in this approach, and the description of the `physical world' that the theory offers is regarded as merely part of the scientist's toolkit, rather than any accurate image of nature herself. I also stressed that in Copenhagen QT the minds of the observers stood "outside" the physical system that was described in the mathematical language of QT: the observer (and thus his mind) was not part of the physical system that was being described quantum mechanically. And the minds of the observers continued to be left out when von Neumann brought the bodies and brains of the human beings into the quantum physical universe described by the quantum mathematics. I continued to use the word "primitive" to characterize mind even in von Neumann QT. You resisted calling mind "primitive" when we got into the question of the universe BEFORE (HUMAN) LIFE. Indeed, the position that I took might better be called "EMERGENTIST": I adopted the idea that (proto) consciousness [or proto-mind] comes into being in conjunction with the coming into being of a physical system whose development can be sustained by the action of mind on matter that vN QT allows. I sharply distinguish this kind of emergence in QT in which a new kind of element appears that: 1) Is NOT just a conglomeration of the previously existing micro elements, and 2) Is, as a whole, an essential element of a causal process that was not previously operating within the associated physical system, to the `trivial emergence' that occurs within classical mechanics, where the `new causal process' is in principle just a consequence is the old micro-physical laws acting within a new physical context. The other point of discussion between us concerned "freedom": I identified the freedom of choice that I was talking about as a choice that is not determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, as they are NOW KNOWN: i.e. the laws formulated by vN. Quantum theory has a TWO choices of this kind: 1) Nature's choice of which of the two "outcomes" will appear. [This choice is subject to statistical rules, and in that sense is NOT `completely free'.] 2) the choice of which question to put to Nature. It is the second choice that is connected to "Free Will". If NOTHING AT ALL fixes such a free choice, I would call this choice a "whimsical" choice. But that is not the only possibility. For the *known* laws of QT may be only part of the story: there may other laws that fill the dynamical gap. The nature of these further possible laws is still unknown. They might tie the "free will" choice to the brain in some nonlocal way. Even the possibility of some "spiritual" influence cannot be logically ruled out. I believe that a rational moral philosophy cannot allow one's "free will" to be controlled by any of the following three possibilities: 1) local mechanical micro-process, 2) random statistical choices, 3) pure whimsy, The importance of vN QT is that this framework encompasses what science knows about Nature, but leaves open, as as rational possibility, that our moral free choices are determined by none of the three processes listed above, but are the outcomes of, for example, a nonlocal process of self examination and evaluation. Henry Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2001 15:52:31 -0700 From: John R. Searle To: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov [ Part 1, Text/PLAIN 23 lines. ] [ Unable to print this part. ] Dear Henry, First off, many many thanks for addressing my seminar. You were a tremendous success, and it was very helpful to the whole seminar and to me especially to have such a clear and powerful presentation of your views. Now about the points in your letter. 1. The problem about ^Óprimitive^Ô is that it can mean either ^Ónot reducible^Ô in the sense of being not eliminable to some more basic micro-phenomena, or it can mean ^Ónot even explicable causally by other phenomena^Ô. I think consciousness is not eliminable, and in that sense it is primitive, but I do not think that it is inexplicable causally. I think you can give a causal explanation of it, though we do not yet have a complete causal explanation. 2. About freedom. I think the fact is that the brain creates consciousness which gives us the impression at least that we are making decisions which are not based on causally sufficient conditions. Whether or not we are right about that is an open question, but that I see as the thesis of free will. It is not a thesis to the effect that our decision-making is random or that it is a matter of pure whimsy, but rather that the unified field of our consciousness allows for various options in our subsequent behavior. Again many thanks for speaking with my group. Best wishes, John From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Tue Apr 24 08:10:52 2001 Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2001 14:27:40 -0700 (PDT) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: John R. Searle Subject: Re: your mail On Fri, 20 Apr 2001, John R. Searle wrote: > Dear Henry, ..... > Now about the points in your letter. > 1. The problem about "primitive" is that it can mean either "not reducible" > in the sense of being not eliminable to some more basic micro-phenomena, or > it can mean "not even explicable causally by other phenomena". I think > consciousness is not eliminable, and in that sense it is primitive, but I > do not think that it is inexplicable causally. I think you can give a > causal explanation of it, though we do not yet have a complete causal > explanation. > 2. About freedom. I think the fact is that the brain creates consciousness > which gives us the impression at least that we are making decisions which > are not based on causally sufficient conditions. Whether or not we are > right about that is an open question, but that I see as the thesis of free > will. It is not a thesis to the effect that our decision-making is random > or that it is a matter of pure whimsy, but rather that the unified field of > our consciousness allows for various options in our subsequent behavior. > Again many thanks for speaking with my group. > Best wishes, > John > > Dear John, I understand your first point about primitive/irreducible/not-eliminable by analogy to the electromagnetic field: it is ontologically different from the charged-particle motions that cause it, and is not reducible to those motions. Yet it is in a sense causally explainable in terms of of these motions: if you know the motions you know the fields, provided you know the causal laws that determine the fields from the motions. But the key further question is whether the fields act back on the motions. The reason that bringing the fields into classical physics was important was that the TWO-WAY causal connection between motions and fields allowed physicists to understand the connections between the motions that were mediated by the fields: it gave them a rationally complete dynamics. Your earlier remarks about the need for two-way causation in order to account for the co-evolution of mind-brain indicate, I believe, that you do accept that the connection must be two way": epiphenomenal consciousness is neither natural, nor adequate within a broad scientific perspective that includes evolutionary biology. You often emphasize that brain causes consciousness, but seem reticent about the back action. I hope you agree that this question of the back action is a key issue that cannot be ducked in an adequate theory of consciousness! A key virtue of vN QT is that it accomodates the needed two-way causation. This is important for two reasons: 1) It shows that epiphenomenal consciousness can be avoided without being forced to identity theory. 2) By accommodating an efficacious consciousness that is dynamically linked to brain, but is not identical to motions of particles, it suggests that classical physical theory is too narrow a base for mind/brain theory. About freedom, you say that the thesis of free will is that our decisions are not based on causally sufficient conditions. If one accepts that thesis then it seems to me that one is forced either to accept, as a corollary, random or whimsical choices, or to explain some other way out. Randomness and whimsy do not help us out of the moral problem: they exacerbate it. I do not believe that the experiential feeling of free will is identical to the logical thesis that our decisions are based on causally insufficient conditions. I believe that the experiential feeling of free will is that "I" am making the choice. So the real questions are first to understand what that "I" is, and then to understand the causal role of that "I" in the decision-making process. The "I" certainly includes the stream of conscious events, which include our innermost feelings. The problem is then to understand how such subtle things can determine our decisions, rather than trying to understand how definite decisions can arise from causally insufficient conditions. At least that's the way it seems to me. Do you disagree? Best regards, Henry Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2001 09:47:42 -0700 From: Philip Clayton To: hpstapp@lbl.gov Subject: Re: Emergence and Free Will [ Part 1, Text/PLAIN 127 lines. ] [ Unable to print this part. ] Henry, This is a remarkably clear presentation of your views. Your distinction between trivial and (let's call it) genuine emergence, and your list of criteria for genuine emergence, are very helpful. I believe that your position on the emergence of mind, drawing from the resources of vN QT, represents the currently best justified position on the mind/body problem. Philip From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Tue May 1 12:10:01 2001 Date: Tue, 1 May 2001 11:41:12 -0700 (PDT) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: John R. Searle Subject: QT, Consciousness, and Free Will. Dear John, I understand that you are suggesting that according to my approach QT does not explain consciousness, but rather consciousness explains QT. I would say that according to my approach QT does "explain" consciousness in the sense that VNSQT (von Neumann Stapp QT) gives a putative description of a reality that has: 1) physical aspects, described by the mathematics of QT, 2) the observer's stream of conscious events, and 3) dynamical laws that give a two-way causal connection between them. Of course human consciousness is, in a certain unavoidable sense, primary in human science, since all empirical data and all of our theories reside there. But the VNSQT is a putative objective (though partial) description of a world containing both consciousness and a physical aspect, and conditions on the two-way interaction between them, and this seems to me be what a theory of consciousness ought to do. About Freedom, I have brought the dynamics to a point where "consent/veto" is the place where Human Free Will enters. The choice is Free, in the sense that it is not bound by any known law of nature. Thus one can say that the choice is made "freely, by the person", since this choice is not constrained by the laws of physics. This seems to me to be a close-to-ideal disposition of the problem of free will. Scientist and metaphysicians can try to dig deeper from their own points of view, but it may never be possible to distinguish cleanly, an the basis of empirical data, whether the the valuations behind our "consents/vetos" operate in the realm of the physical or the realm of feelings, or in some realm that partakes of both. Indeed, the basic message from VNQT is that these two realms are closely entwined, so a decision between these worlds in explaining "consent/veto" may not be achievable. Henry