Date: Sun, 23 Aug 1998 14:27:02 +0000 From: Saul-Paul Sirag Subject: [q-mind] To Bias Dirac Choice (or NOT) -- Henry Stapp MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Henry Stapp Subject: Follow-up comments Re.: Experience w/o Biasing Dirac Choice -- Reply to Sarfatti Dear Jack, Your posting is long, as usual. You have been trying to get me to compare our two theories. I think that will be a useful thing to do: often matters are made clearer by drawing contrasts. I do not wish to enter into an interminable dialog, but will try to illuminate both of our theories by pointing to key differences in responding to the points you raise. Since the issues are intricate I think the only clear way to proceed is to repeat here your points and then reply to them. I shall indicate my present comments by # on the left margin. [Jack Sarfatti to Henry Stapp] OK, Henry what you wrote is a clear statement of your theory. I am not sure if I can prove your theory false within its own terms because I have good reason, based on Basil Hiley's analysis, to question your basic premise. First, I have a question of clarification. You say: [Stapp] "My approach is to accept the basic premise of the Copenhagen interpretation that our experiences are real, and are the basic realities of the scientific description." [Jack] You also say: [Stapp] "My theory (the von Neumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the Copenhagen interpretation) specifies that the 'output of any experiential quality' is the brain activity that evolves from the reduced state P_e S P_e." [Jack] Therefore, I understand this to mean that you go from the epistemology of Bohr to an ontology. But your ontology is based upon statistical ensembles of some kind. Where are they? Bohm's ontology is free of statistical ensembles. It is fundamentally a theory of individuals. # No, I adopt Heisenberg's idea, borrowed from Aristotle, # that the state of the universe acts like a "potentia": an # "objective tendency", in Heisenberg's words, for an actual # event to occur. Each such actual event is an "experience", # in some very broad sense of the word. Thus the actual # world is composed of a sequence of discrete experiences. # I adhere to the principle of sufficient reason, which # asserts that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. # But the essentially nonlocal nature of the universe, and # our ignorance of almost all of the fine details, make # recourse to a statistical account of the "Dirac Choices" # necessary for human science. I have shown in my Xth Max # Born Symposium paper why this ignorance would by # expressed by the orthodox statistical rule. # On the other hand, a troublesome feature of the BOHM # model is that although it describes just one universe, # the correct statistical results arise from the peculiar # condition that this one universe is somehow a member of a # stistical ensemble of universes distributed in accordance with # the "information field" Psi. This is a rather baffling # initial condition statistical constraint, upon which the entire # concordance with the predictions of QM rests. [Jack] You also say: [Stapp] "The quantum versions, with brains generating superpositions of brain "templates for action" would, if collapses occur to brains with single templates for action, be able to select from a variety of nonrandom patterns of action, including the generation of nonrandom bit strings, if its communications to its fellows are in bit strings. This is how nonrandom bit-string generation would come about in my model." [Jack] Yes, I have already said that I agree that one can use both classical feedback-control loops and quantum feedback-control loops to generate non-random c-bit string outputs from an inanimate device like a quantum computer. Let me be clear what I mean by a "quantum feedback-control loop". The quantum system is in interaction with an environment. The output to the environment from the quantum system is the cause of a return input from the environment to the quantum system. This regulates the quantum system to produce some kind of non-random output. Now, my claim is that this will be a Golem or Zombie totally devoid of inner-experiential qualities e. The reason, is that "e" requires a direct self-feedback of the classical material beable whose configuration is X(t) back on the Bohm quantum information field Q. # This is what the theory you are proposing says. Every # theory has some assumptions, and this is your assumption # about how "experience" enters. In the end, empirical # tests must decide. But in the meantime we can ask why # the assumption seems promising. # Such judgements are subjective, and not normally # provable. But I find your arguments not at all plausible, # in my view, for many reasons. Each reason would need some # space to explain, and I do not believe this is the # appropriate venue to spell them out in detail. But I can # at least list some reasons by title: # To construct a theory that is most likely to be useful in # this complex arena one should pursue the direction # initiated by the practically successful quantum theory, # which means: (1), bringing "experiences" in explicitly, # since they are both real and basic to science; (2), # discard classical ideas in favor of the incredibly # coherent ideas of quantum theory that give classical # ideas in an idealized limit; and (3) discard concepts that # are not needed in calculations, and that break the # symmetries that quantum theory manifest (e.g., between # the two slits in the double-slit experiment. # By "experiences" I mean---in this context of human minds # and bodies---things described in *psychological* language, # not in the "physical" language of complex fields over a # configuration space. [I do not believe that it is # sensible to call something described in