From:	THEORM::STAPP         5-MAR-1996 13:50:01.07
To:	@KLEINLIST.DIS
CC:	STAPP
Subj:	Reply to Hayes 4

Dear Pat, 

My strategy is this. Suppose someone says:
"I hypothesize the that  horses are identically the  same as cows". Now it 
is clear that he can maintain that horses are  cows without any inconsistency
so long as there is no pre-existing  meaning for what horses  and cows are. 
But in the present case both F  and P have  pre-existing  meanings, insofar
as F is defined  within  the  framework of   classical  mechanics  (as some  
functional structure  implemented in  matter, as matter  is   defined and  
characterized in classical mechanics) and  `pain' is something that we 
learn the  meaning of  already in   childhood.

To set the framework let us consider (as we both suggested) Venus viewed 
as the morning and evening star, or the sound and sight of lightning, 
or Sherlock Holmes's tramp-business man. All are essentially the same: 
one thing is experienced in two different ways. In no case are the two 
experiences the same: the two experiences are clearly different. And these
two differing experiences are `caused' by something else, which is different 
from either of the two experiences. So these analogies do not cover the case 
in question, in which the endeavour is to identify an experience with 
something not originally identified as an experience. But they do teach us 
that the experiences that constitute two different ways of knowing one 
thing are two different experiences, and that there is no a priori suggestion 
that either of these two experiences is identical to that which we learn 
about by the two different ways of knowing.

Let us turn, then, to the case at hand, which you (essentially) describe as one
thing P= Pain known in the E-knowing way but also in the F-knowing way. So we
have again two ways of experiencing what you claim to be one thing, P. But
what is experienced in the E-knowing way is the pain itself: the E-knowing 
way of experiencing pain is an experience, and this experience is called 
either pain, the experienced pain, the experience of pain, or the experiencing
of pain, and the child knows (all too well) what it is. The F-knowing way of 
experiencing it is also an experience, but this experience is not identical 
to the experience  that the child recognizes as pain: it is an experience 
that you admit the child does not have.  This F-knowing would reveal aspects
of P not explicitly known to the child, who *does* explicitly know the pain.
But then the thing known in the two different ways must have aspects beyond 
the explicitly known experienced pain that the child experiences: it cannot 
be just exactly the pain P, as originally assumed. The special property of 
experience, namely that it is exactly what it reveals by the E-knowing way 
of knowing it, means that this experience cannot be anything beyond exactly 
what the E-knowing way of knowing it reveals.

This is just a restatement of my argument that because E is
`immediately experientially known' to the child but F  is not
`immediately experientially known' to the child one cannot postulate that 
E=F, if these terms carry the child's meaning of the experienced pain E
and the classical physicalists meaning of F.

It seems that you gave no reasoned answer to this argument.

Cordially, Henry

Cc:Klein, Sloman, Keith, Mckee, Brings, Rosenb, PatrickW