From peternick@earthlink.net Tue Aug 10 10:03:18 1999 Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1999 09:41:27 +1000 From: Peter Mutnick To: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov, chalmers@paradox.ucsc.edu Subject: [Fwd: The Rocket's Red Glare (Dialogue with Henry Stapp) -- Peter Mutnick (version 4, FINAL CORRECTED VERSION)] Henry, This is a very good dialogue, IMHO. If more of the physicists and philosophers would participate on this level, q-mind forum would become like Plato's Academy, which would make Heisenberg very happy. Peter [ Part 2: "Included Message" ] Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1999 09:11:27 +1000 From: Peter Mutnick To: quantum-mind@listserv.arizona.edu Cc: peternick@earthlink.net Subject: The Rocket's Red Glare (Dialogue with Henry Stapp) -- Peter Mutnick (version 4, FINAL CORRECTED VERSION) [ The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set. ] [ Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set. ] [ Some characters may be displayed incorrectly. ] Note to Henry and David, I would like to send this, or some further extension of it, in to the quantum-mind forum, but only with your permission. I hope you find my comments at least genuinely perplexing and in the right spirit. Peter Mutnick Note from Henry Stapp: Peter, I have reponded to your comments, and you can send the exchange to q-mind if you wish. But I do not intend to get back onto q-mind myself. You should cite as the source the entry "My Flagstaff Talks" on my website, which is open to all. My comments pertaining to Chalmers were made in the context of his book "The Conscious Mind: In search of a fundamental theory" (Oxford, 1996), and the two talks that I gave at Flagstaff. Those sources give the background that I assumed. My Website http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html [Henry Stapp] PART III Discussion with Chalmers about this Quantum Ontology. One of Chalmers' question can be posed as follows: Is this ontology an idealistic monism or an interactive dualism? Answer: Both! Fundamentally it is an idealistic monism: all elements are idea-like. But there are TWO DIFFERENT knowledge-like aspects: (1) The subjective knowings. (2) The evolving objective state of knowledge, which is the accumulation of the subjective knowings. The evolution of the objective state of knowledge, which is the physical aspect of nature, proceeds via an "interaction" with the subjective aspects via accumulation. [Peter Mutnick] Wouldn't interactive dualism be manifested in von Neumann's Process 2, [Henry] No! Dualism requires TWO things, whereas the vN process 2 (Schroedinger evolution of the quantum state) involves only one thing. [Peter, later] The two things I had in mind are subject and object, or the subjective and objective aspects of the wave function evolving according to the Schroedinger equation. You know the famous quote from Heisenberg (p. 53 of "Physics and Philosophy"), probably by heart: "This probability function follows the laws of quantum theory, and its change in the course of time, which is continuous, can be calculated from the initial conditions; this is the second step. The probability function combines both objective and subjective elements...." [Henry, later] The INTERACTION occurs when process 1 enters. Also, Heisenberg makes it clear immediately that the subjective aspect of the state in Copenhagen quantum theory is associated with the fact that an individual human observer's knowledge is incomplete, and hence the state of his personal knowledge is a statistical mixture. The state of the universe that occurs in the vN/W theory that I am talking about is objective since it a compendium of all the subjective knowings: it does not refer preferentially to any individual. It is the analog in that theory of the objective physical world of classical physical theory, even though it represents only knowledge. [Peter] which I would see as physical, [Henry] as do I: it is ONE WING of the dualism between physical and knowings. [Peter, later] This is a broader kind of subject/object dualism that involves mental description and (presumed) physical reality. However, I see subject and object present also in the physical and state vector formalism including the wave function present also in the mental plane description. [Peter] and idealistic monism be manifested in von Neumann's Process 1, [Henry] The vN process 1 is only part of the whole process: there is also the "physical" aspect, which accounts, for example, for all the regularities described by classical physical theory. You do not get an idealistic monism unless ALL parts of nature are basically idealike. So to get idealistic monism both the physical aspect associated with process 2, and the knowings associated with process 1 must be idea like. [Peter, later] Heisenberg goes on to say about the evolving wave function, "It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies ('potentia' in Aristotelian philosophy), and these statements are completely objective, they do not depend on any observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be different for different observers. In ideal cases the subjective element in the probability function may be practically negligible as compared with the objective one. The physicists then speak of a 'pure case.'" And then, "After this interaction [with the measuring device] has taken place, the probability function contains the objective element of tendency and the subjective element of incomplete knowledge, even if it had been a 'pure case' before." Finally, "The observation itself changes the probability function discontinuously; it selects of all possible events the actual one that has taken place. Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation also has undergone discontinuous change and we speak of a quantum 'jump.'" So, my point is that before the interaction with the measuring device, there was in the evolving wave function a subjective/objective dualism, weighted in favor of the objective. The interaction with the measuring device restores the balance of a now inevitable subjective/objective dualism. And finally, the reduction tips the balance in favor of the subjective, since the discontinuous change corresponds entirely to a change in our knowledge. So, it is this unitive ideation that constitutes the basis for idealistic monism while the subject/object dualism was an interactive dualism, since the subjective and objective aspects cannot be separated, nor are they fully integrated until the actual reduction which extracts the information held in "potentia." [Henry, later] The vN/W quantum theory get away from all that confusion that infests the Copenhagen QT when one departs from its rational status as a set of rules for making predictions, and tries to make a sensible ontology. The vN/W quantum theory is ontologically clear and straight forward. That is what I am using. [Peter] which I would see as patently meta-physical? [Henry] I see vN process 1 as the actual effect of mind on the physical. [Peter, later] This process is obscure in orthodox theory, as I think you once mentioned in one of your papers. Exactly how the change in our knowledge changes the reality is not explained. In fact, to dodge the question, orthodox theory tends to deny the reality altogether. But this cannot satisfy Einstein or any other physical realist who senses a cop-out here. [Henry, later] Orthodox (i.e., vN/W) theory, as I understand, it does not deny reality: rather it adopts a basically idealistic view of reality, which however is closely tied into quantum theory in such a way that the physical-objective aspect interacting with our subjective knowings explains all of the physical properties that classical physical theory explained, and much more besides: all quantum phenomena. Einstein certainly objected to Copenhagen QT, which had no representation of reality, but only a set of disembodied rules. But he might have been more sympathetic to vN/W, who do have a simple coherent ontology. [Peter, later, cont.] My explanation is that the reduction is meta-physical, but the meta-physical is linked to the physical through the seven planes of ontological reality. The reduction happens uroborically, across the transcendental abyss between the physical and the meta-physical, but the meta-physical then acts through the ether (which is the fourth plane) upon the physical, as a higher plane acting on a lower plane. [Stapp] Chalmers asks: What about the Hilbert space vector? It REPRESENTS the evolving state of absolute or objective knowledge. But what is its ontological status? Physical theories merely specify relationships. The relationships between our subjective experiences that are consequences of their connections to the evolving state of knowledge are real, and the mathematical structures by means of which we understand these relationships are real elements of our thoughts. But there are, according to the ontology proposed here, no added entities beyond subjective knowings and the evolving objective state of knowledge specified by their accumulation. Vectors of all sorts are parts of our theoretical imaginings, by means of which we represent to ourselves, and to each other, relationships that may exist between various aspects of nature. But they exist in our thoughts alone. It would be ontologically nonparsimonious to have as basic ontological entities both the evolving state of knowledge AND a vector that represents it. And it is bad to have ontological aspects of nature that are not logically related: that was Chalmers' main point, and also the main lesson of the history of science. [Mutnick] It seems to me that state vectors in the original orthodox theory of Bohr and Heisenberg were associated with the actual events and knowings which reduce them, while the state vector of the universe is associated with objective knowledge. [Henry] The orthodox idea is that the quantum state of a system represents OUR KNOWLEDGE of that system, and it is objective because it is intersubjective: it belongs equally to all of us. If we follow vN/W and bring in the state of the whole universe, then this "objectivity" can become somewhat strengthened: it becomes more "absolute". [Peter, later] What about before there were any human observers? I would say that the State Vector of the Universe, which represents Wisdom in its entirety is objective Knowledge, while the state vectors of individual systems that are components of Wisdom represent "our" knowledge. Our "knowings" are based on this lesser knowledge and are changes in it. There is then the recurring mystery of how changes in our knowledge change objective knowledge and reality. This is described in Vedic literature as the unity of the Atman and the Brahman. [Henry, later] There must be simpler kinds of knowings than ours. [Peter] I know both Heisenberg and Dirac said that the state vector represents our knowledge (which is of course not entirely objective), but I wonder if they were not in essence conflating the state