On Fri, 4 Jan 2002, Stanley Klein wrote:

> Dear everyone,

,,,,,,,

> Henry and I have a basic disagreement: 
> namely, I think there is a good chance that a robot built out of 
> classical neurons (i.e. the framework of of present neurophysiology) 
> will be able to have subjective feelings, whereas Henry thinks 
> quantum mechanics is needed. I think highly complex neural networks 
> (not simple thermostats or present computers) can produce emergent 
> top-down influences that eliminate epiphenomenalism.
> 

This issue has been discussed at such great length that I suppose there is  
no point at all saying anything. But still, the whole thing seems so 
absolutely clear that I cannot see how there can be any disagreement.

If one accepts classical electromagnetism, with specified kinds of 
essentially point-particles moving in an electro-magnetic field generated 
by well specified laws, and  giving determinism based wholly on these
geometric concepts (microdeterminism) then, although one can presumably
get very complex macrostructures (such as wheels, mechanical toys, 
weather, digital computers, solidity, digestion, etc.) that are 
"emergent" in the sense that the macro properties do not exist until
the special kinds of physical structures that support them come into 
being, and although these emergent physical structures impose 
characteristic constraints on the motions of the microelements that allow 
various macrofeatues to be described in terms of new concepts, formulated 
in terms of new linguistic and mathematical structures, these emergent
properties are all merely complex geometric properties (properties of
evolving shapes of conglomerates of the microelements) since those are
all that can follow from the principles of classical physics alone.
The fact that a "feeling of pain" exists under certain physical 
conditions is not in any way contained within the premises and
principles of classical physical theory. That theory is based on
taking the notion of locations of point particles and numerical values
(of the EM and Grav fields) located at spacetime points and specifing
the rules that fix how these quantities change with time.  No matter
how complex the consequent physical structures become,  there is nothing 
in these rules that could ever mandate the existence of a 
"feeling of pain", or a "feeling of effort", for the defining 
characteristics of these qualities involve more that evolving geometric 
shapes, which is all that classical physical principles can yield.

Thus the existence of these psychological realities is something that
must be added by fiat to the principles of classical physics, in order
to account for their existence within that classical framework.
But if, then, they are ad hoc add ons, that are not essential to  
the dynamical evolution, which is in principle determined by the geometric
properties alone, then they are "epiphenomenal" by definition.

The situation is completely different in quantum theory, which is 
formulated in terms of experiencing human agents acting on physical
systems. And the formulation is such that the efforts of these agents
influence those physical systems. It is odd that scientist dealing with 
the relationship between psychological and physical realities should 
reject out of hand the adequate contemporary theory of nature built
around a two-way mind-brain connection in favor of a physically 
inadequate nineteenth century theory in which minds can play no  
dynamical role.