From:	THEORM::STAPP         7-MAR-1996 21:46:26.06
To:	@KLEINLIST.DIS
CC:	STAPP
Subj:	Re: Reply to Hayes 4

Dear Stan, 

This is a reply to your letters of March 6 and 7.

As you know I find the word `cause' in your NCCQ ojectionable.
If you would substitute the word `exact' (Neural Exact Correlate of Qualia)
and (thus) make it clear that you mean nothing more than an empirical matching
then I would see no problem with anticipating that some NECQ of certain qualia
will eventually be found. Of course, that may hinge on exactly what the range
of experiments actually performed are. A more satisfactory stage would be
where one understands the functional structure well enough to know why certain
of these NECQ's will cause the person to report that he has experienced this
qualia, and in the case of a severe pain will cause all of the other nonverbal
indicators of pain (sweat, heartbeat, etc.) to occur. This subset of the 
NECQ's one might call the NCEFCQ (Neural Cause of the Exact Functional 
Correlates of the Qualia). In a functionalist's account this is the end of 
science, in this field. If someone asks about the actual pains he will be met
with a blank stare, or a response: "What are you talking about? I have already
explained everything that there is." It is as if the functionalist does not 
know what an actual pain is, but only what a reporting of pain and other 
deep behavioral/functional activities are. But another possible stage of 
science would be a causal theory that includes among its primitive elements 
things such as `an experiencing of pain by Stan Klein'. To the extent that 
such a theory were true one would have the basis for talking about NCCQ.

I think such a theory is within reach, and that it is testable in the 
sense that it will explain the facts, and explain more than its competitors:
the phenomenal facts are, after all, the basis of science, and a theory 
that fails to explains how these fact are tied into brain activity is less 
satisfactory than a theory that does.  

But as Gregg points out the word `cause' might not be the right word even
in such a causal theory. For example, in my quantum theory of the mind/brain
there is a process the includes events that have two aspects: a phenomenal
aspect that is describable in phenomenal terms and a physical aspect that
is described in the mathematical framework of quantum theory.
These two aspects constitute partial features of the whole event. They 
co-occur because they are two aspects of one and the same event. But it would
be incorrect to say that either one `caused' the other.

Regarding Pat Hayes's reply (March 7) to your query, you see what sort of 
problems ensue from trying to adopt a functionalist position. At the  
beginning he confirmed that he was saying `the pain' IS 
`the neural activity'. This seems blatantly to contradict what we normally
would mean by such a statement. How does he defend it? 

By shifting the meaning! He ends up saying something that we would normally 
express by saying: there are two descriptions, one phenomenal and one
functional, of one happening. There are two  different `descriptions'
of one `happening'. This seems similar to the dual-aspect position
of Rosenberg and of quantum theory, but Hayes speaks of two 
`descriptions' rather than two really existing properties or activities.

So Hayes's statement that `the pain' IS `the neural activity' does not mean
what you and most people would take it to mean. It does not mean that that 
`excruciating feeling that you actually feel' is the very same thing as some
equally real thing, the `motions of some particles in your head'.
Its meaning is more like the assertion that `the Morning Star' IS 
`the Evening Star' (both being Venus) where these phrases `the Morning Star'
 and `the Evening Star' designate the *cause* of the experiences called
"the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star". But normally when one says 
`the pain' one means the experience itself, not its cause. But the experiences 
themselves are omitted from the functionalist ontology. The real question, 
therefore, is whether the functionalist is omitting something real that 
needs to be included in a complete scientific account brain dynamics , 
or is omitting merely some illusion that man has dreamed up. 

Well, this is what the situation seems to me to be, but I would welcome
corrections, or improvements. (I am basing my conception of the 
functionalist position on my understanding of Pat Hayes's recent 
communications, but am not sure whether this is the official party line, or
simply Pat's own version.)

Henry