From: SMTP%"PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU" 2-SEP-1997 16:32:52.13 To: STAPP CC: Subj: Re: QM and consciousness Date: Tue, 02 Sep 1997 00:50:40 -0700 From: STAPP@THEORM.lbl.gov Subject: Re: QM and consciousness Sender: "PSYCHE Discussion Forum (Theoretical emphasis)" To: PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU Reply-to: "PSYCHE Discussion Forum (Theoretical emphasis)" Message-id: <970902005040.2e6124c5@theorm.lbl.gov> Approved-By: metacom@MINDSPRING.COM William Robinson (8/30/97) writes: >Henry Stapp (4:53am, 8/24/97) gave some very helpful clarification on >some questions I had asked. As clarifications should, his post leads to >some further questions. Some of them probably import classical ways of >thinking into QM contexts in an inappropriate way; but I think others >will be like me in not knowing *how* we are to avoid such >inappropriateness, so I am going to ask the questions that *seem* to me >to be important. > >Stapp speaks of "real events that collapse the wave function (or ARE >collapses of the wave function)." I will use the latter formulation (and >hold myself open to correction if the difference turns out to make a >difference I've missed). > >Of such real events, Stapp says that he assumes they "are ubiquitous in >nature. Certain events of particular interest to human beings are events >associated with human body/brains and our conscious experiences." > >Q1: Are collapses that are not associated with human body/brains also >conscious events? If not, why not, exactly? Answer: My aim is to try to construct the simplest ontology that will provide a reasonable, naturalistic explanation of our basic physical theory, namely, orthodox quantum theory. That theory is formulated in terms of relationships between human experiences (For documentation see Ch 2 of my paper "A Pragmatic Approach to Consciousness"---On my Home Page: http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/ stappfiles.html). In that theory human conscious experiences enter in association with certain abrupt changes called quantum jumps, or reductions of the wave function, or collapses of the wave function. In an ontologicalization of the orthodox (essentially epistemological) quantum theory these collapses are naturally associated with human brains. I have described the proposed nature of this connection in numerous publication (some of which can be found on my home page). The key point is that in order to have a natural connection between the content/quality of the conscious event and brain process I have proposed that each conscious event is closely connected (See below for more details) to a collapse of the wave function of the brain that actualizes a large-scale pattern of neurological activity that constitutes a "template for action", and that the conscious event is the feel of intiating the action that the template for action initiates. A crucial feature of each of the (instantaneous in physical time) conscious events is its "temporal structure" in psychological time. This feature, borrowed from Wm. James, depends strongly on the dynamical qualities of the brain. (See my book; Ch 6.6 Qualia: The experiential or felt quality of actual events. This Chapter is on my home page) Within this theoretical framework it is clear that conscious experiences of the kind we human beings experiences are closely connected to our human brains: no properly structured brain activity, no conscious experience. Of course, other biological or nonbiological systems that have associated quantum events could have "experiences" of some kind, but I propose reserving "conscious experiences" for experiences that are a lot like our own, though I have not tried to define the boundary with any precision. > >A key part of Stapp's response, as it seems to me anyway, is the >following: > >"[E]ach actual conscious experience is created . . . by the nonunitary >process of actualizing the state whose actualization is that experience >. . . . The patterns of neural activity that are present before the >nonunitary process sets in are . . . the raw material for the nonunitary >process. This raw material consists of a superposition of different >(unitarily evolving) states that correspond to different mutually >exclusive possible experiences, in the sense that the actualizing of one >of the states by the supra-physical nonunitary process would create the >corresponding experience." > >Q2: Although we don't know just what neural activity pattern corresponds >to any experience, it seems reasonable to estimate that such patterns >would involve no less than ten to a hundred neurons, with many action >potentials each, over no less than 25 ms. Such a pattern would involve a >very large number of ionic events across axonal walls. From my >admittedly primitive understanding of QM, it seems that such a pattern >of activity would be a "large" event, that would, therefore, behave >classically. So my question is, Is it really alright to suppose that >such large events are in superposition? Yes, it is definitely alright to suppose this! The superposition persists in principle until there is a collapse. In an ontological description with real collapse the conditions for collapse must be specified by the ontological theory. Size has, fundamentally, nothing to do with it. If one is trying to ontologicalize the orthodox quantum theory, than one evidently should have the collapses and conscious experiences that the orthodox theory is built on, but that is the only real condition on the size of the events. I am proposing that the events associated with human conscious experiences are "large". Sometimes there is conflation "decoherence" and "collapse", but in an ontological setting these are two quite different things that should not be conflated. > >Responding to my question about time of collapses and required numbers, >Stapp says: > >"The collapse events are instantaneous in physical time, and there is >supposed to be a rapid succession of these in physical time. One can >imagine the evolution as occurring in a complex-time space, where the >real axis represents physical time and the imaginary axis represents >collapse-process time." > >It will take me some (physical) time to work through the material Stapp >references. In the mean time, I have the picture that, in an experience >that I would ordinarily describe as lasting for a second or so (e.g., an >afterimage that slowly fades, but changes very little in one second), >there are superposed neural activity patterns that collapse, followed by >another superposition that then collapses, followed by another >superposition . . . etc. in rapid succession. > >Q3: Viewed from the perspective of physical time, is this picture >correct? Yes! > >Q4: If this picture is correct, it seems natural to ask what >"reinstates" the superposition after the collapse. Does this question >make sense? If so, what's the answer? Yes, the question makes sense. After each collapse the unitary evolution corresponding to the Schroedinger equation comes into play, and it generates an evolution of the state forward in time. Out of the state produced by any collapse a new superposition of possibilities will gradually emerge. This is the "raw material" that forms the physical basis for the next (collapse/reduction/actual) event. > >Q5: It seems to be an implication of the picture that successive >collapses are collapses *to* the same state. (Otherwise, it would seem >that our experience should fluctuate in its quality.) But superpositions >are (I think) potentials to collapse to different states. So, what is it >that keeps successive collapses collapsing to the same state? The Schroedinger evolution of the brain is the purely physical evolution, and it is controlled by the evolving state of the brain. Sometimes the condition of the brain will not call for large or rapid changes, and the succession of actualized brain states will be changing only slowly. But there will always be some change between one actualized state and the next because of the continuing changes in the macroscopic brain. It is only by virtue of these progessive changes that one can be aware of the enduring quality of a thought held in mind. Again, I think that a perusal of Ch 6 of my book will clarify these matters. Henry P. Stapp PS My Book: Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Springer, 1993 1-800-springer