On Mon, 9 Oct 2006, Anthony Freeman wrote: > This was posted by Jo Edwards today on jcs-onine > > ------- Forwarded message follows ------- > -----Original message----- > Subject: [jcs-online] Stapp and Atmanspacher > To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com > From: Jonathan Edwards > Reply-To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com > Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2006 18:44:27 +0100 > Message-ID: <56D9FD87-83C8-4FC3-A1C1-C69A15314781@ucl.ac.uk> > > The interview of Henry Stapp by Harald Atmanspacher in current JCS is > enjoyable, but fuels my concern that approaches that claim to draw on > 'conventional quantum theory' include the slipping in of highly > tendentious metaphysical footwork, thereby making them totally > incompatible with other approaches equally 'based on conventional > QM'. Thus Stapp's account is very different from the picture that > Atmanspacher himself presents in his review of Pauli's ideas. Is > Atmanspacher being polite in his interview with Stapp or am I missing > something? > > I fail to follow Stapp's suggestion that the 'free choice' of setting > up an experiment is somehow outside the scope of a physical account. > True, the events in a brain freely choosing are too complex to > analyse, but that does not put them outside physics. This is no > evidence that physics is not causally closed. The suggestion seems to > fit precisely with Spinoza's jibe that men only talk of free will > because they have no knowledge of what causes their actions. In his > article on Pauli and in his interview questions, Atmanspacher > suggests that the consensus on QM is probably that mental processes > have nothing to do with 'wave function collapse' (von Neumann type > 1). Moreover, Stapp's quantum-Whiteheadian 'events' seem one minute > to belong to observers as whole brains, at other times to local > neural events and sometimes events outside brains, while baulking at > panpsychism because 'observers' have to be large enough to be > 'classical'. This seems the sort of filawsofy Feynman would have > dismissed out of hand. > > Further problems are that Stapp gives no neurobiological example of > what sort of 'events' he is implicating and most worryingly, he > admits that QM seems to deny any possibility of showing that his view > is right, rather than the alternative. Stapp seems to view the > alternative as epiphenomenalism, but as far as I can see the real > alternative is that consciousness fits in to current physics as an > aspect of a causal chain in a way yet to be understood which happens > to have nothing to do with the collapse of a wave function belonging > to some particle that has hit a measuring devise somewhere in a > physics lab - which always seemed a rather odd idea anyway to me. > > I find it hard to identify exactly what Stapp is proposing but the > impression that comes across is that it is a form of dualism far more > extreme than Descartes. Descartes tried to fit the mind into > naturalism. He divided 'solid stuff' from things like light which > took up no space. He put thought in with light because the appearance > of a thought does not seem to displace the solid stuff of the brain > (or have mass). Although his conclusions went awry, his basic dualism > is entirely consistent with QM (contrary to Stapp's retort)- being, > in simple terms, the Fermi/Bose duality. This sort of duality within > naturalism is essential for many reasons; in this issue Hinzen gives > an interesting new one. In contrast, Stapp proposes a Deus ex Machina > ghost in the machine; overtly supernatural in a way that is certainly > pre-Darwinian and probably pre-enlightenment - i.e. medieval. This > ghost is a religious object that has to be taken on faith because the > very theory that is used to propose it denies the possibility of > testing its existence. The idea that suggesting that QM is supported > by ghostly puppeteers 'choosing' what will happen in our bodies can > help us to be ethical seems as crazy as creationism. > > Stapp's arguments seem to draw on what he suggests is common > intuition; that we 'consciously choose'. However, as Neil Levy rather > neatly pointed out in JCS a while back this is a neurological > oxymoron. To be conscious is to have an input. To choose is to have > an output. You cannot have an input about an output until the output > has already happened. Neurology does not have a way round this, and > nor should it. For most intelligent adults I know (with Spinoza) it > is not our intuition that we consciously choose. We realise that we > are, if not automata, something a bit more unpredictable - it feels > that way. We have no idea how our brains come to choose the things > they tell us they have chosen most of the time, but we suspect it is > partly how they are built and partly our life history. > > It is frustrating that those with a QM background interested in > consciousness give us such widely disparate views of what is > presented as an orthodoxy. Maybe we would make more progress if > somebody could explain to us how to sort this out (actually I thought > Harald had). > > Jo