Dear Pat, 

You say: "But even if we allow pains to be real things..."

In order for the identity E=F (or P=F) to have meaning the E (or P) 
must mean something. I purposely chose a child's pain in order to
be able to talk about something that seemed reasonably definite.
The formula E=F that I am talking about relates two things that have 
pre-assigned meanings that I think I understand.

I hope we can agree that a suitable terminology that allows 
`a child's pain' to mean what  `pain' or `experiencing of pain'
means to the child is to say this: there is a realm of experience called 
the child's realm of consciousness, and that when the child touches the hot
stove something (normally) appears in that realm that we call the child's 
pain, and that this is exactly and precisely an `experience' (`feeling')
that the child can normally report as `a pain', or as `a feeling of pain',
or as `an experiencing of pain'. The E (or P) that we are talking about is 
supposed to be just such a real element or event in the child's realm of 
consciousness. If we cannot agree on this then perhaps I must bow out,
because I then would not know what the P (or E) in P=F (or E=F) means, and 
would suspect that this identity may then have no meaning beyond some 
definitional tautology. 

The smell of the tramp can come into the policeman's realm of consciouness,
along with his (the policeman's) feeling of disgust, etc.. Later, 
propositional knowledge linking these experiences to the name 
`Arthur Geoffrey' may appear in that realm. But Arthur Geoffrey, the 
physical man, never enters this realm, any more than does  Julius Caesar 
when the policeman learns about him. Thus `Propositional knowledge' ABOUT 
a physical event PE can enter a realm of consciousness, but in these examples 
the physical event PE does not itself enter into the policeman's realm of 
consciousness. Hence these examples are *counter-examples* to the relationship 
P=F under consideration here: in these examples the PE `causes' something 
ELSE to appear in the realm of consciousness. 

The issue is whether a physical event F in the child's brain, an event that
is supposed to BE exactly what classical mechanics says it is, can be the 
very same thing as the pain that occurs in the child's realm of consciousness. 

In the case at hand the physical event or activity F is supposed to be
adequately represented and described in terms of the concepts of classical
mechanics. This means that the picture of F formed by the propositional 
knowledge that comprises our scientific description of F is a`replica'
 ---sufficiently accurate for our purpose here--- of the real physical F 
itself: our classical picture of F is essentially equivalent to F itself. 
Thus our propositional knowledge ABOUT F (which we can suppose to be complete 
and accurate) is knowledge OF F: propositional knowledge ABOUT F is enough 
to tell us what F IS (to the level of accuracy needed to discuss the 
mind/brain problem). And what this F IS is `neurons firing, etc.'. But 
what is in the child's realm of consciousness is a `pain'. 

One could quite naturally describe this conjunction of facts by saying that 
F `is experienced as' a pain, or that F `causes' a pain to appear in 
the child's realm of consciousness. 

The question, however,  is whether it is logically consistent to assert, 
instead, that F IS `the pain', given that F IS nothing more or less than 
`the neurons firing, etc.', that `the pain' IS nothing more or less 
than the `experiencing of pain'.

In the phrase  "experiencing of X" the variable "X" describes the 
content or identity of the experience: it identifies which experience is being
referred to by describing, with some words, the quality of the experience.
Thus an `experiencing of pain' is a `pain'. However, an experiencing of 
pain P, is *not* an experiencing of the corresponding F: the qualities of 
these two possible experiencings are different. There is, therefore, here, 
apparently a correspondence F ~ P rather than an identity F = P.

In your original note you said that:
"One must distinguish knowing what it is to experience something, 
and knowing what it is that one is experiencing" 

This distinction would seem to fit the formula: "F is experienced as P". 
But this would mean there are two different things involved, not one: 
`the act of experiencing', and `what is experienced'. These are, you say,
to be distinguished. So if the experiencing of pain is called P is, then P 
is not identical to F, and the resolution of our difference would be merely
that I call `the experiencing of pain'  by the name `pain', as I has often
emphasized in this correspondence. Indeed, I am more than happy to give 
experience an active mode of being: I certainly never meant it to be a 
substantive thing, but think of it rather as an action or activity.

In your next letter you say that `the experience is F', but distinguish
F from `an aquaintanceship with F', which again seems to be the
experiencing relationship that manifests the experiential quality P that
is under discussion here. Without this `aquaintanceship relation' coming 
into play the experiential aspect of the `experience' F would be dormant, 
hence nonexistant: F would be merely the physical F, not also an experience.
So it would seem that `the actual experience' attaches to the aquaintanceship 
relationship, not to F alone. In any case there are two 
aspects involved here: the F aspect, and an experiential quality  connected
with an acquaintance relationship, or in the terminology of your letter of 
March 4, with aquaintance-knowing.

So where does this lead us? 

In your attempt to defend P=F in the face of the fact that the 
experiencing of P is qualitatively different from the experiencing of F, 
you were led to distinguish the `experiencing of P' (where P is the 
experiential quality or content of this activity of acquaintanceship or
acquaintance-knowing) from `that which is experienced', which in this case
is F. But then the P in P=F is a different P, and it plays no role: 
it is the P in `the experiencing of P' that identifies the quality
of the experiencing activity that is actually felt as the pain P

I hope you will find this analysis reasonable.

Best regards, Henry

PS

Re: Rosenberg's intervention (March 5).
I agree with what Rosenberg says. But my endeavour is to do more: I wish to
show that the hypothesis P=F not only does not follow from causality, but
is, in fact, logically (and hence ontologically) untenable.

Re: Cc
I do not know what I have missed by the faulty Cc: I have received 
only Pat's letters, and two from Stan, including the first one that
generated the short list of people and e-ddresses, and a good-bye from
Sloman. (And now an encouragement to continue from Stan)  

PPS. Some other stuff has just arrived, but I send this out now, before
looking at it.