From:	SMTP%"klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU"  8-MAR-1996 16:36:19.49
To:	STAPP
CC:	
Subj:	Re: Reply to Hayes 5

Date: Fri, 8 Mar 96 16:32:31 PST
From: klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU (Stanley Klein)
Message-Id: <9603090032.AA27387@adage.Berkeley.EDU>
To: ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu, phayes@cs.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Reply to Hayes 5
Cc: A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk, STAPP@theorm.lbl.gov, brings@rpi.edu,
        keith@imprint.co.uk, klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU, mckee@neosoft.com,
        patrickw@cs.monash.edu.au

Gregg,

I liked your question so much (why is it so hard to get agreement between 
you and Pat?) that I'd like to say two more things. 

First, why are most scientist's in Pat's camp? I believe it is because the 
hard problem isn't amenable to experiment. What experiment would you 
propose to gain an understanding of why a particular NCCQ produces a 
particular quale? Take the experiment of replacing neurons by chips. I 
presume all of us agree that the results of that experiment are that qualia 
do not fade away. So that wasn't a useful experiment. When a scientist 
sees that what we are discussing is a metaphysical topic rather than a 
scientific topic the standard scientist will say that it isn't a real problem. 
My hunch, however, is that it is a real problem and that it will have a real 
solution (as I mentioned in my preceding post about how the discovery of
NCCQ might inspire new ideas on the hard problem).

Second, what might a solution look like. I am in the business of doing 
experiments on visual perception and then developing models to account 
for the data. Let's take one typical example of a typical quale: the stability 
of the world quale. Our eyes are moving around constantly, the retinal 
image is jumping around and all purely sensory areas in cortex are jumping 
around. Yet the subjective experience is that the world isn't jumping 
around (unless one is tired, or drunk or one has learned how to cut off the 
stability system so that you can see it jump). Now, there are two 
categories of explanations. On the one hand there are those who believe 
that there will be an area of cortex found where a clear neural correlate of 
the stability of world quale will be found. On the other hand, many believe 
that such a direct neural correlate need not be found anywhere. There is 
clearly information about eye position (or intended eye position) in some 
parts of the brain, and there is clearly information about the retinal image 
in many parts of the brain. There really is no need to put that information 
together in a single cortical area that produces a stabilized image. This 
latter view would hold that there is never a need for a direct connection 
between the quale and the simple neural activity.  I will end this example 
by pointing out that there is mounting neurophysiological evidence for 
cortical areas where stable world representations are found. They are not 
in purely sensory areas, but in areas that have both sensory and motor 
aspects. (I am not an expert in this field, so I can't go much deeper into it). 

To my experience, so far, when there is a visual quale one can expect that 
there will be a simple, neural correlate. But that didn't have to be the case. 
There could have been some complex, opaque neural network that is 
correlated with the quale. That is probably what Pat Hayes would say. My 
guess is that there will someday be a discovery of how the neurons go about 
producing quales that is going to dramatically shift how we understand 
that connection. But of course at the present we don't have the foggiest, so 
Chalmers is able to get his book published. And I am able to defend quantum 
dualism, and Pat is able to say there is no fundamental hard problem.

Too bad David Chalmers isn't receiving these mailings. He might enjoy them.

Stan