vectors of individual systems with the state vector of the universe, which would have been forbidden to talk about by Bohr. [Henry] Dirac and Heisenberg thought deeply about these matters, and understood very well what they were saying. They were following the Copenhagen line, which they helped create, in which the system that is represented by the wave function (state vector) is some smallish system that does not include we human observers of that smallish system. vN/W went beyond that idea, and took a more ontological, rather than pragmatic, approach, which brought in the idea of the wave function of the universe. These two approaches are very different in spirit and in practice. In order to cope with the problem of the relationship of consciousness to brain one must go over to the vN/W form of QT. But in that transition from Copenhagen to vN/W one MUST RETAIN the basic commitment to the quantum precept that the quantum state represents an objective knowledge that includes the "our knowledge" that the Copenhagen quantum theory described, for it was VIA THIS REQUIREMENT that vN/W were able to show that their vN/W version reproduced all the predictions of the Copenhagen version. [Peter, later] I think the difference between vN/W and Copenhagen comes in sooner than you do. Von Neumann does seem to be talking about a physical objective reality, while Copenhagen was always talking about mental description or phenomenal reality to the exclusion of physical reality. In his later, post-1935 work, Bohr did begin to speculate about the deeper connections. [Stapp] Chalmers suggested that there could be no ontological reality that was ^Ñthe evolving state of knowledge^Ò because at the beginning of time, before the first knowing, there was no knowledge. But perhaps there is no beginning, or perhaps "in the beginning was the word", which is both a knowing and a state of knowledge. [Peter, later] As I have already said, one must distinguish "our" knowledge from objective knowledge. "Our" knowledge is always limited and any isolated object of that knowledge is even more limited. [Mutnick] I would see Henry's knowings as falling under the heading of Wisdom. Wisdom, (Kantian) Understanding, and Knowledge constitute the Hassidic triad, Chokmah-Binah-Daath, or CHABAD. One can add, as Henry suggests, the Word, which would be Crown or Kether. The point of all this is that Kantian Understanding is grounded in the Noumenon as an unknowable but essential point of reference. The Universe I would see as the connection between the sephiroths of Understanding and Crown, part Noumenon and part Word. The State Vector of the Universe represents Wisdom itself in relation to the Universe, whereas the state vectors of individual systems are just components of Wisdom. [Henry] No comment. [Stapp] Chalmers noted that whereas I focussed on classical physical theory, and its contrast with orthodox quantum theory, his argument really did not single out classical physical theory in contrast to quantum theory: the important distinction was whether or not consciousness supervened on the physical, and that distinction cuts across the quantum-classical divide. [Peter, later] Bohr apparently agreed with Chalmers. Here is a quote from page 120 of the "Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr," Volume IV: "As for Professor von Neumann's remark about the separation of the phenomenon and the observer, he [Bohr] thought that the problems we were dealing with in quantum theory were naturally defined as soon as the phenomenon was fixed into the descriptive framework of daily life, whether it were a case of finding the place where an electron or a photon was absorbed into a photographic plate rigidly attached to the reference system, or if it concerned direct visual impressions, for which the retina acted as a photographic plate. Any question of observation beyond those limits was, in his opinion, a philosophical problem, common to all domains of knowledge, and for which atomic theory was in no way distinct from classical physics." [Henry, later] My exchange with Chalmers was about my use of some technical arguments from his book. [Stapp, cont.] That is true. But Chalmers' actual arguments were phrased in terms of the ideas of classical physical theory, and the source of the intuitions about the nature of "the physical" that allowed him to conclude that consciousness does not supervene on "the physical" was the classical conception of "the physical": it would be circular to characterize "the physical" by the requirement that consciousness not supervene on it. One needs some independent characterization of "the physical", and this is supplied by the clear concepts of classical physical theory. [Mutnick] In my ontological system of worlds, the quantum physical is connected uroborically to the classical meta-physical. In the midst of this divide is a transcendental system of worlds wherein the God Consciousness supervenes (more or less) on the physical. But the consciousness usually referred to by orthodox theory seems to be the Christ Consciousness or Cosmic Consciousness or Stream of Consciousness, which is the part of von Neumann's III that is absorbed in the phenomenal object on the fifth plane of ontological reality. As I see it, the physical plane of the transcendental system of worlds that spans the divide is neither quantum nor classical, or perhaps, as the realm of measuring instruments, both quantum and classical, depending on one's viewpoint. [Stapp] Yet, indeed, Chalmers' arguments do