Dear Pat, I'm sure were both getting pretty anxious to terminate this: I had really heaved a big sigh of relief, that I could get back to physics. But still I think some account has to be given of the application of CM to tides and cannon balls etc. etc. It seems to me that Einstein's and Bohr's analysis was essentially correct: we make the connection, and thus apply the mathematical statements of CM to macroscopic features of the world about us, by constructing, within the mathematical framework,. macroscopic conglomerates of the elementary particles and fields that should have the general appearance of tides and billiard, looked at from a distance, and that would respond to the probings of mathematical models of measuring devices, whose "pointers" we can see from afar, in the ways that waves and billiard balls do. I think a look at how CM has been used and applied since the time of Newton and Galileo shows that the mathematical theory is linked into our experiences of the world in this nonproblematic way, and that this correspondence at this nonproblematic level is part of classical mechanics in the broad sense in which it is understood by people who use it. I think this was the common ground of Einstein and Bohr in their debate on essentially this issue. But when we look at a person who is seeing something blue we do not see, or expect to see, patches of blue appear in his brain. There must be, or presumeably is, some sort of activity in his brain that we may be able to detect by various devices that we can all observe, and that he himself might even observe, that corresponds to, or co-exists with, his experience of blueness, and it is these latter sorts of things that orthodox classical mechanics deals with, by constructing out of the elements of the theory conglomerates that have the properties that should be visible to all of us through our sense of vision, and confirmable through our sense of touch. So I think you are defining too narrowly the meaning of classical mechanics when you assert that it can say nothing about the brain, or about springs and hurricanes. The more normal meaning of the words would have classical mechanics make purported statements about such macroscopic things: for only then could it be proven to be false, as it has in fact been. Henry P.S. Jim Balter sent me a note supporting your position, and I have sent this letter (and yours) to him and to Stan K, who asked for some further clarification on our differences. Pat's Letter: From: SMTP%"phayes@picayune.coginst.uwf.edu" 14-OCT-1996 10:02:21.21 To: STAPP CC: Subj: Re: Wrapping up QM and C. > >This is, I think, an important concession on Pat's part because it puts in >jeopardy his claim that consciousness is both 1), adequately described >within CM, with no need to go to QM; and 2), simply a complex activity >of classically describable brain, nothing more. For, according to the >principles of CM, brain activity is entailed by the principles of CM. It is simply a matter of LOGIC that CM says nothing about brain activity. This follows from the Craig interpolation lemma, among other things, which states that if one sentence entails another, then there must be a third sentence which uses only the common nonlogical vocabulary such that the first entails it, and it entails the second. That is, any argument from one to the other can be made to 'pass through' their common nonlogical vocabulary. Let me emphasise, this is a theorem, not a matter for debate. It has an obvious consequence that if two sentences have no common nonlogical vocabulary, then there can be no (nontrivial) entailment between them. (One might be a tautology or a contradiction, of course.) Now, classical mechanics speaks of particles and fields; it does not speak of brains (or gases or springs.). Hence it is *logically impossible* that CM should entail anything at all about brains, unless extended by some sentences that mention brain-relevant topics. No consistent theory can possibly entail that it entails anything about things which it does not even mention. If CM does make such a meta-claim then it is inconsistent, by Craig's lemma. This has nothing whatever to do with views-from-afar, or any of the other irrelevant stuff you keep injecting into the discussion. You STILL havnt responded to this point. But I give up: you got the last word. I tip my hat to your energy and perseverance, if not to your logic or your conclusions. Pat Hayes