From stapp@thwk10.lbl.gov Thu Jul 28 09:57:58 2005 Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2005 09:36:50 -0700 (PDT) From: stapp@thwk10.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: "Hinzen, W." Subject: RE: First Draft-comments On Wed, 27 Jul 2005, Hinzen, W. wrote: > Just a quick response to some few points, I'll get back to the rest: > > > > > > Larger comments > > > > > 1. What exactly is the message of this paper? That the > > > > > Libet experiments are fully CONSISTENT with quantum interactive > > > > > dualism and the causal efficacy of the mental (or > > > > > perhaps merely > > > > > its active veto and control function)? > > > > > > > > > HPS: The message is that the Libet data do not imply that > > > > our volitions must be *consequences* of brain activity, rather > > > > than inputs from 'res cogitans' that are not completely specified > > > > by the physically/mathematically described aspects of reality. > > > > The Libet data is interpreted by materialists as evidence that > > > > what we feel to be choices driven by reasons and consciously felt > > > > experiences are actually just---or can be considered to > > > > be just--- > > > > consequences of the physically described aspects of nature, > > > > and that the > > > > reasons and consciously felt experiences are either > > > > epiphenomenal side > > > > effects that have no real causal effects on brain or body > > > > activity, > > > > or that these experiential realities are merely alternative > > > > characterizations of aspects of nature that are > > > > ultimately traceable > > > > to, and are causal consquences of, the fundamentally mechanical > > > > physically described (localizable) aspects of nature that > > > > Descartes > > > > called res extensa, and that Newton built his physics upon. The > > > > > > Not sure that is historically true (enough). Newton's conception of > > > matter exploded Cartesian res extensa. > > > > What does this word "exploded" mean here?? > > It seems to me that Newton retained the idea of a part > > built of things located in space. > > > > > But without res extensa, no res cogitans. > > > > I keep both aspects. So what is your point here? > > Are you making a big distinction between Descartes' res extensa > > and Newtonian Matter? I regard the latter as a special case of the > > former. Is this interpretation (of mine) what you are objecting to? > > Descartes' dualism was built on the foundation of the 'Mechanical Philosophy', inaugurated by Robert Boyle. If you make that your scientific ideal, he found, the mental is to be left out, since it cannot be accounted for mechanically. Thus dualism is born. It's erected on the foundations of the modern scientific world view, hence in no way a non-scientific doctrine, as is often claimed. Then Newton came and destroyed the mechanical philosophy. He found it did not only not work for "mind", but also not for "body". In short, there IS no res extensa in Descartes' sense, which is the sense of the mechanical philosophy. And if there is no "body", there is no "mind" distinct from it. This is what it means that Newton "exploded" the machine: Ryle thought it was the "ghost" housing in it that was the problem. Newton found there was no machine. All his contemporaries, including Hume, Locke, and Leibniz, were horrified by this, and feared the old scholastic metaphysics with its mysterious "forces of attraction and repulsion" was back on the scene again, after Descartes and Galileo had tried to expel it - unsuccessfully, it now turned out. This is the story I was alluding to, which makes dualism a non-issue. The counterargument I gave myself is that even Newtonian matter is not good enough for mind. A duality prevails, though it cannot be called "Cartesian", since Cartesian dualism is premised on the mechanical philosophy. I thus also don't understand your remark that Newtonian matter is a special case of Cartesian res extensa, which I think is historically inaccurate, but not otherwise problematic. More later, I hope, yours ever, Wolfram. > Many thanks for your explanation. But when you say "Thus dualism is born." don't you mean Descartes' Dualism, which accommodates "mind" interacting with matter/brain. Does not this mean that Descartes res extensa is not required to be stricty mechanical, but can be a more general kind of structure imbedded in space (extended in space), which seems to be the way Descartes finally defined/characterized 'res extensa'. If res extensa were required to be strictly mechanical then it could not (according to your description of Descartes reasoning) accomodate mind, which is what Descartes was aiming to do. Also, Newton's theory evolved eventually into relativistic classical physics, which is "local". Would you say that relativistic classical physics, where all causation is transmitted via interactions between neighbors, and no faster than light, is mechanical? Is not this theory, relativistic classical mechanics, in res extensa? I have taken Descartes' 'Res Extensa' to be characterized by the requirement that it be describable in terms of mathematical quantities localized (essentially) at space-time points. That would encompass the structure of the evolving state of the universe of