Dear Stan, Language certainly is a problem in these discussions, and a standardized terminology would undoubtedly clear up and end a lot of confusion. But there is the problem that language tends to be rooted in common ontological assumptions: the language both grows out of our ideas of what it is we are talking about, and to, conversely, form and encapulate these ideas. This is not to say that this barrier to communication is impenetrable, but only that the terminology is very much intertwined with the underlying substantive issues. In this very connection let me mention some of my reflections upon the `debate' between Pat Hayes and myself on the assertion that the pain IS the functional activity. Although our differences can be clarified by analyzing the differing interpretations that we were placing on what the assertion means, the reasons that we were making these differing interpretations was rooted in differing conceptions of the world that were rooted in our differing backgrounds. Pat was coming, I suppose, from a cognitive science background that consciously or unconsciously accepted the classical mechanics conception of the world. There is no natural place in that monistic conception of nature for something fund- amentally different, and hence there is a natural tendency to describe everthing that needs to be explained in terms of functional structures implementable in a physical world conceived to be like the one described in classical mechanics (even if there is in the explicit statement of his position no explicit reference to classical mechanics: it seems to him, in the way he looks at it, to be just a matter of `logic', or a clear understanding of the way language is normally connected to fact.) But there is the underlying notion that it is at least logically consistent to maintain that there is just one thing described in two different ways. But there is the question of what the `basic facts' are: of what it is that needs to be explained, and, in particular, the basic question of whether the experiential pain (the intimate immediate knowing called `pain' can be merely an `appearence', or description, of something that is accurately portrayed as a functional activity that is implementable within the framework of classical mechanics). Most people's intuition says No. But since the issue here is logical possibillty, the argument from intuition (which my have stemmed from incorrect philosophical/physical understandings handed down from the past) is not unchallengable. In the case of the Morning Star, and the Evening Star, and Venus in is pretty clear that we have three different realities involved, a certain appearance if brightness in the morning sky. a certain appearance of brightness in the eveing sky, and, if the ideas of classical mechanics are at all accurate in this context, some conglomeration of particle motions located far away from earth, and from all of us subjects to whom the appearances appear (let us restrict our attention to human subjects). But in the case of a pain the physical activity associated with the appearance (the intimate immediate experietially expressed knowing) to the subject is located within the subject. Hence it is not immediately clear what the relationship is between the appearance to the subject and the physically described activity in the subject. One way to approach this problem is to ask: What IS a pain? This leads to the question: What IS a pain beyond everything that a pain DOES? What pain DOES is to make the subject (sometimes) say: I have a pain, and make him sweat ,to dilate his pupils, etc.. Once one completes this list is there anything more that is left to say within the realm of science? Since all of the subjects descriptions of the pain (``It is a *searing* pain in my whole hand, even though I can see that it is only my index finger that is burned), and probably even mental rehearsals of unarticulated descriptions are accounted for, and represented, within the functional description, there seems to be nothing lacking as regards scientific description. And to the dualist objection that even when all of the behavioural/functional activities are accounted for there is still no description of the actual pain itself the functionalist can reply that he has become so used to thinking in these functional terms that finds in increasing difficult for him to even comrehend what the so-called `actual pain' beyond what is accounted for in the complete (deep) functional description, which accounts for all of his pain related large- and small- scale behaviour. He will increasingly come to see the dualists protest---that motions of particles, no matter what functional properties they implement, are not *identical* to things such as actual pains---as just some sort of useless, outmoded, and intrinsically false notion, carried over from sort ancient and confused way of thinking. The dualist reply is essentially that immediate knowings, which include such experiences as pains, are themselves the immediately-known-to-us-realities, and they cannot be identical to something that is not immediately known to us: If the immediate knowing, P, is a knowing `about' something F then one reality, according to the dualist, is the knowing itself (just as `the appearance (to the subject) of the morning star is a reality) If this knowing, P, is identical to something then that something must be just exactly P, as it is known to us. Of course, this knowing, P, could be a knowing `about' something that either causes P or co-occurs with P in nature. The lesson of my debate with Hayes, as I understand it, is the importance of distinguishing at the beginning of the discussion the two mappings I(x) and E(x), where x is a descriptive phrase, e.g. Morning Star, or Our First President, and I(x) is the entity that is described by the phrase x, but E(x) is the appearance that is recognized by the subject as the signature called x. Thus if x is The Morning Star then I(x) is the planet Venus, whereas E(x) is the brightness appearing over the horizen in the morning sky. For the case of a child's pain the appearance is the named reality, according to the dualist, and to maintain otherwise is not logically coherent because then one would be leaving out of the account a basic reality that would just have to be introduce in terms of some nonstandard language, if one is to give a complete account of reality. Phenomenal descriptions are descriptions of realities that are appearances (experiential realities). But is Hayes right that it is at least logically possible that the pain IS the functional activity, where the functional activity is implementable in a classical mechanics framework. (I add this proviso because it is only then that I see a problem: otherwise the functional activity could be a purely mental or experientially based activity, and our physical account could be a basically fallacious illusion) The problem then is to specify `logically possible': Is it logically possible that moon is made if green cheese? I think we are talking here in a scientific framework where one requires a theory that accounts reasonably well for the facts. But what are the facts? If one takes as a basic fact that pains are a part of that reality that we come to know directly as felt experience, i.e., that I(the pain)= E(the pain), then it seems to me that it is not possible to say that the pain IS the functional activity in a classically describable brain, because one knows the pain directly as the felt experience, but does not know the details of the neural activities in this same direct way, though the experienced pain may supply some information "about" the neural activity. The classical-mechanics proviso is crucial here because quantum mechanics is formulated as a theory of correlations among experiential realities: it is about the very sort of thing that a pain is, so it is not so clear that F, some feature of the functions description in quantum terms could not be exactly the P that we experience. Henry