Edwards > > > -----End of original message from Jonathan Edwards----- > > From hpstapp@lbl.gov Wed Oct 11 11:07:22 2006 Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2006 11:07:20 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Cc: Anthony Freeman , Harald Atmanspacher Subject: Reply to Jo Edwards about Stapp-Altmanspacher Interview (fwd) Jo Edwards says that he fails "to follow my suggestion that the 'free choice' of a setting up of an experiments is somehow outside the scope of a physical account". What I claimed was that this choice is outside the scope of conventional or orthodox quantum theory. The conventional quantum theory that is used in actual scientific practice requires an intervention from outside the system of the atomic constituents that are described in the mathematical language of quantum physics. Bohr calls this intervention a "free choice" on the part of the experimenter, and von Neumann call it Process 1. The *effects* of such interventions enter importantly into the dynamics of the quantum mechanically/mathematically described physical system, and into the structure of our subsequent conscious experiences. But the theory provides no explanation or causal description of how these causally effective choices come to be what they turn out to be. And the problem is more than just the fact that brain processes "are too complex to analyse". If one considers the experiment discussed by Einstein where a pen is drawing a line on a moving scroll, with a "blip" being caused by the firing of a detector of a slow radioactive decay, then the Schroedinger equation, applied to the whole system, would yield a smear of times for the registered decay, and, likewise, a corresponding smear of the location of the blip. And if an observer is watching the device, and his body and brain and its environment (which are all made up of atoms, molecules, and other physically describable constituents) are incorporated into the quantum mathematical description, with no intervention from outside, then the system described by the quantum state of the brain of the observer becomes a smeared out mixture of quasi-classical brain states that correspond to different possible times for the detection to occur. Conventional quantum theory provides no purely physical description of how this smear of brain states gets reduced to one compatible with experience, which identifies a fairly well defined time of registration. Conventional theory, as defined either by actual scientific practice or by the words of the founders of the theory, has, therefore, a *causal gap* in the purely physical description, and this gap is not simply a matter of the quantum-mechanically described physical workings of the brain being "too complex to analyze". There is a matter of principle involved in understanding how a brain state in which the recognition of the blip is smeared out over hours turns into a brain state that corresponds to the registration occurring at some particular moment. The point is that in conventional quantum theory the quantum mathematical description becomes a description merely of possibilities or potentialities, not, in general, of an evolving experientable reality itself. Yet this quantum state is precisely the quantum theoretical generalization of the classical-physics description of physical reality itself. So where did the "physical reality" itself go? What is the rational basis of the claim that the physical description is causally closed when the classical physics description, from which the notion of the causal closure of the physical arose, dissolves into mere potentialities, and the only realities---as opposed to potentialities---that are to be found in the phenomenally validated conventional quantum theory are described in psychological rather than physical terms? Edwards complains that I associated the collapse "events" sometimes with the whole brain of the observer, sometimes with neural events, and sometimes with events outside the brain. I do not associate the collapse events with events at the individual neural level: I discussed nerve terminal dynamics only to show that the classical approximation fails in principle: i.e., to show that one must *at least in principle* treat the brain as a quantum system. The collapse events in conventional quantum physics are, in fact, *psychophysical*: each one has both a psychologically described aspect, corresponding to an increase in knowledge, and also an associated reduction of the (physically described) wave packet (quantum state) to one compatible with the gain in knowledge. This is how the theory works in actual scientific practice. This arrangement ties the mathematical description, which represents gains in knowledge and the effects of such gains on potentialities for future human experiences, to the phenomenal realities that are the only realities---as opposed to potentialities---that enter into the conventional empirically justified quantum theoretical description. As regards the nature of the neurobiological "events" that are associated with our human intentional choices, these events are expected by most (or at least many) scientists working on this problem to be the coming into being of widespread synchronous cortical activities in the beta or gamma frequency range. These neural activities are currently presumed to be the templates for action. But the matter is under intense empirical and theoretical scrutiny. Edwards believes that "consciousness fits into current physics as an aspect of a causal chain in a way yet to be understood that has nothing to do with the collapse". But in current contemporary orthodox quantum theory the collapses are in fact closely connected to consciousness: it is precisely this close connection that makes the theory practically useful. Edwards' claim that consciousness is "an aspect of a causal chain" that is "yet to be understood" is completely correct. But his further claim that consciousness has nothing to do with the collapse is not supported by the way that conventional quantum theory actually works to tie phenomenal reality to physical description. In view of the direction that the advance from classical physics to quantum physics took it is not unreasonable to conjecture that a successful ontology will involve an interlocking of physically described and psychologically described aspects of nature. Science must deal, of course, with descriptions and their relationships. Edwards suggests that the Cartesian dichotomy is between fermions (matter) and bosons (mind). Then the interaction between mind and matter becomes identifiable as the physical interactions between bosons and fermions. But in conventional quantum mechanics bosons and fermions are both treated as parts of the physically described world, and the core problem is precisely that the evolution of this physically described world via the Schroedinger equation is not the whole story: it does not give the collapses that are needed to bring the physical description into concordance with the phenomenally described realities. Edwards suggests that bringing conscious realities into the description of nature in the way I suggest (which is exactly the way prescribed by conventional quantum theory) is "overtly supernatural". But conventional quantum theory is highly naturalistic, and is closely tied to empirical phenomena. There is nothing supernatural about the conscious realities that populate our streams of conscious experiences, and nothing non-naturalistic about bringing these realities into physical theory in the testable way specified by conventional quantum theory. That theory, as it stands today, is ontologically and dynamically incomplete, because it does not explain or describe, even in principle, how our specific choices about how we probe nature come to be what they turn out to be. Pointing to this incompleteness is an act far different from postulating a "ghost" that "is a religious object that has to be taken on faith". Our conscious experiences are not ghosts, and emphasizing the fact that these realities enter conventional quantum theory as causally effective inputs whose causal origins are "yet to be understood" is not an act of religious faith: it is the assertion of a basic fact about the current state of physical theory. Edwards found my position unclear. But my interview with Atmanspacker was, of course, not a systematic presentation. For a more detailed description see on my website (http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/stappfiles.html) the entry "Quantum Interactive Dualism: an Alternative to Materialism", where I make it clear that the intended idea is constructed from earlier ideas, thereby allowing the "input" intention to come before the "output" result, thus evading Edwards' final objection. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Wed Oct 18 08:30:54 2006 Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2006 08:30:54 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [jcs-online] Question for Dr. Stapp Concerning Quantum Interactive Dualism On Mon, 16 Oct 2006, Joseph Polanik wrote: > Dr. Stapp, > > You've described your theory as a Quantum Interactive Dualism. I am > wondering whether you are proposing a dualism as Chalmers counts or a > dualism as Descartes is commonly thought to have counted. > > Chalmers, as I understand it, assumes that there is only one 'stuff' > matter/energy; but, that this 'stuff' has two sets of properties -- the > physical properties familiar to scientists and the experiential > properties associated with phenomenal awareness. > > Descartes, on the other hand, had two fundamental substances, > matter/energy and mind stuff. He is usually thought to have two sets of > properties; but, some argue that he had three sets of properties: > physical properties, mental properties and the experiential properties > associated with sensory awareness that came about because of the union > of body and mind/soul. > > In any event, there is no reasonable way to define 'dualism' so that > Chalmers and Descartes are in the same camp. > > Thus, the question that arises is: Is your dualism a Chalmers-style > dualism, a Descartes-style dualism or something else? > > Thank you in advance for clarifying this