the second way # an "experience": that is an abuse of language]. # Bohm's classical world-line gets ruled out by the second # two conditions. I realize that defending these "reasons" # would involve much discussion [Jack] You are tying both my hands behind my back in your insistence that I refute your theory in its own terms. # I do not think we should be talking about *refuting*. # My orthodox view it no more `refutable' than yours, by # talk alone. [Jack] In fact, you are asking me to violate the spirit if not the letter of Godel's incompleteness theorem because the truth of your theory of experiential qualities is an undecidable proposition in the context of your theory. # Godel's theorem says essentially that one cannot get # the infinite set a true arithematic statements from a # finite sets of operations. But there is nothing that says # that the statements needed to describe a physical system # to any desired degree of accuracy cannot be deduced # by a finite number of operations. [Jack] We need to go outside your theory to disprove it in any logical way. # Theories are imbedded in logics, and can be proved to be # inconsistent: Godel's theorem does not block that. [Jack] But let us look to empirical arguments. Godel's theorem admits true undecidable propositions, but it also should admit false undecidable propositions. # The negation of a true proposition is a false one. [Jack] Let us consider the generation of this particular nonrandom symbol string that this sentence is. I am conscious of creating these sentences. Now what does your theory say about this basic phenomenon that we are experimenting with in every occasion of experience in the stream of consciousness? You say: [Stapp] "The quantum versions, with brains generating superpositions> of brain "templates for action" would, if collapses occur to brains with single templates for action, be able to select from a variety of nonrandom patterns of action, including the generation of nonrandom bit strings,..." [Jack] Therefore, you picture a set of possible alternative sentences that could be the classical output of c-bits in the classical computer hard drive. Let's consider some of these brain templates for intentional action in terms of your theory. |1> = " Let us consider the generation of this particular nonrandom symbol string that this sentence is." |2> = " I want to consider the generation of this particular nonrandom symbol string that this sentence is." |3> = " Let us consider the creation of this particular nonrandom symbol string that this sentence is." etc. You picture in your mind some kind of brain state |PSI> in which |PSI> = |1> <1|PSI> + |2> <2|PSI> + |3> <3|PSI> + ... "You then invoke the "normal rule" that the probability to observe classical c-bit string |1> is |<1|PSI>|^2. But I say this is nonsense. It is preposterous. Why? Where is the "ensemble" here? # There is no ensemble! The state |PSI> "jumps" to one # of the possible reduced stated. This later state is picked # by the "Dirac Choice" . The particular state that is picked # out in any individual case is determined by a global # process about which contemporary science says nothing, # apart from a propensity to occur, in the language of Karl # Popper, a fairly smart fellow who strongly urged a propensity # interpretation of quantum theory. Heisenberg used the phrase #"objective tendency". But behind this "objective tendency" # lies, I say, the process that decides whether or not the # selected (by the Heisenberg choice) possible experience e will be # actualized or not. [Jack] ..... The creation of a complex sentence is a unique non-statistically-based event. Where are the clones of Jack Sarfatti typing these sentences? # No clones! [Jack] Are they in shadow worlds? # No shadow worlds! [Jack] If so, where is consistency of your theory. # No consistency problem! [Jack] Now, in contrast, the Einstein-Bohm nonlocal realism does not have this problem. # What problem? [Jack] The Bohm field of quantum information is a unique physical object that influences another unique physical object, namely the actual complex brain matter configuration X(t) of Jack Sarfatti at time t. There is no statistical ensemble required. # Well, actually one is required to explain the conformity to the # statistical predictions of quantum theory. [Jack] ..... Finally let us look to how Basil Hiley undermines your basic premises in his essay "Quantum Mechanics and the Relationship Between Mind and Matter" (Brain, Mind, Physics, IOS 1997). For example, Hiley writes: [Basil Hiley] "I will argue that while it is not possible to conclude that the proposal of the direct intervention of consciousness to explain the 'collapse' of the wave function is without substance, there is very little direct evidence that such a process does actually occur. I will also show that such an intervention is not necessary." p.39 # Nobody is claiming necessity. There are many conceivable # ways that could be tried. There is no evidence at all for # the existence of an actual Bohm world-line. But there is # strong evidence for the existence of human experience. [Jack] It is amusing that you say my post-quantum theory is not necessary since Hiley says yours is not necessary either. # I have never `said' that your theory is not necessary. # If you had claimed that it was necessary then I surely would # have asked you to prove that claim: but I never imagined you # to be claiming that. [Jack] How do you explain the existence of the universe before there were any conscious beings to observe it? # I assume that human experience is a highly developed form # of experience that evolved with the evolution of life forms, # but from a universe that is essentially idea-like, and # conforming to mathematical regularities. [Jack] How do you explain the difference between a rock and a