From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Thu Aug 22 14:28:47 2002
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2002 14:04:34 -0700 (PDT)
From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
To: Mszlazak@aol.com
Cc: Anthony Freeman <Anthony@imprint.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Freemans version of yours seems confusing!

On Wed, 21 Aug 2002 Mszlazak@aol.com wrote:

> Hello Dr. Stapp.
> 
> I liked the start of Freeman's paper but when it gets specifically to the 
> section about you, things get incoherent. This starts at paragraph 6 and 
> carries on. Basically, he uses the term brain in two ways. One in the 
> standard way the term is used everywhere as a material entity and the other 
> as an entity with nonstandard properties; semantic properties like intention, 
> etc. He almost sounding like Searle. Mind would have been a better term but 
> if that sounds too dualistic then "consciousness," "person" or anything else.
> 
> Also, the way your position is described overall sounds dualistic. That's 
> fine but I got the impression you were more of a monist in the tradition of 
> the process philosophers that look to Whitehead. 
> 
> I can see how this version of QM could be just an instance of Whiteheads 
> grander vision, but because it's so restricted to the consciousness of 
> physicists doing physics experiments, it comes off dualistic not monistic. 
> Maybe any underlying philosophical position(s) need to be made more explicit. 
> After all, good explanation not only involves epistemology but also ontology. 
>  
> 
> Thanks. Mark Szlazak.
> 

Dear Mark,

It appears that you do not have an accurate understanding of my position.
Your phrase "because it's so restricted to the consciousness of physicists
doing physics experiments" reveals a significant misapprehension. One 
reason that I switched from Copenhagen QT to von Neumann QT was to obtain 
an ontology that could be generalized in a way that was not restricted to 
human observers, and that was therefore objective and could be applied to 
the evolution of species. 

My theory is based squarely on physics, and is therefore dualistic in the 
sense that it has a mathematically represented state of the physical 
universe (which is the state specified by relativistic quantum field 
theory) and has also experiential realities (whic are "feelings", 
with all thoughts, ideas, and knowings understood to be 
`feelings' with different qualitative characteristics.) 

The theory is similar to Whitehead's in that there are "events", and each
event has both physical and experiential aspects. The physical 
aspects are specified by physics (the physical state is specified as in 
relativistic quantum field theory), and the experiential aspects are 
feelings of one kind our another. Neither aspect is reducible to the
other, but they are dynamically related to each other by von Neumann's
equations. 

The quantum state is "quintessential", in the sense that it has five
essential features:
(1) It is `physical' in the sense that it is a mathematical structure
imbedded in space-time, and evolves according to rules.
(2) It is `informational' in the sense that it is an encoding within
the mathematical structure imbedded in space time of the information
injected into it by the sequence of Process I projection operators P 
and (I-P) leading up to it.
(3) It represents `our knowledge' in the sense that it encodes the 
`knowings' injected into it by the sequence of projection 
operators P and (I-P) leading up to it.
(4) It creates `tendencies' for events to occur. 
(5) It is `influenced' in its evolution by the mental effort of agents.

All these feature arise from von Neumann's equations, and from orthodox
assumptions about the connection of the evolving quantum state vector to
"our knowledge" and "tendencies for events to occur."

This solution is both Whiteheadian and dualistic.
It might be classified as a "Non-materialistic Dualism."
But the physical and experietial aspects of the quantum state are
so intertwined as to make it also a "Neutral Monism" in the sense
that the basic stuff is neither idealistic nor materialistic, but are
just the elements of contemporary physical theory, which inextricably 
mix the experiential aspects of nature with a mathematical structure 
imbedded in spacetime. Traditional "Neutral Monisims" (Russell),
do not bring in the physical description forged by scientists, 
whereas this ontology is just a slight elaboration
of the scientific description. 


Freeman does not imply that the brain is a "material entity."
On the other hand, the brain is a "physical entity." And due to
"environmental decoherence effects" it does tend to effectively
decompose into a conglogeration of "quasi-classical" states, each
of which is a slightly smeared out classical state that tends to 
spread out into a collection of such states. So a classical-language 
description of the state of the brain is not inappropriate: one must
only remember that the classical picture is only approximately correct, 
and that multiple quasi-classical options grow out of each 
quasi-classical component, when no "events" are occurring.

Freeman's words are a nice summary of my more detailed description given
in the Chapter "A quantum theory of the mind/brain interface", which
is Chapter 6 of my book Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics.                                                                                                                            
(Available also on my website)