point. > > > Joseph Polanik > I start from the structure of conventional quantum mechanics; the quantum mechanics used by physicists in their scientific practice. It uses two kinds of descriptions. One kind of description is used to "comunicate to others what we have done and what we have learnt" (Bohr, 1962, p.3). It is basically a description of the thoughts, ideas, and feelings that populate our streams of conscious experiences. It is a description of psychological qualities. The other kind of description is the quantum mathematical description in terms mathematically characterized properties assigned to space-time points. I call these the physically described properties; the mathematical properties upon which theoretical physics is based. Each of these two properties has a certain persisting "essence", though neither is a "substance" in the normal/usual everyday sense of the word. The physically described properties represent "potentialities" for psycho-physical events to occur. These events are the most "real" things represented in the conceptual structure. Each is supposed to have both a psychologically described aspect, and a physically described aspect. The latter is expressed as a "reduction" of the prior set of potentialities to a new set compatible with the gain in knowledge described in the psychologically described aspect. The one underlying "stuff" is an evolving state of "information", which is characterized as a structure different aspects of which can act upon each other to influence the development of the whole. Certain parts "interpret" other parts, and the whole changes as a result of that interaction. Having described the structure of conventional practically validated physical theory, I leave to you the task of applying the appropriate labels from the philosophical literature. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Wed Oct 18 09:29:17 2006 Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2006 09:29:16 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Cc: Harald Atmanspacher Subject: Re: [jcs-online] Chris Nunn & Stapp/Atmsanspacher dialogue Chris Nunn raises a very pertinent point: Can the proposed attention- controlled rate of process 1 probings be rapid enough to activate a quantum Zeno effect that is adequate to the task of holding the template of action in place? Chris suggests that the rate of probings ought not be more than about 100 hertz, which would be far less than what would be needed to hold in place a macroscopic template for action. But, of course, we do not feel or experience the rate of probings directly: we feel/experience only the effort and the correlated effects. Also, a typical classically describable and observable electromagnetic field, say of fixed frequency and energy, has two very different frequencies associated with it: the classical frequency that is directly observed, and the quantum frequency determined by its energy. The 100 hertz mentioned by Chris is the classical frequency, but there is also the typically much greater quantum frequency. In the model I am describing the directly experienced aspects, the intent and the experienced correlated feedback, have a time scale of at least tens of milliseconds: the time scale of the classical frequencies. But reduction events are naturally associated with the quantum scale: it is enough to reduce a single particle in a macroscopic state in order to reduce the whole. (This fact is used in the spontaneous collapse models of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber) And in the empirical tests of the quantum Zeno effects, although the choice made by the experimenter and the oucome observed are at the macroscopic scale, the reduction occurs at the atomic level, and on the atomic time scale. So although the macroscopic brain time scate (10's of milliseconds) is appropriate for the directly experienced aspects, it is not necessarily the appropriate time scale for the actual reduction events, or for the rate at which they can occur. The quantum scale should be more appropriate for them. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Wed Oct 25 14:14:47 2006 Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 14:14:46 -0700 (PDT) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [jcs-online] Mondor, Polanik, Lofting, Edwards, Nunn & the Stapp/Atmsanspacher dialogue First, regarding my use of the word "free" in "free choice", I have repeatedly emphasized that this word refers here specifically to the fact the causes of these choices are not specified by conventional (Copenhagen or von Neumann) quantum mechanics. The word is not meant to suggest that these choices have no causes at all. I believe that nothing happens without a sufficient reason of some sort, and my basic endeavor, in fact, is to try to achieve some understanding the nature of these causes or reasons. Polanik hits the mark when he emphasizes that the physically described brain (governed by vN process 2) is not self-collapsing, and hence that something outside the quantum mechanically described physical brain is involved in the selection of some particular thought from the mixture