From:	THEORM::STAPP         8-MAR-1996 17:20:49.82
To:	@KLEINLIST
CC:	STAPP
Subj:	Re: Reply to Hayes 4

Dear Pat, 

I do think I understand you. You approved of my characterization of your
position:
Your position is that P is something described in phenomenal terms, and 
that F is that very same thing described in functional terms, so that F=P.

But you did not agree with how I described your position to Stan.
And you said that you were not clear what my position is.

I think I can clear these matters up.

Let me use a notation in terms of functions: f(x) represents a mapping from 
a domain in which x lies to another domain. Let MS and ES be abbreviations
for the descriptive phrases `morning star' and `evening star', respectively.
Let me use the symbol I(x) to denote the mapping from descriptive
phrases to corresponding real entities, defined on the domain of descriptive 
phrases that are sufficiently complete to identify one unique real
entity. Thus your position defined above, applied to the Morning/Evening
Star case, would be: I(MS)=I(ES)=V, where V is the real entity Venus.
You use a shorter notation, but it will be helpful to use mine here.
  
In your letter to Stan of March 7 you note that: 
"The subject is able to recognize the phenomenal description but not the
functional one." 
This question of `recognition' is crucial. There is something important
about difference between the phrases `morning star' and `evening star' 
that is more than just the combination of letters: they label classes of
`appearances' that are recognizably different. They label recognizably 
different experiences. Thus the phrase "morning star" identifies a set of
appearances: a certain brightness over the horizon appearing in the morning
etc. Let E(x) denote these recognizable (to some subject) experiences.

A key difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics is that
recognizable experiences play an essential role in quantum theory, but 
none in classical mechanics.

Consider the following relationships: I(P)=I(F); E(P)=/=E(F).
You use the first to justify saying: the pain IS the neural activity.
I use the second to justify saying: the pain IS NOT the neural activity.

You justify your translation by considering some typical cases:
the morning star IS the evening star; the first president IS George Wash., 
etc.. These are instances of the translation of I(X)=I(Y) into the statement
X IS Y.

This rule applied to the present case would lead to the statement:
the pain IS the neural activity, under the assumption that I(P)=I(F)

But normal usage asserts I(P)=E(P): the real entity I(P) that is 
labelled by the descriptive phrase P=`the pain in my left foot' is 
the recognizable experience E(P). But E(P)=/=I(F), and E(P)=/=E(F).
So I told Stan that your argument did not imply that the excruciating feeling
that you actually feel [namely  E(P)] is the the very same thing as
the motions of some particles in your head [namely I(F)]. 

As for my own view, inspired by quantum theory I think that the fundamental
dynamical process in nature consists basically of a series of actual
events e, each of which is represented by a functional description F(e) in 
the Hilbert space of physical possibilities, and also by a phenomenal
description P(e). The event e can be considered composed of two aspects, 
I(F(e)) and I(P(e)): e = I(F(e))+I(P(e)), where I(P)=E(P), in accordance 
with normal usage. [The quality of the experiences associated with a 
system depends strongly on the system.]

Since I(F(e)) is a physical fact/entity/happening whereas I(P(e))
is a phenomenal fact/entity/happening: 

I(F(e))=/=I(P(e))

even though F(e) and P(e) are descriptions of (aspects of) the same event e.

You would say: It is logically possible to say I(F(e))=I(P(e))=e,
and this is more economical.

But I do not think this does justice to the problem of recognition.
The different descriptive phrases denote not only the entity that they
name, but also the recognizably different appearances, i.e.,  experiences. 

You will counter, perhaps, that functional recognition by the 
subject is all that is needed for science: experiential recognition
is an illusion, or fiction, or some other such non-player. 
[Later: Your PS suggests that maybe you would not be so dismissive]


That is of course true in classical mechnics. But the quantum events
are recognition events, and the recognition aspect effectively controls in
large measure the course of the dynamical evolution of the brain. [The
recognition aspect feeds into the `choice of basis', and 
perhaps also into the ` choice of outcome'.]

You may be skeptical. But I see no rational basis for denying the reality
of experiences that constitute the events of recognition: that might be
reasonable if classical mechanics were true, but it is not reasonable in
the real world, in my opinion.
 
Your PS suggest that some rapproachement may be possible: that the 
phenomenal description does designate a kind of `reality' that enters into
the brain dynamics in an important way. Certainly an understanding of the 
structure and mode of functioning of this `reality' is a basic need in the
development of an adequate dynamical theory of the brain.  

I hope this note clears up the differences in your and my ways of speaking 
about these matters that we have been trying to resolve. 

Best regards, Henry