From: THEORM::STAPP 13-MAR-1996 00:02:21.50 To: @KLEINLIST.DIS CC: STAPP Subj: Re: Reply to Hayes 5 Dear Pat and Stan: Pat suggested that the following two cases are analogous: 1. The Morning Star IS The Planet Venus: MS IS PV. 2. The Pain P IS The Neural Activity F: P IS F. In case 1 the assertion `MS IS PV' means C(E(MS))=I(PV), which is short for: The Entity that is the Cause/Concomitant of the Experience E(MS) ( namely The Experiencing of a Brightness that Appears in the Morning Sky, and that is called the Experiencing of the Morning Star) IS The Physical Entity named The Planet Venus. This can be contrasted to the true assertion E(MS)=/= I(PV): The Experiencing of a Brightness That Appears in the Morning Sky and is called The Experiencing of The Morning Star IS NOT IDENTICAL TO The Physical Entity named The Planet Venus Thus, in the Morning Star case we must distinguish between the two true assertions: C(E(MS)) = I(PV), and E(MS) =/= I(PV). The Physical Entity that is the cause/concomitant of the Experiencing of The Morning Star IS The Physical Entity named The Planet Venus; but The Experiencing of The Morning Star IS NOT The Physical Entity named The Planet Venus. In the analogous P and F case we should assert, analogously, that: The Physical Activity that is the cause/concomitant of the Experiencing of The Pain IS The Physical Activity F; but The Experiencing of The Pain P IS NOT the Physical Activity F. In the case of the Morning Star the connection between the Experiencing of the Morning Star, E(MS), and The Planet Venus, I(PV), is clearly one of causality, not identity: The Planet Venus is millions of miles away from the brain of the experiencing subject. Consider, likewise, the case: "The First President IS The Husband of Martha Washington". The nature of the linkage in this statement, I(First Pres.)= I(Husb, of M. W.), is again causal: there is a causally propagating structure (namely I(Geo. Wash.)) that causally links a certain wedding ceremony to a certain executive feature in the development of our nation. So, likewise, does every pair of characterizations A and B such that I(A)=I(B) is an identity that we comprehend involve either a causal linkage or a logical equivalence between the two characterizations. The assertion `The Morning Star IS The Planet Venus might be represented simply as I(MS)=I(PV), but this is short for the more complete and accurate C(E(MS))=I(PV). Thus I submit that any justified claim of the form A IS B should rest on either a causal or logical linkage that accounts for the claimed identity of what is described in two different ways: there is no example where one asserts, rationally and clearly validly, that A IS B, where A is neither logically equivalent to B nor causally connected to B. Of course, you neither claim that P IS F, nor offer any proof of logical eqivalence or causal connection. Your claim is only that it is logically/physically possible that P IS F (i.e., that The Pain IS The Functional Activity), or at least that my argument that claims to refute this possibility is faulty. A claim that A IS B is logically/physically possible, if the claim is to be scientifically meaningful, requires the terms A and B to be connected into science. Thus "The moon is made of green cheese" is not logically/physically possible because A) green cheese means something in science, pertaining to density, tensile strength etc. etc., and B) so does the moon, and these two meanings are not compatible." Similarly, if the claim that `P IS F is logically/physically possible' is to have meaning in science, then P and F should have meanings, and these meanings should be what the appropriate scientists mean by them. And if the claim is true then it should be logically/physically possible for these two pre-defined things to be the same thing. Thus P should mean what a psychologist means by a pain, or what a child means by a pain, and F should mean what a brain scientist means by F. Now, What is your interpretation of `P IS F'? One interpretation that you accepted was that: P is something described in phenomenal terms and F is that very same thing described in functional terms, so that P=F. In my terminology this is I(P)=I(F), which I argued above is short for C(E(MS))=I(PV). At least this is what it should normally mean if we look at examples: some causal connection (or a logical equivalence like 2+2=3+1) between the two differing descriptions is implied by the asserted identity. The meaning of F is a functional activity implemented in classical mechanics. As regards P, let us agree that what is being referred to is an event, a happening. You admit to knowing a certain feeling called `feeling pain', to an acquaintance with this sort of feeling. That `experiencing relationship' is what you call `my experiencing of P'. You do not, I think, want to accept the Morning Star analogy, where there is a causal connection between the physical entity I(PV) and the phenomenal reality E(MS), which is a certain kind of experiencing activity. Your idea is *not* that there is a causal connection between a physical reality F and a phenomenal reality P, but rather that P IS F. But you must admit to *some* difference that makes the two descriptions different. And we have spelled out what the difference is: on the one hand there is an experiencing called an experiencing of pain; on the other there is an event or feature that is representable in the classical physicist's description of what is going on in a brain. The two desriptions are not simply *formally equivalent* descriptions of one the same thing, such as 2+2 and 3+1. Nor do you call upon a causal connection. You now have in your account of nature these `experiencings' that are not included in the classical physicist's account of brain activity. He could tell you in principle all about F, but the classical physicist's account does not entail or imply or mention any feelings: insofar as the classical-mechanics account (as defined by physics texts etc.) is complete there are no `experiencings'. So you are admitting into your description of nature some happenings that are experiencings or feelings not mentioned in classical mechanics. You are trying to maintain that there is just one thing with two descriptions. But delving into the nature of what is different leads one to the recognition of the presence of experiencings, and these experiencings are realities that are not part of the reality that is described in classical mechanics. What I think you ought to be saying is this: P is the brain's phenomenal knowing of F: P is the brain's phenomenal acquaintanceship with F: P IS F, as F is phenomenally known to the brain. This sort of knowing was not described in classical mechanics, which was designed to deal with systems that do not know themselves in this way, to a degree that significantly affects behaviour. I think that I could agree to this interpretation of `P IS F': P IS F, as F is phenomenally known to the brain. This interpretation acknowledges the crucial element: the existence of felt or experiential (i.e., phenomenal) knowing. The critical question then becomes: Does this knowing make any physical difference? Within classical mechanics it certainly cannot; within quantum mechanics it certainly can! This leads also to the question of cause, and of dynamics: In the classical- mechanics case should one say that this knowing is *caused* by the brain? How does this experiential knowing come about? I have used here the adjective `experiential' to distinguish it from some information transfere that is not associated with any `experiencing'. How does this seemingly gratuitious element come about, in certain special cases of `knowing'? Just saying the formula `P IS F' puts us on a path, but leaves big questions still unanswered. Within classical mechanics it seems that we might one day identify the neural Concomitants of various feature of consciousness, but any dynamical theory that would explain these connection would have to be pecular in that this second dynamics would rise out of the physical dynamics but have no back reaction upon it. Quantum theory opens the door to a more natural interplay: it can bring the experiential knowings directly into the basic dynamical process, and make them causal agents in their own right, not just spectators. Henry