apply equally well to all the forms of quantum theory in which "the physical" is related to consciousness in essentially the same way as in classical physical theory: his arguments do cover those forms of quantum theory in which one tries to follow classical ideas and keep conscious out of our scientific description of nature. The important distinction is INDEED between classical-type theories in which "the physical" does not logically, or conceptually, entail consciousness and the theories LIKE orthodox (i.e., vN/W) quantum theory that make consciousness basic. But if one must use some theory of this latter type, then orthodox QT is surely the best bet: it was already spawned and honed by empirical demands. Chalmers says that his approach is not epiphenomenalism. He suggests, in somewhat vague terms, some ways that epiphenomenalism might possibly be avoided. But his suggestions all involve giving up the normal concepts of classical physical theory, with its idea of strict deterministic causation by means of physical CONTACTS that MAKE the next event or situation happen, and with its exclusion of any conscious underpinning to the physical entities and properties. These normal classical physical concepts were the basis of Chalmers' arguments that, in classical physical theory, consciousness does not supervene on the physical. I do not believed that Chalmers has successfully evaded epiphenomenalism staying within the strict confines of classical physical theory as it is normally conceived. But if one must go to something else, then the first thing to try is the alternative that physicists have already discovered and worked out, and that APPEARS to be pertinent, namely the ORTHODOX QT of von Neumann and Wigner. Indeed, Chalmers' positive suggestions (e.g., in his section "Strategies for avoiding epiphenomenalism") all seem to point in that direction. [Mutnick] God Consciousness may supervene on the physical insofar as the physical with its causal structure is deemed to exist, simply because God has granted Free Will to the creation, including the causal creatures, which are human beings. This is the so-called prime directive. However, the freedom of the God Consciousness is precisely as the uroboric link between physical quantum and meta-physical classical ontological realities. This is the eternal reality irrespective of what human beings may choose to do or the creation is compelled to do to balance the karma of human choices. [Stapp] The fact that SOME physicists have tried to return to the moribund classical idea that consciousness should be kept out of physics---in spite of the fact that it is clearly part of a natural world that is far more unified than classical ideas permit---and that these backward-looking physicists have produced a bevy of unorthodox interpretations [which are not widely believed or accepted by other physicists, and which have serious flaws] should not confuse scientists and philosophers who are investigating the connection between brain and consciousness into being blind to ALL versions of quantum theory: The orthodox formulation is ideally suited to their needs. Rejecting quantum theory because a few scientist cannot shake off old prejudices, is not the sensible thing to do, particularly in view of the profound difficulties and endless controversies that beset also the philosophers who cling to those false and inadequate old ideas. [Mutnick] Counterpoint: Bohr and the other founders of the orthodox interpretation emphasized not only the correspondence principle but the principle that one should continue to use the classical concepts insofar as possible and reinterpret them only when necessary. [Henry] That was not their idea at all. They saw the physical change as fundamentally radical. But they recognized that we do in fact describe our human knowings---i.e., what we think we have observed---in the language of everyday life, honed over millennia, refined by the language of classical physical theory. This is the language by means of which we communicated to other scientists and human beings what we have done and what we have learned. The world was radically different from what classical physical theory claimed it to be, but our experiences, or OUR KNOWLEDGE, insofar as they pertained to macroscopic experiments that we might perform, are described in an older language. [Peter, later] I will quote briefly from Aage Petersen (page 107 of "Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition"). As Bohr's longtime assistant, it would seem that Petersen was in a unique position to know Bohr's mind. "To explore the implications of the quantum-imposed 'individuality' of physical processes one must identify the conceptual elements of the classical scheme or, in Bohr's language, exhibit the presuppositions for unambiguous application of the elementary physical concepts. Then one must investigate to what extent these presuppositions are compatible with the quantum postulate." [Henry, later] I have repeatedly stressed that Bohr's position must be constructed from his own voluminous published works, not what someone else thinks he thought or thinks he recalls. If Bohr's ideas could be expressed in other simpler ways then I think he would have said it that way himself. But he writes in very careful but detailed ways in order not to be misunderstood. But in any case it is certainly correct that Bohr did describe on many occasions, and in very similar words how the classical concepts enter into quantum theory: they enter via the fact