human? # Difference in physical structure. [Jack] Why don't rocks have consciousness the way we do? # They lack the requisite structure. [Jack] You also say [Stapp] "One of the main features of this normal rule is that, in conjunction with appropriate boundary condition, it precludes the possibility of faster-than-light and backward-in-time "signals" (i.e., sending of controlled messages) If some purported phenomena violates these rules about signal transfer then a possible way to explain the phenomena would be to bias the probability rule. But the assertion of the validity of quantum theory is essentially the assertion that this rule is not biased. My theory is based on the postulate that this rule is not biased: i.e., that quantum theory does not fail. And it ties inner experiential qualities to brain activities in a specified way. In this sense my theory yields "inner experiential qualities" without biasing the statistical rule." [Jack] Therefore, your theory cannot explain the paranormal evidence. # Actually, there is a loop-hole! # I do not wish my theory to be considered a theory of paranormal # phenomena: my intention is to focus on the vast # amounts of normal data that are being accumulated about the # mind-brain (mind-body) interface in laboratories around the world. # Thus in order that the intent of my work not be distorted I # shall not explain here this loop-hole. {But any interested # party can figure it out for themselves by combining the results # of the target article and my Physical Review paper on the # Schmidt experiments.} # I just add that this loop-hole arises from the fact that # most analyses of the measurement process follow the von # Neumann line of considering perfect measurements. But the # results in the target article depend on considering essentially # a near-continuum of possible overlapping states to which the # system might jump, rather than the usual set of orthonormal # states. This situation creates very serious problems for both # the many-worlds (minds) interpretation and Bohm's interpretation, # in connection with the computation of the probabilities for # an experience e to occur: those models have no way to pick out # a `question' in this overlapping-state case. But then there is # a serious (insurmountable I suspect) normalization problem. [Jack] I say my MORALLY RESPONSIBLE individually conscious choices to strike THIS key rather than THAT key are biased Dirac choices from the post-quantum field of information personally # Well, Bohm's world line is the world line of the whole world, # so that any deviation in the coordinates associated with any # particle in the universe immediately affects the force on every # particle in your brain: that is the origin of the nonlocal # effects. So your "person" is not so personal. [Jack] attached to my classical brain matter probably at the microtubule electron level. There is no statistical ensemble required here. # No ensemble in my theory, but one in yours. [Jack] This sentient post-quantum information field of q*-bits is a real robust non-mechanical physical object beyond ordinary space and time that is controlling the separated parts of my brain in a macroscopically phase coherent way. It is also experiencing "e" in a binding unitary way directly in the real configuration space of the parts of my brain separately processing the c-bits from the senses, converting them to q-bits and e-bits and finally to the q*-bits (your "e"s) that IS ME. # "The sentient information field is experiencing e"? # Elsewhere (Submission to q-Mind 12 Aug) you said: [Jack] "Your "e", or my "q*-bit", is simply the pattern that the brain directly warps the Q* field with." [Jack] "Well the "experiential qualities" the e's are simply the back-action patterns in the Q*-nonmaterial physical mind-field imprinted by the brain matter it is also guiding." [Jack] "I have said that "e" the experiential quality is the warping, i.e. the back-action or Wigner reaction pattern directly imprinted on the quantum information field by the path of the brain matter in its configuration space." # For me, one of my experiences is neither described as, nor felt as, # an alteration in some field in a configuration space. You have # apparently two things that you are calling an "experience". What # is the connection between the two descriptions? # For me an experience is a "knowing", which includes a knowing of # one's intentions. The connection of this "knowing" the physical # domain --- which is that which is represented by the state vector--- # is that the occurrence of the new knowing causes the state to # reduce to the part it that is compatible with the new knowing. # This is certainly not a completely detailed account of this key # connection. But in practice it is a meaningful connection: if I # see a brown cow then this should cause the state of my brain to # jump into a state in which some structure representing a brown cow # is present. The connection is of a sort that should be usable to # scientists who are studying the connection between mind and brain. # But a distortion of a field in a space of 10^27 dimensions is # off the wall. And a trajectory in that space is equally out of # bounds. That theory seems to have no hope at all of ever # connecting into practical science. [Jack] Finally, Henry, how do you have MORALLY RESPONSIBLE free will, subject to legal punishment, if what ever we do is un-caused by the pure quantum randomness inherent in your "normal rule" of unbiased Dirac choices? In my theory, the post-quantum sentient complex adaptive system is self-determining because the Dirac choices are biases. The consequent violation of passion-at-a-distance explains paranormal phenomena and ordinary mental phenomena in a unified logically economical non ad-hoc way. # The point of my paper is that in addition