Unruh says at the top of page 8, in connection with LOC2, that: ``If it were true that one could deduce solely from the fact that a measurement had been made at L that some relations on the right must hold, then I would agree that this requirement would be reasonable.'' Of course, one needs not solely the assumption that the measurement L2 is made in L: one needs also LOC1, and the assumptions that some predictions of quantum theory are valid. But from these alone one can deduce the validity of the premise of LOC2: PREM-LOC2: L2-->[(R2^R2+)-->((R1/R2)-->(R1-))]. There is no assumption or requirement on what the outcome of L2 is: that is certainly a key point in my proof. So Unruh appears here to be conceding that my LOC2 is OK! There are two essential points. The first is that the assumption in PREM-LOC2 pertaining to L is merely that L2 be performed. The second is that the statement in the square brackets refers only to events and hypothetical events in R. It is, of course, an absolutely central feature of logic that the statements themselves convey their meanings: one does not have to probe through the hundreds of assumptions that may go into proving that some statement is true to say what it means: each statement in the logical universe under consideration is supposed to have a meaning before one tries to prove whether it is true or false. Indeed, many different proofs might be given that some statement is true, or that it is false. As an example, consider two real numbers x and y. Let S be the assertion that ``x is positive''. S refers only to x, not to y. But in a context defined by ``y is positive'', and ``x=y'' one can prove the validity of S. This proof refers to y. But the MEANING of ``x is positive'' does not involve y. This simple example illustrates that the proof of a statement can refer to things beyond what the statement itself refers to. Analogously, in our case the statement in the square bracket refers only to events and hypothetical events in R, and it is proved to be valid in the context defined by LOC1, and the validity of some predictions of quantum theory, provided only that L2 be performed. LOC2 then asserts that this statement that refers only to events and possibilities in R, and that is true provided only that L2 is carried out at the specified later time, would be true also if the later free choice in L had gone the other way. Later on page 8 Unruh says that the assertion (a prediction of QM) (L2^R2^g)-->(L2^R2^c) has two possible interpretions. But in a sound logic each statement has only one meaning. The meaning of the above statement is this: ``If L2 is performed and R2 is performed and the outcome of R2 is g, then L2 is performed and R2 is performed and the outcome of L2 is c.'' The meaning of the statement does not depend on whether it happens to be true or false in some context, or how it was derived. Unruh goes on in this way conflating the meanings of statements with how they are proved to be valid under certain conditions. But this is not how logical reasoning goes. His assrtions violate the basic principle of logic that each statement must have a well defined meaning independently of how it is proved in some context. It should be emphasised that we are dealing here only with possibilities for setting up experiments, and noting their observable outcomes. Bohr often said that no special intricacies arise at this level, and he rejected special logics. Heisenberg explicitly rejected logical positivism. Unruh claims that this basic principle of logic cannot be maintained in the quantum context even at the level of our classically formulated descriptions of which experiments we can set up, and what outcomes we might observe. Bohr certainly did not appeal to any idea of the failure of logic in his discussions with Einstein of matters essentially similar to the one being discussed here. Unruh's essential claim is that in the quantum context the meaning of the statement in square brackets in PREM-LOC2 cannot be considered to refer only to (real and hypothetical) events on the right. He claims that because the proof of the validity of PREM-LOC2 involves an intermediate step in which the value of the outcome of L2 is fixed (by the combination of the assumptions that R2 is performed and gives outcome g, and that the prediction of quantum theory mentioned above is valid), the meaning of the statement in the square bracket is tied to that outcome on the left. This is certainly not the case in classical modal logic, where referents of meanings are separable from the referents of proofs of validity within some context. But Unruh claims that in the quantum context the assertion that the statement in square brackets refers only to things on the right ``is simply another form of realism.'' Unruh does not prove that this is true. I think it is false. The widely accepted idea in quantum theory, stemming from Dirac, is that no outcome is specified in nature until the experiment is performed, and that under the condition that the measurement is performed Nature selects some outcome. Within that quantum framework the statement in square brackets says that there is a constraint on Nature's selection process that is such that in any case for which R2 is performed and Nature's selection for the outcome is R2+, if, instead, R1 had been performed then Nature's selection would have been R1-. This is the natural meaning within the quantum universe of the statement within the square brackets, and it refers only to events and hypothetical events in R. There is no need to abandon of the basic principle of logic, which is that the statements must have well defined meanings. This property was proved within a certain context (formed by LOC1 and some predictions of quantum theory) by an argument that referred to things on the left. But the proved property itself, described above, does not refer to things on the left. The property was prove under the condition that L2 was performed, without imposing any condition as to which outcome appears in L. Since the choice to perform L2, not L1, was made later than all of Nature's possible relavant selections in R, any dependence of ``the constraints on those selections'' upon which choice is made in L would constitute some sort of influence of that choice upon constraints pertaining to earlier possible selections. There is no implication here that the unperformed experiment R1 has a fixed result: there is merely the deduced result that Nature's selection process in R must be constrained in a particular way if the later free choice is L2, plus the locality idea that the outcome of this later free choice should have no effect on the constraints upon Nature's selections pertaining to the earlier times. I believe that this example shows how my arguments conform to the basic logical principle that the meaning of each statement be well defined (in a way that matches the words of the statement) without bringing in any idea of reality that is alien to quantum theory.