relativistic quantum field theory, which is the contemporary form of the physically described world of Newton. I presume that contemporary dualists do not want to be labelled as "Cartesian Dualists", since they will then be laughed out of court, and forever smeared. But if 'res extensa' is allowed to mean simply "describable in terms of mathematical quantities assigned to spacetime points" then I think that contemporary relativistic quantum field theory is built upon "res extensa", interacting with consciousness. RQFT, interpreted in accordance with the ideas of von Neumann-Tomonaga-Schwinger, seems to me to be essentially in line with Cartesian Dualism, characterized in this way. But I am anxious to learn whether this idea is wrong, and if so why. > PS1 I'll be on vacation for two weeks from tomorrow. > > PS2 No objection to put this or a part of this on the website. > > > > This is indeed why people like Chomsky say that the whole > > > dualism issue > > > evaporated through Newton. > > > > I presume that this means that, according to Newton, matter > > (elements of res extensa) is *everything*, at least as far as causal > > efficacy (in the physical/material/res extensa-based aspect > > of nature) > > is concerned. Mind was left out the causal picture by Newton: > > that is where QM deviates from Newtonian/classical theory. It brings > > consciousness into the physical dynamics in an essential noneliminable > > way, at least in human brains. Descartes also allowed > > interaction within > > human brains, so their is a close similarity between orthodox > > (von N) QM > > and Descartes' idea. > > > > > What you are implying here is that dualism is coherent > > > INDEPENDENTLY of > > > the Cartesian notion of matter on which it (in Descartes) > > > depended: > > > > In QM we have a physical description that is imbedded in spacetime: > > So we still have a "res extensa". But we also have (res cogitans) > > streams of consciousness that play a key role in the dynamical > > evolution of the physical (res extensa) part, at least in human > > brains. Our human minds depend upon our human brains, but are not > > completely determined by brain alone. No known laws determine > > our thoughts from brain activity. > > > > > > > With Newtonian matter, the issue of 'mind' arises as it did with > > > Cartesian matter, in ways you explain. This I think is the > > > right answer > > > to Chomsky. > > > > But with Newton there is causal closure of the physical, so > > there is a big > > problem of why is mind there at all, and why does it seem to > > be doing what > > according to Newtonian/classical physics brain alone (within > > the physical > > universe) already does by itself. > > > > But in QM there is causal interplay between res extensa and > > res cogitans, > > just as Descartes suggested. But QM actually supplies some of > > the mathematical rules connecting mind to matter, whereas Descartes > > lacking even the Newtonian/classical approximation, was unable to > > spell out, as QM does, precise laws connecting the two realms. I > > tried to make all this this clearer in my re-write. > > > > > > > advance from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics is a shift > > > > from a monistic materialism that is supposed to rest causally on > > > > res extensa to an interactive dualism that rests on an interaction > > > > between the physically described and the thinking/feeling > > > > aspect of reality. > > > > > > Does then the fact remain that BOTH the monist and you can make > > > sense of the Libet-data, even though you can do it in a way that > > > preserves pre-theoretic intuitions, which is a plus? > > > > The answer has several levels. > > In the first place, classical materialism is an *approximation* to QM, > > and examination shows that this approximation is not valid in human > > brains. In principle one must use QM, which is not > > monistic/deterministic. > > One might imagine that a classical monistic description could explain > > the behavior of the mind-brain, with mind epiphenomenal, and > > construct > > some materialist/deterministic model that *accounts* for the > > Libet data, > > but it cannot be based on valid physical principles---that > > i.e., respect > > the Heisenberg uncertainly principle at the ionic level. So the monist > > might be able to "make sense" of the Libet data, to his satisfaction, > > but at the cost of denying the basic laws of physics! So at this level > > we are not yet concerned about the intuition of free choice, or even > > consciousness, but merely compatibility with the most basic > > requirement > > of QM, compatibility with the replacement of numbers by > > actions, and the > > associated Planck's constant based features of the real world. > > > > Then there is the fact that the classical approximation works only > > when the phenomena under investigation do not involve the > > effects of mind on matter. The classical approximation eliminates all > > effects of mind upon matter. But in the Libet case the phenomena > > are precisely about the possible effects of mind on matter! So the > > applicability of the classical approximation is ruled out, a priori: > > classical mechanics specifically fails to cover the topic of the > > effects of mind upon matter, quite apart from the issue of > > the intuiton that our thoughts feel "free". > > > > Finally, there is the issue of "free choices", and our intuition > > that our choices are "free", in some significant way: that > > our thoughts > > themselves are somehow "instigators" of certain of our actions. QM > > is actually built around the idea that our choices can > > *consistently be > > treated as free input variables*. This notion that our "free choices" > > can consistently be treated as free input variable, in the > > mathematical > > treatment, seems to lead to causal anomalies in both the EPR- > > and Libet- > > type cases, but the theory gives a rationally coherent ontological > > explanation of both cases in the same way, by elevatng the pragmatic > > interpretation of the von Neumann formulation of QM to an ontology. > > This ontology rests on the idea of "potentialities for psychophysical > > events to occur", and features essentially instantaneous > > action-at-a-distance along the spacelike surfaces upon which the state > > of the universe is defined, but is nevertheless compatible with the > > requirement of the theory of realitivity that no signal can be sent > > faster that light. > > > > > > > > That would be to say that the experiments have a > > > > > quantum-mechanical > > > > > INTERPRETATION, or that quantum-mechanical effects COULD be > > > > > involved, > > > > > because an ontology based on Heisenberg "potentialities" > > > > > PERMITS (p. 13) > > > > > what the Libet experiments show, and the intitiation of > > > > > motor action COULD require a volitional effort (p. 17). > > > > > > > > HPS: PART of the message is that QM can accomodate (permit) > > > > the Libet data, but the importance/significance of this fact > > > > is that this QM interpretation reconciles these data with the > > > > assumption that the volitions can be treated as "free choices" > > > > not (fully) determined by brain/body activities. One MUST > > > > IN PRINCIPLE use QM, not CM, and when one does that the Libet- > > > > based argument that res cogitans is causally fixed by > > > > res extensa fails. The apparent causal anomaly associated > > > > > > OK, with this independent argument for dualism (as derived from QM) > > and its principled need, I think you win. > > > > Yes, the point being that with a VALID applicable physical theory the > > Libet data is compatible with causally efficacious 'free > > choices", hence > > that data cannot rule out that possibility. > > > > > > > > > the combination of Libet's data with the idea of "free choice" > > > > is evaded in the same way as the EPR paradox was resolved. > > > > > > > > > > > > > What Libet - judging from > > > > > his rethoric elsewhere, would, I think, ask here is > > > > > experimental > > > > > support for all of these POSSIBILITIES, or for an argument that > > > > > QM is REQUIRED. > > > > > > > > HPS: QM is required, above all, by physics, But it is also > > > > required to save the notion of "free choice", which Libet > > > > wants to save. If one tries to stay with CM then the later > > > > "consent" that Libet wants to invoke, to save "free choice" > > > > in the face of his data, would be not be free: He (Libet) > > > > must dump CM in order even to entertain the idea of "free > > > > choice". But when one throws out CM one must ask what > > > > > > Ah, that seems obvious enough - and it makes it quite puzzling > > > why Libet isn't actually simply a determinist. > > > > > > > physics is to replace it. There is, at present, only one > > > > candidate, QM. So one must ask whether that replacements > > > > (QM) will do the job of saving "free choice". It is not > > > > immediately clear that QM can do the job, but I show that > > > > QM can do the job. > > > > > > > > > > > > >Also, you end up saying merely that there is a > > > > >"causal gap". But does speaking of "volitions" etc., things > > > > >we don't really understand, really fill this gap? Or does it > > > > >fill it in an honest way? > > > > > > > > HPS: QM has a causal gap, and hence it provides a *possibility* > > > > that conscious effort could have causal effects. But QM goes far > > > > beyond just providing an opening for conscious effort to make > > > > a difference. The all-important Process 1 is specifically an > > > > injection of a freely chosen conscious intent of an agent > > > > onto the physically described observed system. QM is formulated > > > > as an interactive dualism. The conscious choices made by > > > > the agents > > > > pertaing to which probing action they will undertake is a key part > > > > of the existing orthodox theory. It is not something that needs > > > > to be invented or added on. And these volitions are what we > > > > understand > > > > best of all things. These things are the foundations of our lives. > > > > Our perceptions can delude us, and our theoretical ideas > > > > about the > > > > nature of physical reality can be profoundly mistaken, but > > > > our volitional > > > > efforts we know intimately. QM rest on the secure realities of > > > > our conscious volutions. > > > > > > But then, playing devil's advocate, why not say that talk about > > > these volitions, intentions, etc. is