to the local # deterministic process (1), over which "I" have no control, because # this process is completely fixed by local atomic level # microprocesses, and the random process (2), over which "I" have # no control, because it is govered by far away unknown process, # there is ALSO process (3), which Is controlled by my whole # mind/body, acting as a whole, with my whole conscious experiences # playing a key role . # I believe this arrangement of causal connections provides a # perfect foundation in science for the concept of personal moral # responsibility. Henry P.Stapp ********************************************************************** Subject: Realistic versus Pragmatic-idealistic Theories of Mind. Dear Jack, There are two very important methodological issues that are absolutely basic to the entire field of mind-brain research, and which are manifested in the differences in our approaches. The most interesting and important thing to do, I believe, is to identify these basic issues: to get them out in the open: the smaller points in our discussion can then be seen as ramifications of these big and important ones. The two issues are these: (1) How is mind to be introduced into the scientific study of the mind-brain system? (2) How are the useful concepts of classical physics to be introduced into the scientific study of the mind-brain system. Question (1) is essentially the question of whether it will be feasible and useful, in the the study of mind-brains, to follow the tactic that was followed by the founders of quantum theory, which was to introduce---at the ground level---into the scientific theory of the system under investigation "the observer's description of his experiences", and, if it is feasible, how the theory ties these descriptions of experiences into physical theory in a satisfactory way. After all, our measurements of neurological (and other brain activities), which inform us about what the brain is doing, are physical measurements that we understand and interpret in terms of the principle of physical, so we must, one the one hand, maintain some secure connection to these principles. On the other hand, the subject's experiences, are described in the way we describe our experiences, and these descriptions are half of the data. The basic problem, therefore, in formulating a scientifically useful theory of mind/brain systems is how to relate these two different kinds of description of data in way that is rationally coherent and useful. Question (2) is whether the classical aspects of nature ought to be brought into the theory in the way the quantum theory does, which: (a) is in terms of the de facto classical character of our description of our experiences pertaining to the "physical world", possibly abetted by the classical qualities of the coherent states of the electro-magnetic field, and (b) uses the fact that classical physics automatically re-appears in an idealized limit of the quantum description when some small parameter goes to zero. Or should we bring into the theory some intrisically classical element that is alien to "quantum theory" as that theory is formulated in pragmatic Copenhagen approach. Your approach is probably closer to what most scientists who work on the mind-brain problem prefer. You accept, as you correctly emphasize, an Einstein-realism-sort-of-view-point that there really is a physical reality out there, which you jimmy in order to make compatible with the nonlocal character of quantum theory (which Einstein did not believe was a characteristic of the real world) You correct the deficiencies of the strictly classical model by taking, basically, Bohm's model, which is intuitively very appealing to adherents to the realism-based approach because it brings back an "essentially" classical picture of the universe as a world line through "configuration space", which is a space of 3N dimensions, where N is the number of particles in the universe. In order to reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory [at least in the non-relativist limit---I note that worker's in the field, such as D. Duerr (Munich) and F. Faisal (Blielefeld) have, in spite of intensive and long-term effort, not yet succeeded in making Bohm's idea work in Quantum Electrodynamics: Bohm's book does not achieve that] you introduce Bohm's extra quantum force. Then you add your "back-action field" in this 3N-dimensional space, and equate that field to "experience". I think your solution may be an ideal solution from the standpoint of someone inclined to the idea that classical physics, realistically interpreted, is basically OK---though some fine-tuning is undoubtedly needed to make it agree with quantum phenomena---and who believe that "experience" ought to be *identified* with some aspect of the physical description, and that this aspect may perhaps ~emerge~ only under appropriately conditions of ~complexity~. Most active scientists in the study of the mind-brain connection probably ARE pretty much wed to those ideas, or to the "Emergentist" position that there is probably a hierarchy of "emergent" levels that probably block altogether the relevance of quantum theory to the question of mind. I will return to the "Emergentist" position. But let us accept here the notion that the various hierarchical levels of structure in the brain, although present, with each level in need of its own language and concepts for our understanding of it, do not actually physically disrupt the validity of the basic principles of physics. I hope I have made it clear that I think your idea is reasonable and rational, and is probably in line with the realist leanings of most scientists who work in the field, and most philosophers who discuss it. But quantum theory opens up also another possibility, which I believe will eventually be more useful to