From: SMTP%"PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU" 14-AUG-1997 19:08:30.24 To: STAPP CC: Subj: Re: References and causal linkage Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 13:24:03 -0700 From: STAPP@THEORM.lbl.gov Subject: Re: References and causal linkage Sender: "PSYCHE Discussion Forum (Theoretical emphasis)" To: PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU Reply-to: "PSYCHE Discussion Forum (Theoretical emphasis)" Message-id: <970814132403.2e603125@theorm.lbl.gov> Approved-By: metacom@MINDSPRING.COM Mind-Matter Synthesis. Thesis: Mind is not reducible to matter; it does not logically supervene on matter. Antithesis: Mind is reducible to matter. The thesis rests basically on the huge disparity between our normal conception of matter and our intuitive grasp of what our conscious experiences are like. It is defended on this forum recently by Robinson. The antithesis is the identity-theory/functionalism viewpoint. It stems from the fact that conscious experience cannot be defined in terms of anything else: any characterization of it in terms of something else would leave out its most essential feature. So it can only be characterized in terms of its internal structure, which is causally incomplete; being intertwined, at the very least, with unconscious or subconscious elements. It has recently been defended on this forum by Neil Rickert. The apparent inability of the proponents of the contending views to communicate to each other suggests that the time is ripe for an Hegelian synthesis. Rickert proposes to make `information' the basis of consciousness: "I am suggesting that consciousness is the picking up of that information". [August 9] "So what I take as the information is not public, and must be considered to have a subjective component. I actually want to use `information' as meaning `that which informs me', and I take it that meaning should clarify why there something subjective about it."[August 8] But if the information is not public, yet is associated with `me', ---in the psychological sense, since 'me' in the bodily sense is public--- then he seems to have moved into a position of merely focussing on some `informational' aspect of conscious experience. So there seems to be a blurring here of exactly what the debate is about: Robinson is clearly insisting that we have conscious experiences that should be recognized as such, and described in the way we describe our experiences. Rickert does not seem to be denying this. And I doubt that Robinson would deny that it could be useful to examine the structure of our experiences in terms of flow of `information'---information in the sense of what informs (the conscious) `me'---to the extent that that notion can be made clear. So it seems that the point at issue has become blurred! I think this blurring is a consequence of the fact that one basic element of the problem---one that is behind our intuitions---is not being made explicit. That is the idea of `matter': that intuition is lurking, unmentioned, in the wings. If Robinson does not mention `matter' and its properties then he could be talking about a universe built out of some mind-matter stuff that can manifest (i.e., under some condition BE) conscious experiences, and yet have the causal structure in spacetime that the empirical evidence demands. If Rickert does not mention `matter' and its properties then he could be speaking of the same sort of universe. He has, I think, not put forth a clear assertion that conscious experiences are constructed out of something `else', since his `information' seems to be interpretable as a property or aspect of some mind-matter stuff. So I suggest that the two intuitively disparate positions are converging to a common synthesis, which, in fact, is the same synthesis that physics is moving toward. Once one shakes out certain obscuring false intuitions about the nature of `matter' one is left with a coherent synthesis of the seemingly irreconcilable points of view, and one that is certainly compatible with---and I would even say is independently indicated by---modern physics. I have explained the main points many times [see my home page] so I merely list here the essential points of this synthesis: 1. Orthodox modern physics is about "events", not substances. 2. Some of these "events" might be associated with inanimate devices, and would not be directly associated with conscious experiences of the kind human beings have. 3. But some of the events are associated with human beings, and some of the latter are human conscious experiences: orthodox pragmatic quantum theory is built precisely upon events of this latter kind, and the very essence of the orthodox interpretation is that we MUST build our basic physical theory on the conscious human experiences, in order to have a rationally coherent theoretical framework. The founders of quantum theory, all famous and renowned physicists, were DRIVEN to this radical (for physicists) conclusion. 4. Although orthodox quantum theory eschews ontological commitment, the de facto ontology is one of a mind-matter stuff that manifests human conscious experiences under appropriate physical circumstances---namely a properly functioning human body/brain--- and manifests these experiences within a mathematical structure that is in full accord, insofar as we have been able to check the theory empirically, with the actual structure of our experiences. 5. This framework permits our conscious experiences to influence the course of physical/mental events, and to emerge in a quantum mechanically governed universe by a process of natural selection. We must resist allowing unmentioned and fundamentally false classical intuitions about `matter' to block progress toward a philosophically, mathematically, and scientifically sound synthesis of the mathematical and experiential aspects of the natural world! Henry P. Stapp http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html