Dear Pat, 

Thanks for yor reply of Feb 28 to my reply to you of Feb 27.
To review ---  You summarized my argument against Functionalism:

"Imagine an experience (say, of intense pain) which a five-year-old child
has experienced, call it E. Functionalism suggests that there is some
physical event in her brain - call it P - which actually *is* that pain, ie
P=E. Your refutation says that the child knows E but does not know P: Q(E)
& not Q(P), where Q is the property of being-known-to-the-child, But if P=E
then Q(E) implies Q(P); a contradiction."

You then quoted a passage from my response to your story about an
experience of yours (an experienced sound) that was associated with something 
else, namely a wiggling of your ears. Regarding that pair of different
things, which you raised to support your position, I said:

> Your story emphasizes the distinction between
>the experience itself, which you knew very well, and some physical activity
>that is not the very same thing, since, as you yourself emphasized, you 
>knew one intimately without knowing anything about the other.
 
You used this remark to introduce two kinds of knowing:

"Precisely. I KNEW it, but I didnt know ABOUT it. There is no need to make a
distinction between two entities because the properties are different.
These are different senses of 'known', which might be called experiental
vs. propositional knowing: known-to vs. known-that. One is to *know an
experience* in the sense in which we say 'she knows what that feels like',
or 'he knows her very well'; it means something like 'to be acquainted
with'. The other is to *know what one is experiencing*, in the sense of 'I
know who that guy is'."

In these case, as in your example of the `ear wiggling' and the `experience'
that you had (the experienced sound), there are two different things involved,
the experience itself and some other thing or activity that is causing it. 
But you are trying to defend a contention that two things that seem two be
different, in a somewhat similar way, are not different. So the analogies are 
not helpful, and in fact go the wrong way: they suggest that two different 
things are involved also in the case at hand.

But your point regards two the two modes of knowing.

An experience is knowable in only one way: by immediate acquaintance.
What you are directly acquainted with is exactly your experience. On the 
other hand, the phrase *know what one is experiencing*, if differentiated
from `knowing the experience itself', by direct acquaintance,  seems to be
pointing beyond the experience itself to some `cause' of that experience, 
such as the `guy out there' that is `what one is  experiencing', provided one 
explicitly rejects using this expression to indicate the experience itself 
`that one is experiencing'. So again your words seem to acquire meaning  by
pointing beyond an experience itself to something else, e.g., its putative 
cause. 

You conclude:
 "A coherent functional account of the case of the little girl's pain is 
given thus: P=E, Q(P) (and hence Q(E)), and  not(Girl-knows (P=E)). This is 
quite consistent, since Girl-knows is referentially opaque. On this account 
it is perfectly correct to say that she was acquainted with the physical event,
since that event in her brain *constituted* her having the experience in
question; but she did not know *that* the experience was that event."

We are familiar with cases where two knowings can be different knowings of the
same thing. [The experiences of `hearing' lightning and `seeing' it, or seeing
the morning and evening stars]. But in the present case the two things in 
question are not supposed to be two different experiences with a common cause,
but rather an experience and something that is supposed to be not its cause, 
but this very same experience itself that, however, is not recognized as 
being this very same experience itself.

But if E is an `experience', which is, by definition, the very thing that 
is known by direct acquaintance, and P is identically the same as E,
then, as you say, P is this very (same) thing that is known by direct
acquaintance. But direct acquaintanceship is a connection such that
if one is directly acquainted with two things, and one is, by definition,
nothing but what one is directly acquainted with, and the other is identically
the very same thing, then one must not only know them both, but also know them 
as the same thing. Referential opaqueness can block knowledge of the `cause'
of an experience but it cannot block knowledge of the identity of two things 
that are the same thing, if one, and therefore both, are nothing beyond what 
one is directly acquainted with. 

So the point is that the referential opagueness of the `Girl-knows'
relationship is pertinent when one is distinguishing what is known by direct
aquaintanceship, namely some experience [this experience `appears' in the realm
of things known by direct acquaintance] with something that is not in that
realm, such as `a cause of the experience', but there can be no opaqueness
to that which is identical to something that is nothing but what is known by
directly acquaintance, and no experiencing of two identical experiences
differently. 

Best regards, Henry

Cc: klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU, phayes@cs.uiuc.edu,
        A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk, keith@imprint.co.uk, mckee@neosoft.com,
        brings@rpi.edu, ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu, patrickw@cs.monash.edu.au