of potentialities generated by the physical/mathematical locally mechanistically described process 2. Von Neumann's discussion of the three parts I, II, and III (mentioned by Polanik) seems to me to be stressing "psycho-physical parallelism": the fact that certain systems can have aspects that are described in the mathematical language of QM, and also aspects described in the language of communication among the observing and acting agents. The whole is not adequately described in either one of these two languages alone. Nor need the causal relationshps be fully describable in one of these language alone. So when Lofting (Oct 20) says the we must "step out of the QM box and into the GENERAL box of how our neurology processes data" he seems to be assuming that the causal structure is describable in physical terms alone. I see the main message of quantum theory as an alert to the rational possibility that all causes and reasons need not be purely mechanical. Thoughts and intentions are themselves actual realities, and as such they ought to be able have real actual consequences. Quantum theory opens the door to this possibility by converting the deterministic mechanical structure of classical physical theory into a mathematically described structure of potentialities for observable events to occur. And the quantum rules that specify the content or structure of these events are treated in actual scientific practice as entering from outside those aspects of nature that are described in purely physical terms; i.e., from outside the aspects that are the quantum counterparts of the physical properties of classical physical theory. Feynman, mentioned by Edwards, asserted that he did not understand quantum mechanics, and doubted that anyone else did. The problem is basically the mismatch between the known basic purely physically described laws and our conscious experiences. QM tells us that when we try to descend to the microscopic roots of the "physical substrate" the physically described properties dissolve into potentialities for the occurence of experiencable events. The suggestion that Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Wigner, and von Neumann were introducing "fairies" into basic physical theory, by introducing our experiences importantly into basic scientific theory, is unhelpful: the entry of causally efficaious consciousness coherently into physics ought not be treated lightly. Nunn (Oct 20) correctly observers that the theory entails a person's capacity to choose to sustain a desired macroscopic brain activity without that person's knowing the physically described details of what his choice is actually doing. Trial and error learning allows the person to correlate his mental effort to experienced feedback without his knowing how the conscious effort produces that conscious feedback. The mechanism that I am proposing merely requires that when a conscious (probing) action produces an experience that contains an experienced high positive valuation, the required choice is merely to repeat very quickly the *same action* as before, whatever it was. This allows the agent to choose to sustain positively valued actions without knowing the actual physical structure of the collapse events their efforts are causing. This theory accommodates nicely and naturally the experience of, for example, learning to use a prosthetic limb, by activating through effortful trail and error learning a conscious-effort/conscious-feedback loop never used either by the individual or any of his ancestors. Nunn asserts that "It's not obvious that this provides any better grounding for a naturalistic conceptof free will than classical mechanistic accounts of brain function." But the quantum account gives a completely rational account of the "manifest" causal connection between mind and brain, by explaining it as a real understandable causal connection; whereas the classical mechanistic account says that every physical connection can be explained without mentioning consciousness. But how in this completely novel situation does consciousness enter in a way that gives the illusion that it is playing a crucial causal role in the physical process when it is really doing nothing at all. Is not a naturalistic actually-causal account of the apparently-causal connection between mind and brain, and an account that is rooted squarely in contemporary physical theory, "obviously" better than a theory rooted in a falsified theory that leaves mind out of the physical proceedings, but then brings it in ad hoc, deceptively pretending to do what it seems to do. Quantum theory *needs* something to fill a specific causal gap, and provides the means for mind to fill it. whereas (false) classical theory has no need for mind and provides no means for it to do anything, and no physical foundation into which it naturally fits. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Tue Oct 31 09:11:45 2006 Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 09:11:45 -0800 (PST) From: 5BHenry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [jcs-online] Mondor, Polanik, Lofting, Edwards, Nunn & the Stapp/Atmsanspacher dialogue On Fri, 27 Oct 2006, Ray Mondor wrote: > Dr. Stapp, thank you for your response. > > I see now that your use of the term "free choice" has little or nothing to do with the traditional meaning(s) of "free will" in philosophical literature. > > I am pleased to know that your theory does not require the > existence of free will. Yes, I certainly do not subscibe to the notion that our conscious choices have no causes or reasons whatever. But a commitment to the idea that each conscious choice has some reason to be what it turns out to be certainly does not mean that this reason can be specified completely in term of the localized physical variables of classical physics, or their direct quantum counterparts. > May I also assume it does not require > consciousness, since it may be that the "free choice" comes from > unconscious mental activity preceding conscious awareness of it? > I repeatedly use the words "orthodox", "Copenhagen", or "Conventional" to emphasize the fact that I am describing the quantum theory that is used in actual scientific practice, and validated empirically. As Wigner ("Remarks on the Mind-body Question"; cf. Wheeler and Zurek p. 169) said: "it was not possible to formulate the laws of Quantum Mechanics without reference to the consciousness." Also Heisenberg: "The laws of nature that we formulate mathematically in quantum theory deal no longer with the particles themselves but with our knowledge of the elementary particles." "no longer the behaviour of the elementary particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior" Some physicists (eg. Bohm, and Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber---and Philip Pearle) have tried to eliminate consciousness but all have failed to accommodate relativistic QM with particle production. Others have tried the many-worlds approach, approach, which many have noted ought really be called the "one-world, many-minds" theory because it tries to tie theory to data (which is experiential/empirical) by somehow trying to understand why the experienced world is so tremendously different from the world governed by the currently known laws that make no reference to consciousness, by assuming (without specifiyiong how) the one quantum state is experienced in myriads of different ways that hang together in mysiads of separate streams of consciousness that manifest the statistical regularities specified by the quantum laws. To even begin to face the problems one must bring in the concept of consciousness. Then there is the question of whether the laws that generate these fantastic regularities in our streams of consciousness can be formulated or expressed without refering to consciousness. So I would say that you cannot say the my theory (or orthodox, or Copenhagen, or conventional quantum theory, or any other quantum theory} does not require consciousness. The huge disparity between the stucture of human experience and the stuctures generated by the purely physically described quantum laws makes the discussion of the relationship betweem conscious experiences and physically described laws the primary issue in the use and understanding of quantum theory. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Tue Oct 31 14:51:14 2006 Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 14:51:13 -0800 (PST) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: Stapp/Atmanspacher and To what is conscious presented? Polanik: "enduring insight: the distinction between a property and that which has or exhibits that property." HPS: Conscious experiences belong to stream's of conscious experiences, and these streams are part of nature's proceess. This process has aspects that are described in psychological language, in terms of thoughts, ideas, or feelings which have various qualities that have been given names by persons. Each person constitutes an aspect of nature's process that possesses a stream of consciousness. One can properly say, therefore, that a stream of conscious thoughts has psychologically described properties. What "has" a psychologically described property is primarily a conscious experience; secondarily the stream of conscious experiences to which the experience belongs; and tertially the person (an aspect of nature's process) the "has" this stream of consciousness. Polanik: "The next question is: If there is experience occuring; then to what is that experience occuring?" HPS: "To what?" I guess the correct question is "In what?", and the answer is "In a stream of consciousness!" Polanik: "...it follows that there is something real to which experiences occur." HPS: This may be harking back to "I assume that the presentee is whatever entity in the brain experiences consciousness." (See Hameroff, Oct 29) The idea the something in the brain "experiences conscious" goes far beyond what science says. Nor does science tell us that some immaterial entity "experiences consciousness". Experiences occur in streams of conscious, which are aspects of nature's psycho-physical process, and "to" a "person" by appearing in that person's stream of consciousness. Each human person is an aspect