From: SMTP%"klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU" 8-MAR-1996 15:50:01.55 To: STAPP CC: Subj: Re: Reply to Hayes 5 Date: Fri, 8 Mar 96 15:46:03 PST From: klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU (Stanley Klein) Message-Id: <9603082346.AA27371@adage.Berkeley.EDU> To: ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu, phayes@cs.uiuc.edu Subject: Re: Reply to Hayes 5 Cc: A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk, STAPP@theorm.lbl.gov, brings@rpi.edu, keith@imprint.co.uk, klein@adage.Berkeley.EDU, mckee@neosoft.com, patrickw@cs.monash.edu.au Gregg, I expect that your predicted 75 - 25 split is probably close to correct for the people on these email discussions (the minority siding with Clark and Hayes that the Hard Problem isn't a real problem). I do suspect that among scientists in general (not just the engineers or AI types that you mentioned) the percentages would be reversed. I think that a good goal for the present discussions is to try to isolate why there is such a sharp difference. What fundamental metaphysical assumptions are separating you from Clark or Pat. You suggested getting Chalmers' book and then picking it apart. Gregg, what do you think of my position: First, I agree with you and Chalmers that I can't imagine how the neural activity produces the realm of qualia. The jump in category seems too great. I see two possible solutions. 1) I believe the quantum duality can provide a metaphysical basis for two separate ontologies that could possibly be mapped onto the subjective and the objective worlds. This is a wonderful nonreductionist formalism but it doesn't really satisfy me as to how the particular feel of a quale comes about. 2) When the NCCQ are discovered, all of a sudden our imaginations might be stimulated into seeing how the "hard problem" can be tackled (why does a particular quale have its particular fee). How can David be so sure that this isn't possible. Stan