just LANGUAGE? Things > > > need not be > > > for real just because we think of them in a certain way. Take Paul > > > Bloom, > > > who says that dualism is innate. Children simply naturally > > > evolve these > > > categories of 'mind' and 'body' natively (there is > > > experimental evidence > > > for that, in fact), but these simply do not describe > > > anything in nature. > > > Moreover: true, QM is formulated as an interactive dualism. But the > > > mental vocabulary that enters here is just filling a gap in our > > > explanations that we do not know how to fill in an honest > > > way. Do we > > > UNDERSTAND what's needed here any better, by saying: well, > > > you see, a > > > conscious volition takes place. Might we not talk, more > > > neutrally, about > > > a "Process 1", which is just more physics, and not bring > > > psycho-physical > > > dualism into the picture? > > > > > > > One cannot deduce ontology from theory. > > > > The way I usually put it is this. Science deals with our descriptions, > > not with realities. CM had a description called a description of the > > physical world. It was in terms of mathematical quantities > > tied to points > > in spacetime. The theory worked so well that people thought that the > > description was isomorphic to an aspect of reality itself. The failure > > of CM inoculated physicists (and I presume philosophers of science) > > against the dangers of assuming that the usefulness in an empirically > > adequate theory of a description conceived to be a > > description of X entails > > the existence of X. Science deals with descriptions, not > > realities. The > > quantum physicists were made acutely aware of this, and their words > > (particularly those of Bohr) focussed on theory as manipulation of > > descriptions, for useful purposes. > > > > In science we have a description of a system of interest. In basic > > physics this is basically a description of the physical world, or some > > part of it. CM had such a description, and QM has a somewhat similar > > but richer description of the physical world. Science endeavours to > > use such a description to help us live our lives. We need to tie the > > theoretical *description* of the physical world to > > *descriptions* of our streams of conscious experiences. > > > > Yet it is hard to deny that our conscious > > experiences exist, and that our descriptions of our streams of > > consciousness are describing some aspects of these streams. > > It also seems > > hard to deny that our description of physical systems are capturing > > *some* aspect of nature that lies, or extends, beyond the streams of > > consciousness of human beings. But, in any case, science deals with > > these descriptions themselves, without needing or making any > > ontological > > claims about the things that the useful descriptions claim to be > > describing. In short, science deals with useful descriptions, not with > > ontology. But to pass on to moral philosophy we do need to assume that > > the things being described, namely ourselves and the larger > > world in which > > we are imbedded, do exist and are partially characterized by the > > descriptions that enter into validated science. > > > > But ontology necessary involves an assumption that carries the > > description-based theory beyond what science can establish. > > > > > One other point: you say we cannot be confused about the content > > > of our minds. We know these contents too intimately. Now, > > > Chomsky wrote > > > me recently that "it is simply false, flatly false, that we > > > cannot be > > > confused about our concepts, these or others" (he means 'mind' and > > > 'body'). > > > Now, I don't know why he thinks that, but I also don't see > > > why you hold the opposite!! > > > > > > > William James emphasizes that all observations are subject to error, > > (difficult and fallible: p.191, Vol I) and introspection is > > no exception. > > We report to ourselves, or to others, what > > we are currently experiencing, but the very act of focussing on an > > experience can change it. So even immediate reports of > > current elements > > in our streams of consciousness can be fallible. But science > > must take > > something as needing to be explained: something to represent our > > knowledge, and our intentions. It takes our self-reports, and > > particularly > > reports to others, of what a human person is currently > > experiencing as > > essentially veridical, or, in any case, what the theory needs > > to explain. > > This is all part of the essentially pragmatic stance of QM. > > > > > > > Why might a monist not say: there is > > > > > no gap to be filled. The experiments suggest that volition does > > > > > not really exist, or is an illusion. > > > > > > > > HPS: If CM were true then one would have a good reason > > > > for accepting > > > > the Libet data as evidence that the seeming causal > > > > efficacy of our > > > > volitions is an illusion. But that stance has led to > > > > three centuries > > > > of confusion and debate with no concordance in sight, and many > > > > mysteries: Why do these illusions exist? How can they evolve > > > > > > You see, this reminds me a bit of Descartes' proof of God. We have, > > > he says, the