From:	THEORM::STAPP         7-MAR-1996 17:15:16.67
To:	@KLEINLIST.DIS
CC:	STAPP
Subj:	Re: Reply to Hayes 5

Dear Pat, 

Your position is that P is something described in phenomenal terms, and that
F is that same thing described in functional terms, so that P=F.

This can be compared to the alternative way of describing the (same ?)
situation in which P denotes the phenomenal aspects of something and
F represents its functional aspects, so that P=/=F.

You resist giving any ontological status to `experience':
"I have no idea what... `experiences'... are...  . It is one thing to say 
that I experience a pain but something else to say that therefore something
exists, called an experience, ..." 

One might call your account a descriptional account and the other an
an ontological account, in the sense that for you the different symbols
represent the things characterized by different descriptions, whereas
in the other account different symbols represent different ontological
aspects.

Your account is perhaps less rich, but you can reply that you think it
is sufficient for science.

But it would not be accurate to characterize the meaning of your formula
P=F as saying that `the pain' IS `the functional activity': you are saying
rather that the phenomenal and functional descriptions are two descriptions
of one and the same thing.

You say: 
"Something is happening, and I experience it as a pain in my foot. I still
see no reason why this description might not be taken to refer to some neural
event in my brain. Of course this event has a phenomenal aspect *to me*,
because its my brain in which it is taking place, so that one might expect 
that I have a rather priviledged way of sensing it and describing it."

This sound very similar to my formulation: "F is experienced as P",
and to the dual-aspect ontology, in which one single (quantum ?)
event has both a phenomenal and a physical aspect. This makes it look like
maybe the difference between us is mainly a matter of what the symbols P and F
are supposed to mean, as suggested in the opening paragraphs, plus a 
commitment on my part to say something more about this `experiencing',
or `I experience' that is somehow connected to the phenomenal aspect or
phenomenal description. In my book I endeavour to explain the "I", and the
"I experience". And I  explain, within the mathematical framework of
contemporary science, how the phenomenal and functional descriptions are 
descriptions of the same event. You may be insisting that such endeavours are
not necessary for science. But a science that `explains' things is better 
than one that does not, because `understanding' provide a foundation for 
pushing beyond the present boundaries. And I think in the end science should
account for how we come to know things: how our knowedge arise from
the activities in our brains and feeds back into them. An overly lean
ontology could block progress on this problem.

Best regards, Henry