Mind in the Early Universe. von Neumann's formulation of quantum theory, like the Copenhagen interpretation, gives human participant/observers---P/Os--a special role. To convert von Neumann's theory into a satisfactory theory of nature it is necessary to extend P/O status to certain primitive systems, which can then exploit the control mechanism inherent in their quantum mechanical character to evolve via natural selection more efficiently than could a system that exploits only the laws of the classical approximation. As an introduction to this issue I quote parts of a communication to Psyche-D: --------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2001 13:04:16 +0100 From: John McCrone To: PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU Subject: consciousness and information ... So an explanation of consciousness needs to model both the raw dynamics of brain/organisms and also somehow include in that model the information-like ways that brain/organisms encode control over that dynamics. But it is a big mistake to assume that this information is the "real stuff" as it gives rise to many probably false problems - Chalmers' hard problem being an example (there is a hard problem, but it is the ultimate problem of "why anything?" rather than Chalmer's lesser problem of "how can material brains cause experiential minds?"). ... living and sentient systems can only encode meanings. To rise up out of the sucking murk of continuous dynamic reality, bios has to evolve information-like memory mechanisms such as DNA, neural networks and human language. But these memory mechanisms are an expense and can only be produced so long as they contribute to fitness - ie: so long as they are encoding meanings rather than just general information. Meanings being "information" connected via a control hierarchy (Pattee) to dynamical reality. ... John McCrone ---------------------------------------------------------- The "Hard Problem" is neither `How can material brains cause experiential experience?' nor `Why there is anything at all?'. It is, rather: `What is the nature of the relationship between the experiential and material aspects of reality?' Many kinds of conceivable mind-matter connections have been proposed. I believe that the most plausible idea of the connection between mind and matter is that they are two aspects of a deeper dynamical structure that mediates the dynamical linkage between them. I expand here upon that theme. We now know that the classical conception of matter is profoundly mistaken at the fundamental level. The material (i.e., local deterministic) aspect of nature acts not like the collection of local mechanical parts that classical physics proclaimed the (physical) universe to be, but more like a cloud `potentialities' for the occurrence of actual events that define the empirical world that we experience. There is no longer any reason within physics to believe that causation is a one-way street in which the dynamics of the material aspects are complete within themselves, and determine the experiential. The deterministic aspect of quantum theory, namely the Schroedinger-equation-directed evolution of the state of the universe, or of its parts, does not yield exact deterministic predictions about all (or indeed any) of the future individual empirical facts. There is ample room within the known laws of nature for `experience' to play an irreplaceable role in the dynamics; i.e., a role in which experience is neither fully determined by differently described aspects of reality, nor excludable from an adequate descriptions of the dynamics. The original Copenhagen formulation of quantum mechanics was designed as a practical tool to allow scientists to make, on the basis of their past experiences, predictions pertaining to their future experiences. Von Neumann's formulation was basically a reformulation that allowed these experiences to be connected directly, within the framework of the quantum dynamics itself, to events in the brain's of these human scientists. The idea that human beings play a special dynamical role in nature is alien to the traditional ideal of science, which, almost by definition, seeks a non-anthropocentric understanding of nature. On the other hand, human experiences are certainly parts, or aspects, of nature. Hence even a non-anthropocentric understanding of nature requires an understanding of the role in nature of `experience', where by `experience' I mean the general aspect of nature that encompasses human experience as a special case, and that plays, in appropriate systems, a dynamical role similar to the one played by human experience in human behavior. McCrone stesses the connection: meaningfulness <---> control But control without "evaluation" is meaningless. Conversely, evaluation without control is pointless. Meaningfulness demands `control' influenced by `values'. Of course, even a robot that operates in accordance with the laws of classical physics can exercise control influenced by "values" that have been programmed into it, or that are created by `natural selection'. But quantum theory allows for another kind of control. It allows values to influence what happens in the associated body/brain in a manner that goes beyond what is possible for a system that can be adequately described within the classical approximation to the underlying quantum laws. Quantum theory is built around the idea of "events" that distinguish the actual world, as specified by empirical facts, from evolving clouds of possible worlds. Each such event reduces the existing cloud