idea of God. How could that be an illusion? If it was, > > > then, > > > since God does not exist, something less than God himself > > > would be the > > > origin of that idea, say the evil spirits of our priests > > > who wished to > > > take power. But something less mighty than God himself can't be the > > > cause > > > of that idea, just as it's logically impossible that a > > finite series > > > could not be the cause of the idea of the infinite. In > > short, if God did > > > not exist, we could not have an idea of him. But we do, > > therefore he > > > exists. > > > > > > Similarly you: we have this idea of consciousness. If it > > > was an illusion, > > > why does it exist? The idea we have of it proves the > > > existence of the very thing it is an idea of. > > > > > > I personally think most arguments against Descartes' > > > argument actually > > > fail, and see no way to respond to the one I am ascribing > > > to you. The > > > point, differently put, is this. We have no epistemic distance to > > > consciousness: we are not looking at it, from an elsewhere > > > position, > > > having thoughts ABOUT it. We basically ARE this consciousness. > > > Therefore, it is logically impossible - by the structure of our > > > epistemic access to > > > it - that we can be wrong about it. > > > > > I basically agree. Streams of consciousness exist, and the > > desciptions > > of them constitute the psychologically described aspect of the > > person/agent. Although a thought can slip away before it can > > be caught and > > stored in an accurate way, science rests primarily upon those stable > > elements of human streams of consciousness that can be > > repeatedly recalled > > and confirmed and reported. I accept the foundational role in > > science of our > > descriptions of human thoughts/ideas/feelings of this kind. > > > > > > > > > if they have > > > > no physical effects. How can they "emerge" from the motions > > > > of particles. > > > > > > You said a while ago to want to stay neutral on the issue of a > > > platonism about concepts (contents of consciousness, things like > > > the ideas of a house, of a person, of a tree, etc., which > > > all humans share). > > > You did not want to rule out that our human concepts of things are > > > obtained in the course of our evolutionary history by > > > natural selection. > > > If that was true, you would be COMMITTED to the view that concepts > > > "emerge from the motions of particles" alone, plus > > > Process-1. But the > > > latter would on this (empiricist) picture not be specified > > > for content. > > > It would not be, as I put it, intrinsically > > > "content-involving". So it > > > would not be no help for the origin of concepts, or the specific > > > contents of conscious intent. > > > > > > > This is getting into cosmological questions about the creation > > of the universe, and its pre-biological stage. Even Newton seemed to > > accept that something else, besides his laws, were needed to fix the > > initial conditions. If we elevate QM to ontology then the primordial > > Process 1 events would presumeably be involved. They would have their > > "experiential" sides, but those primordial experiences would probably > > not be identical to human experiences. In an ontological setting we > > must allow experiences that are diffent from ordinary human > > experiences.The features or aspects that our human > > experiences normally > > manifest could have evolved in step with the brains with > > which they are > > closely connected, and selected for the survival of the > > creature in which > > these brains reside. Thus the idea of a "perfect triangle" may have > > somehow been constructed in connection with the developement > > of certain > > kinds of brains. It is not clear to me that there is an timeless or > > eternal realm in which is enshrined a "perfect triange" ready > > to be used, > > eventually, by some first "geometer". It seems just too > > inefficient for > > every possible idea to have been created "beforehand", most > > never to be > > used, presumeably. In any case, this question is, for me, getting too > > close for comfort to "angels dancing on the head of a pin". > > Still, human-type experiences could have evolved from more > > primordial ones. > > > > How do they keep in step with their apparent physical > > > > effects if they are > > > > mere illusions. The philosophical tomes that have been > > > > written around these > > > > issues, with no accepted answers delivered, should make every > > > > cognitive > > > > scientist, philosopher of mind, psychologist, and > > > > neuroscientist eager > > > > to try the new tack of taking cognizance of the fact that those CM > > > > precepts are known to be PROFOUNDLY incorrect, and that the > > > > above-mentioned mysteries look very different when looked at > > > > from the standpoint of the (more) correct > > > > physical foundations used in contemporary physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > At one place I find a stronger > > > > > statement of yours than the ones I just quoted, one being that > > > > > a classical ontology does "not permit" (p. 13) certain > > > > > empirical > > > > > relationships, but again I do not know whether