that we use ordinary language refined by the concepts of classical physics to communicate to our colleagues what we have done and what we have learned: i.e, how we have prepared the devices and what knowledge we have gained from our observations of the outcomes. That is the accurate way that Bohr himself described the role of classical physics in quantum theory. [Peter, later] This is the very essence of my understanding, as well, and I think that classical here does not have the meaning of a kind of magic show, like Dennett's Cartesian theater, that exists parasitically upon the quantum substratum. Rather the classical continues to exist as the meta-physical essence of all reality, and the physical quantum existence is unfolded from it. [Henry, later] Bohr never advanced any such meta-physics: to do so would be completely contrary to his epistemological, as opposed to ontological, approach. [Peter, later, cont.] The meta-physical is not less real so long as it is recognized as meta-physical, which was the point that William James made in the Introduction to "Principles of Psychology." This essential realization was of course what was lacking in classical physics. [Peter] They wanted as much solid ground beneath their feet as humanly possible. [Henry] No! That was not their point. Rather, they recognized that the interface between the external world and the internal world, insofar as we are doing physics experiments, was via a certain language, but they rigorously abstained from trying to inject that old language into the new physical reality itself, which is some new kind of "stuff". Nevertheless, exigencies of science demand that the old language be used for human communication. But it should be used for human communication ALONE: THAT was their main point. One should NOT try to put old, approximate, and false, ideas into the reality itself. [Peter, later] You have said many times yourself that Bohr especially tended to deny the relevance to physics, if not the very existence, of the "reality itself." I think that is a false reading of Bohr, but it is correct that he rejected the postulation of a new quantum independent reality to take the place of the old classical independent reality. Reality is now seen as a process of unfolding and enfolding - the unfolding of quantum reality and its enfolding back into the context of classical reality. [Henry, later] Sounds like Bohm, not Bohr. But Bohr never denied reality. He simply showed how to do science without making commitments about meta-physical questions that need not be answered to apply quantum theory to atomic phenomena. [Peter] Theirs was not a complete uprooting of the classical viewpoint, but a subtle deepening and expanding. That is why there is not so much distance between orthodox theory and Bohm theory as the Bohmians are claiming. [Henry] On the contrary, that is why there IS such a huge conceptual gulf between Copenhagen and Orthodox (i.e., vN/w) quantum theory and Bohmian theory (based on his 1952 papers): the latter puts classical ideas right into the physics, which is exactly what the Copenhagen and Orthodox theory eschewed. [Peter, later] I don't see how Bohmian theory could put classical ideas into the physics if they weren't there to begin with. I agree with the Petersen quote above that one "can" and "must" put classical ideas into the physics, but only insofar as it is compatible with the quantum postulate, or the postulate of the unknowable individuality of the ultimate physical referent of all description. This is where the disagreement with Bohm comes, in that Bohm thinks one can put classical ideas into the physics without limit, while Bohr says there is a limit. Bohm's theories, insofar as they are profound and interesting, do not attempt to violate the limit, but rather to explore the limit. [Henry, later] No one denies the classical features of human experience. That is Bohr's starting point. What is highly significant that you are forced to turn to how Aage Petersen tried to understand Bohr, rather than anything Bohr wrote. Your ideas may be completely correct, but don't say that Bohr agrees. [Peter] Of course, there were differences within the Copenhagen circle in this regard ^Ö Pauli did tend to be more of a revolutionary, while Bohr was more conservative ^Ö Heisenberg was somewhere in between. [Henry] but they all agreed that classical description was brought in by human descriptions of what human beings did and learned, and should not be confounded with reality itself: THAT is exactly the essential core element of the Copenhagen philosophy, and it carries over to the more ontological vN/W interpretation. [Peter, later] I seem to have caught you in a contradiction - you purport to believe in idealism and the idea-like nature of all reality and yet you say that the very ideas humans find essential cannot lay claim to reality. How does this state of affairs come about? [Henry, later] The question is whether the real world out there is really made of tiny bits of matter, as classical physical theory avers, or whether classical structure comes in because our thoughts have classical features. It is easy to show that thoughts that do not have this classical structure, but which would actualize, say superpositions of classical-type structures could not reproduce themselves or be causally efficacious, and hence would have no survival value for individuals that had experiences of that kind. That is why our experiences have classical structure: its all a matter of natural selection.