of possibilities to a subset compatible with a new empirical fact. In von Neumann's formulation each such event is associated with a mathematically defined sudden change in the (quantum) state of a physical system. When the physical system includes the bodies and brains of human beings these events---which distinguish the "empirically factual" world from alternative empirically-unrealized possibilities---can include events associated these human brains. These brain events can be vehicles of control. Also, each event can have a characteristic *feel* that both *identifies* this event within a realm of experience, and gives it a *value* within that realm. The human being acts as both a PARTICIPANT in the evolution of the empirically factual universe and as an OBSERVER of empirical facts: he is a participant/observer (P/O) who can both act, and hence influence, and feel, and thereby evaluate, the events that define the factual world that is concordant with his own experiences. The requirement for non-anthropocentric explanation demands the existence of non-human P/O's that can, in a way similar to human P/O's, exert control influenced by felt values. Within the quantum framework any such P/O can influence the course of events within that subsystem itself: i.e., within its own "body/brain". The way it works is this: Each reduction event is associated with a question "To be or not to be P=1". This question is put to nature by the P/O. Nature immediately delivers an answer, Yes (P=1), or No (P=0). The possibility P=1 is associated, within the mathematical structure, to a "projection operator P" that acts on the state S of the subsystem P/O. The answer P=1 reduces that state S to a new form, PSP, from which is excluded all components that are incompatible with the new empirical fact specified by P=1. The other possibility, P=0, excludes the complementary components. The possibility P=1 specifies a physical alternative PSP that, at least in the case of a human P/O, is actualized in conjunction with an associated "experience", which is basically a "felt value" V(P). The course of physical events is influenced by the choice of these operators P, and the timing of these questions "To be or not to be P=1." The mechanism of influence is called the Quantum Zeno Effect (QZE), which been intensively studied both empirically and theoretically. The effect is simple. If this question is repeatedly posed rapidly, relative to the normal (Schroedinger-driven) rate of change of the state S'=PSP, then the normal (Schroedinger-driven) transitions out of the subspace defined by P are suppressed: the actual evolution tends to preserve the states that have positive value V(P). This influence of value on the physical evolution is achieved WITHIN AND BY VIRTUE OF the orthodox laws of quantum physics. These influences of value upon physical process have a structural character that is very different from the structural character of the influences of "classically described values" that can operate within the framework of the laws that govern the classical approximation. Three key differences are: 1. The choice of P, and of the timing of the question, can be a function of the state of the P/O *before* as well as *after* the reduction. 2. The feel V(P) can be a NONLOCAL function of the full (nonlocal) state of the P/O after reduction. 3. The reduction event is a nonlocal event: it can extend over the entire brain of the P/O. Control influenced by felt value is achieved by allowing the positive felt value V(P) of a possible impending P to enhance the likelihood that the question "To be or not to be P=1" will be posed. Such an enhancement allows behavior to be influenced by felt values strictly within the quantum rules, without any biasing of the quantum probabilities. (Any such baising would violate the orthodox quantum laws, hence undermine the basic thesis that we should build our theory of nature on valid physical principles rather than on physical concepts that have been shown to be incompatible with the empirical fact about the behavior of physical systems.) The key point about application to the early universe can now be stated: V(P)-associated enhancement, hence influence, can operate just as well in a primitive system as in a complex one. Projection operators P certainly can be defined for simple systems, and a *felt value* V(P) could be be associated with the possibility P=1 just as well for a simple system as for a complex system. Note that this quantum approach gives a coherent alternative to the "identity theory in mind" that classical physics seems to foist upon us. [Within classical physics one seems to be forced to the idea that each experience IS THE VERY SAME THING as some aspect of brain process, since otherwise our experiences seem to be some *by-products* of brain process that are not actual parts of the dynamically closed physical universe, and hence are causally inert and causally superfluous. The existence in nature of such causally inert and superfluous element is unnatural, and the notion that our thoughts and feelings do not influence our actions is contrary to our deepest intuition about ouselves. Hence it seems more reasonable, within classical physics, to IDENTIFY human experience with associated functional aspects of human brain process rather than to conceive our experiences to be some logically, dynamically, and ontologically unnecessary "dangling appendages".] [The problem with this "identity theory" position is that although this classical-physics conception of the physical world (as a structure