I should > > > > > read this > > > > > to assert that the Libet experiments are *inconsistent* with a > > > > > classical ontology. > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: I was speaking there about the EPR paradoxes, but the > > > > broad point is that that Libet data is reconciled with > > > > freedom of choice in the same way that the EPR data is > > > > reconciled with freedom of choice. > > > > > > OK, that's a nice point, which belongs into the abstract, if it's > > > not there already. > > > > > > > It was in the abstract, but even more clearly in the new abstract. > > > > > > > 2. Libet has made very numerous responses to critics > > > > (in Consciousness and Cognition, and JCS): has he ever reacted > > > > to a quantum mechanical interpretation? Has somebody else? > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: Not to my knowledge. > > > > I have talked to Libet several times, but never pressed this point > > upon him. > > > > > > > > > > > Stan Klein at the last ASSC9 conference at Caltech (a few > > > > > weeks ago) > > > > > mentioned Penrose's QM-stance on Libet, e.g.. Penrose's > > > > > qualms, however, > > > > > I think, concern more the other experiments, concerning > > > > > a delay in > > > > > our conscious response to a given somatosensory > > > > > stimulus - how do > > > > > these experiments fit into your story? > > > > > > > > HPS: Our volitions are based on our trial-and-error > > > > learning of their > > > > feed-back effects, so one must expect the neural machinery to > > > > evolve in a way that facilitates the occurrence of efficacious > > > > psychophysical events based on judgments that rest on earlier > > > > feedbacks. Useful temporal adjustment are to be expected. > > > > > > > > > > > > >(Klein also mentioned you, > > > > and that he had heard you had "convinced" Searle that > > > > dualism wasn't > > > > so bad after all: but I felt nothing about this in Searle's talk, > > > > which was announced to be on dualism, but in which Searle > > > > only said > > > > things he has said 100.000 times, and which contained mostly > > > > trivialities concerning dualism.) > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: He sometimes seems to waver a bit, but soon retreats > > > > to his matras. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3. The paper is a little unbalanced, given its title: first > > > > it is about the Libet experiments, but then what it really talks > > > > about is that the pragmatic interpretation should be taken > > > > ontologically serious. For much of this discussion the relation > > > > to Libet is not direct, and you might want to make a > > decision here. > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: I see it as all tied together. > > > > > > > > But I'll review the paper, with your remark in mind. > > > > > > > > > Smaller comments > > > > > In the second par. on p. 4 I found a bit puzzling that you > > > > > would move, from saying that contemporary physical laws specify > > > > > *interactions* between observed systems and observing ones, > > > > > to saying we have a form of *dualism* here. What this "dualism" > > > > > amounts to, I suppose, is a duality between process 1 and > > > > > process 2. But, one might point out, these are simply different > > > > > processes in nature. Why take this to support *dualism*? > > > > > Having observers and observed things doesn't in itself > > > > > imply THAT. > > > > > There are lots of different processes in nature, after all; > > > > > moreover, physics may move on, or have moved on already, > > > > > perhaps to "M-theory", or whatever. > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: The varieties of theories being explored these day > > > > leave essentially unaffected QED (Quantum electrodynamics) > > > > which is the theory that covers the functioning of the brain. > > > > Nothing I say should be affected by these new theories. > > > > As regards "Dualism", the point is that Process 1 is asserted > > > > to be a free choice by an agent of what action he or she > > > > will make. It is a psychophysical event that on the one hand > > > > is a physical event in a physically described world (res extensa) > > > > and of the other hand is an associated conscious experience, > > > > a resident of the world of our thoughts (res cogitans). > > > > > > Following William James, thoughts, ideas, and feelings, are all > > considered to be aspects of a stream of consciousness. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (I personally do not necessarily see this as a problem: > > > > > dualism might as well be a temporary empirically supported > > > > > stop-gap position. But I'd like to hear your opinion on this. > > > > > And even if it is a stop-gap position I'd like to know why > > > > > we call the fact that we have two processes "dualism", > > > > > appealing thereby to a traditional term with a particular > > > > > denotation: > > > > > we have to have an ARGUMENT that process-1 has anything > > > > > to do with > > > > > the "mind", as opposed to simply with something not > > > > > capturable by process-2.) > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: Process 1 is an intervention in the Process 2 > > > > evolution, and this intervention is explicitly the > > > > injection of a freely chosen consciously conceived intention > > > > into the physically described world. > > > > > > See my devil's advocate point above: that's just words, or > > > language, > > > the point is. No monist would need to be impressed that physicist > > > DESCRIBE things using terms like "injection of a freely chosen > > > consciously conceived intention". > > > > > > > I have already anwered that science, per se, deals with > > descriptions: it > > makes no claims about the underlying realities (ontology). So > > the jump to > > ontology is certainly a logical jump. But I, at least, find it absurd > > to say that the description of what I describe as a certain kind of > > pain is not just what it claims to be, namely a description > > of a reality > > that is what it feels like, namely a really existing pain of > > that special > > kind. Streams of consciousness are collections of realities that are > > thoughts ideas and feeling that have the property that the memories > > and the reports to ourselves about these action/events are > > themselves elements of these streams, that can re-live these > > happenings, and report them to ourselves, and also to others. > > This is where > > I start, and I think any challenge to it is unproductive of > > understanding, > > and a symptom of the mental illness generated by trying to believe > > that the known-to-be-false precepts of classical physical > > theory are true. > > Absurdity is what comes out of false and contradictory assumptions, > > and the mental instability generated by basing ones thinking on false > > precepts has infected the intellectual environment created > > by some of the thinkers who try hardest to be completely rational. > > Common sense can sometimes flag the presence of faulty premises, > > and should, therefore be not lightly cast aside. > > The above argument is explicitly based upon my own bias, stemming from my recognition the CM is false, and inapplicable-in-principle (for reasons given) to the mind-brain system. TO ME it seems clear that it is irrational to try to force mind-brain theory into the mold created by a classical physics that is an approximation to QM that eliminates the mind-brain interaction we are trying to understand. Of course, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating", so the bottom line is how well the CM- based theory works in understanding the mind-brain. I submit that the current state of the three-century year-old effort to base mind-brain theory on the in-principle-inapplicable biases of CM, in comparison to the state of the QM-based theory developed in my recent Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. paper (with Schwartz and Beauregard) is evidence in favor of the option of accepting the pertinent findings of physicists. > > > > > It is difficult to understand (for me) what it could mean, > > > > > on the bottom of p. 4, that choices are "absolutely necessary", > > > > > yet "completely undetermined". > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: I have elaborated upon this in the text. The point is the > > > > the occurrences of Process 1 events is neeeded in order > > > > to tie the > > > > mathematical machinery to human experience, but the > > > > theory does not > > > > specify when these events occur, or which aspect of the observed > > > > system this event will probe. > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is hard to read the statement on p. 5 that properties of > > > > > the observed system are "fixed by the observing system" as > > > > > anything other than a vindication of idealism. Is that a > > > > > consequence you endorse? > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: No! I endorse interactive dualism, although it is true that > > > > the physical (res extensa) part has the ontological character > > > > of a "potentiality" for a psychophysical event to occur, and > > > > "potentiality" has a certain idea-like and non-material character. > > > > > > > > > > > > > There is an intuitive tension between saying, on p. 6, > > > > > that in the warm wet brain all quantum interference effects > > > > > will be "washed out", and saying, just a few lines below that, > > > > > that, after all, the epistemic or lack of knowledge > > > > > interpretation > > > > > cannot be maintained, because the effects are really real. > > > > > > > > > > > > > HPS: I have emphasized the key point that the washing out > > > > is only of effects that relate points that are spatially > > > > separated from each other by more than some small distance. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder whether the best way to get these answers > > > > into the article is to insert essential this letter > > > > into an appendix. > > > > > > That would be rather non-standard in ERKENNTNIS, unfortunately, > > > and also not advisable, because I have no definite enough > > > views on these > > > physical matters. Yours, Wolfram. > > > > > > > Your probing question have allowed me to elaborate on my position > > in ways that I have not done elsewhere. Would you agree to my > > putting this exchange on my website? > > > > All the best, > > > > Henry > > >