these scientists, even though it pursues the pragmatic-idealist route, rather the realist one that they are now inclined to believe is the only, or in any case the best, way to do science. It starts with the idea that universe is basically idea-like, and that the basic realities idea-like events that are connected to each other by the mathematical rules specified by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. All of the known "classical" aspects of our experiences pertaining to the world we see around us are neatly explained by this ontology, in spite of its essentially idealistic foundation. And these explanations are, from a computational point of view, very much simpler than, for example, those basically required by Bohm's model. A look at the trajectories so carefully plotted out for the single particle in a double-slit experiment shows that this model is probably not going to be of much use for studying the brain. Of course, the point of the model is that it reproduces all the predictions of the pragmatic Copenhagen approach, so that one does not really need to do any calculations based on the world-line. But this fact does, of course, raise the question of whether that concept is really useful to the scientist at the basic level. I have strongly supported the notion that Bohm's model is a very useful heuristic tool. And the model certainly does show that, contrary to the apparent expectations of the founder's of quantum theory, a realistic model is possible, if locality conditions are abandoned. But the more useful model, computationally, is the "idealistic" one that directly relates descriptions of experiences to descriptions of experiences. In the case of experiments on the mind-brain connection the pragmatic-idealistic theory relates descriptions of experiences made by the subject to descriptions of the outcomes of measurements made upon the brain of the subject. This gets directly to the core of the scientific study of the mind-brain connection, and in a way that provides also an ontological model of the universe, albeit a one that is built around our experiences, as we describe them. It has also the Bohm "information field". construed however as a representation of an objective state of knowledge, to which every increment of knowledge contributes. Each such increment is associated with some physical system, in a mathematically specified way. So the entire structure, though based on knowledge rather than substantive matter, is very physical: it is imbedded in an evolving physical state of the universe that is a structure defined over spacetime, in the field-theoretic sense. Since this structure has no trace in it of Bohm's singled-out world line, and since all practical computations will surely be in terms of the general quantum concepts, rather than in terms of the working out of a trajectories in the configuration space of the brain, I strongly suspect that the pragmatic-idealist will turn out to be more useful, practically, than a Bohm-based approach. Of course, if a strong case could be made that the world "really is like" what the Bohm model claims, then there would be a reason to pursue it. But I do not believe that a strong case can be made for it. Since the classical aspects of our experiences can be explained by the pragmatic-idealistic model, without bringing in the preferred world lines of Bohm, there is probably no reason to believe the world "really is basically like Bohm's model of it." I doubt that Bohm would claim otherwise. Notice that since in the pragmatic-idealistic approach the "physical description" is a mathematical representation of knowledge, and of tendencies for new knowings to occur, there is no conceptual problem with relating an "experience" to its physical counterpart, which is a reduction of the former state of knowledge to the part of the former state that is compatible with the increment in knowledge provided by the new experience. A hierarchy of "emerging" levels of structure in biology could be compatible with the basic quantum ontology outlined here, in spite of the need FOR US to bring in new principles to aid our human ability to comprehend complex structures in useful ways. But it it is also true that our high-level knowings can be only the tip of an iceberg of "experiences-in-some-far-more-general-sense" that extends down far below what we human beings experience. These more primal "experiences" could conceivably be associated with lower levels of emergent phenomena that actually do require some addition to the basic dynamical analogous to the collapse process associated with our human experiences. There is, in my thinking, one outstanding reason [beyond its failure so far to accommodate quantum electrodynamics] why the Bohm model, as extended by you to include conscious experience, cannot in my opinion be regarded as a satisfactory description of reality itself. I believe it is not satisfactory to say that an experience IS identical to a warping of a field defined over the configuration space associated with the brain. Such a field has essentially a infinite amount of information in it, which the experience does not have. An experience is a felt quality that has feelings of intentionality, which is essentially a feeling pertaining to the experiential quality of its successor, in a causal chain of experiential events. There is in the concept of a field defined over configuration space no logical need for it to be a felt experiential quality. It is, in my opinion, logically more satisfactory to take experiential-type qualities as the basic building blocks of nature, and take the laws of nature to be expressed as mathematical relationships between them. A natural framework for doing this is provided by the vonNeumann/Wigner ontologicalization of the pragmatic Copenhagen approach to quantum theory.