Dennett's Behaviorism and Quantum Theory. The recent Journal of Consciousness Studies Volume (10. no,1) on "The double life of B.F. Skinner" has an article by Daniel C. Dennett defending a certain kind a behaviorism and opposing a certain kind of dualism. The kind of "behaviorism" that Dennett defends has room for "feelings, pains, dreams, beliefs, and hopes and expectations" " but only so long as these are understood to be physical (`informational' or `computational') processes that could be accomplished by the machinery of the brain." Dennett evidently grants "the central importance for a science of psychology of making sense of the Jamesian stream of consciousness" but rejects the idea of taking "this stream of consciousness to be sharply distinguished from the streams of mere information-manipulation discernible in the activities of cortical subsystems, etc., etc. The key concept here is "physical processes that could be accomplished by the machinery of the brain." As long as this concept is not clearly defined neither is Dennett's thesis. If one accepts the notion that the brain is, for these purposes of studying the stream of consciousness associated with that brain, adequately described by the concepts and principles of classical physics, which make the brain into a conglomeration of balls and levers and springs and gears and cogs, then the phrase "physical processes that could be accomplished by brain machinery" acquires a clear meaning. Then what "could be accomplished by brain machinery" does not include the conclusion that a certain brain activity is accompanied by "a feeling of subjective pain," although that brain activity certainly could account for some verbal reports of a "feeling of pain." The point is simply that the concept of "a feeling of subjective pain" does not enter into the conceptual structure of classical physical theory, which, however, is dynamically complete. The machinery of the brain determines the motions of its physical parts without saying anything at all about "subjective feelings" associated with brain activities. So it would inconsistent for Dennett to claim that the brain machinery accounts for any understanding of the Jamesian stream of consciousness, insofar as that stream includes "subjective feelings." If he claims that the Jamesian stream of consciousness that his behaviorist approach makes sense of does not include "subjective feelings" such as pains, then he would seem to driven to claim either that they do not exist, which is belied by experience, or they exist but are not covered by his "science of psychology," which would then be less complete than a rival scientific theory that does account for subjective experiences. There is another problem. Dennett notes that the scientific method in psychology involves intrerviewing subjects, under controlled conditions, and taking verbal reports. That involves dealing with descriptions couched in psychological terms. But he also stresses "physical brain process" which is described in terms of mathematical properties ascribed to point or tiny regions in space. Thus psycho-physics uses two kinds of descriptions of the mind/brain: psychological descriptions and physical descriptions. They are both parts of sciences. So there is an intrinsic dualism in the scientific method that must be recognized at the outset. There are two ways of probing the mind/brain: via conceptual communication, and via physical probings. Science is based on both. In classical physics the physical description is dynamically complete. Hence one is driven to the conclusion that every feature of nature must, to the extent that it has any effect in the physical universe, be describable in physical terms. Any effect not traceable to an exclusively physically describable cause would be "magic." But the whole basis of the application of quantum theory to the problem of consciousness is that the quantum dynamics has inputs from two sources, one physical the other psychological. (See "Quantum Approaches to Consciousness on my Website.)