composed of tiny elements, each of which is localized in space and interacts only with its very near neighbors) can surely entail the emergence on the macroscopic scale, under appropriate boundary conditions, of all sorts physical structures, whose properties can be described in all sorts of ways, it can entail the existence only of structures that are characterized either in physical terms (i.e., as locally defined mathematical properties defined over space-time) or as properties entailed by such physical properties. But the existence of a "feeling" (e.g., a `pain' or `joy' or `sorrow') is not entailed in either of these ways by the principles of classical physics. This means that the assertion that such realities are actually parts or aspects of the physical world, AS THAT WORLD IS CONCEIVED OF IN THE CLASSICAL APPROXIMATION, has no rational link to the postulated principles that define that theory. The standard examples in which "light", and "heat" and "solidity" and "mitosis" etc. are defined to be properties of the underlying structure of particles and fields are all cases of relating different theories about the CAUSES of our experiences, and the identifications are justified in terms of connections that can be deduced from the various postulated "physical" properties. No such deducible linkage is provided between the characterizing properties "feelings" and the postulated properties of the physical substrate of the classical approximation.] [Indeed, neither the assertion that feelings are IDENTICAL to classically described brain process, nor the claim that feelings are CAUSALLY INERT follows from any rational analysis. Hence proponents of these two conflicting notions have been squabbling inconclusively at least since the 1950's, and in a general sense for centuries, and in a more general sense for millenia. The synthesis that naturally resolves this long-standing dilemma pops out when we cease to equate nature to the invalid classical conception of nature.] Quantum physics has experiences built right into its basic structure: experiences define the empirical facts that the quantum mathematics correlate. The basic postulate is that there exist certain subsystems, called P/Os, each of which is associated with "events". Each such event is characterized by: (1), a question "To be or not to be P=1", (2), a projection operator P that acts in the subspace associated with P/O, (3), a chosen (by Nature) eigenvalue P=1 or P=0, (4), an associated *reduction* S-->S' of the state S of that system, and (5), in the case P=1, an experiential aspect V(P). In the case P=1 the reduction changes the prior state S of the P/O to the maximal "reduced" state S' (=PSP) of that subsystem that is "compatible" with V(P). A key question is then: What is the nature of this relationship of "compatibility" between a felt value V(P) and a physical reduction event specified by S-->S'=PSP? To grasp the general connection it may be useful to consider first a simple possibility. One conceivable possibility is this. Because the quasi-stable state actualized by a reduction undoubtedly involves some persisting vibratory motions the basic positive value could be an `aesthetic' quality of the combinations and progressions of these frequencies. Such a valuation could exist for very simple systems, as well as complex ones. Given such a positive aesthetic value of some evolving state PSP, and an associated enhancement (of the likelihood in state S that the question "To be or not to be P=1" will be posed), this value V(P) could, in a biological system, quickly become tied by survival dynamics to fitness. [i.e., *If* the internal dynamics of the system happens to tie "aesthetically preferred chord progressions" to survival enhancing control sequences then the QZE mechanism, which would then TEND TO LOCK the beneficial activity in place, could give an organism that exploits QZE an advantage over organisms that use only the classically describable mechanisms.] This avenue to value-driven control of physical action could operate in any quantum system that maintains its integrity, and supports an internal structure that can evolve in diverse ways. That is, it could operate in the cosmological, geological, physico-chemical regimes, as well as in biology. A key question is: What physical properties characterize possible P/Os? The natural answer would be: Any physical system whose internal structure evolves into a quantum superposition (or mixture) of distinctive alternative physical possibilities on a time scale small compared to its lifetime. If, for such a system, intrinsic values are associated with various enduring states, and if positive values tend to increase the rate at which the associated questions are posed then such a system would tend to exhibit value-driven behavior. A positive value V(P) associated with the collapse S-->PSP would be indicated if the system tends to stay in the subspace specified by P longer than would be expected on the basis of the Schroedinger equation. One could embark on a quest to look for, or create, systems that exhibit such anomalous behavior. But in any case, we should be alert to the occurrence of systems with an `odd' behavior that could be explained by this kind of mechanism. The empirical signature of this "odd" behavior would be prolonged stays in states, where these prolonged stays are hard to reconcile with the diffusion or dispersion expected on the basis of the uncertainty principle, but could be readily explained by QZE in conjunction with an internally generated von Neumann process I.