of nature's process with both physically described and psychologically described aspects. The physically described aspects specify *potentialities* (objective tndencies, in Heisenberg's words) for certain psychophysical events to occur. Von Neumann has spelled out the currently known rules for the known (to science) connection between the physically and psychologically described aspects of nature's process. Mondor: "But in 1952 David Bohm published an interpretation of QM that... was completely deterministic." HPS: But, in spite of massive intense effort, this result has not been able to be carried over to the domain of special relativity, where particle creation becomes important. And when, trying to generalize his ideas, Bohm was led to an infinite tower of guiding fields each being guided by a higher one. [Bohm 1990: A new theory of the relationship between mind and matter, Philosophical Psychology 3, 371-286] Logical closure was lost. Edwards: "When I say von Neumann believed in fairies I do not do so lightly. Fairies are supernatural beings the existence of which we can neither observe nor infer,... Abstract Egos seem to be that." HPS: The account I have given above about the place of consciousness in nature and in physics is essentially my understanding of von Neumann. I find no fairies there. The term "abstract ego" highlights the fact that reality contains psychologically described aspects that are tighly tied to the physically described aspects of brains, but are not fixed by specifying the prior physically described (quantum) state of the universe. The quantum state of the universe fixes only the potentialities for (collapse/reduction) events that---and this is the key to the pragmatic success of quantum theory---are closely connected to increments in human knowledge. The events have psychologically described aspects, which are what we observe/experience, or, more precisely, *are* the empirical data They are not superhatural or unobservable, but are rather a core part of the quantum mechanical description, and the only part of nature unequivocally known to be real. But nature's overall process needs a (sub)process that partitions the continuum of potentialities into some set experiencable parts. At least that is how conventional (Copenhagen/vN) QM works in real scientific practice. In that theory there is a psychologically described aspect that is an integral part of the whole dynamical structure, and that continues to be essential (in connection with process 1) when the brain is made part of the aspect of nature that is described on quantum physical terms. Henry P. Stapp From hpstapp@lbl.gov Mon Nov 6 15:20:11 2006 Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2006 15:20:10 -0800 (PST) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: RE: [jcs-online] Re: Stapp/Atmanspacher and To what is conscious presented? On Sun, 5 Nov 2006, Philip Benjamin wrote: > From Philip Benjamin, medinuclear@hotmail.com Re: [jcs-online] the > Stapp/Atmsanspacher dialogue Nov 1, 06 > > [Henry Stapp] Tuesday, October 31, 2006 Reply to Ray Mondor > > ** I repeatedly use the words "orthodox", "Copenhagen", or "Conventional" > to > emphasize the fact that I am describing the quantum theory that is used in > actual scientific practice, and validated empirically** . > > [Philip Benjamin] > How can any equation, including the Schrodinger, be a definition of > anything? HPS: The Schroedinger equation is a equation of motion: it defines how the mathematically specified quantum state evolves over the course of time. It gives the way this state is changing over an infinitesimal interval of time in terms of properties of the state that can be defined at the *instant* of time that preceeds the infititesimal interval that follows it. Combined with some rules about how to connect this mathematically defined evolving state to our conscious experiences the Schroedinger equation defines the empirically validated predictions of quantum theory. > [Henry Stapp] continues > > ....trying to understand why the experienced world is so tremendously > different from the world governed by the currently known laws that make no > reference to consciousness.... The huge disparity between the structure of > human experience and the structures generated by the purely physically > described quantum laws..... > > [Philip Benjamin] > > This is where the quantum mystics put the cart before the horse. [not > Henry > Stapp, a solid brilliant realist]. The normally experienced world is the > REAL objective physical world, the Gibraltar Rock. It is the Quantum > Mathematical Probability World which is the MAYA world of Abstraction that > can NEVER exist outside the quantum mathematical descriptive world of > finite > human minds. Alice can see this Wonderland only through quantum goggles. > > [Jonathan Edwards] jo.edwards@ucl.ac.uk Saturday, October 28, 2006 > > All we need is wave function progression punctuated by > creation/annihilation > of bosons - what physicists deal with day to day, as I understand it.... > all > you need is a dual aspect ontology, fermions (matter) and (sentient) > bosons. > .... > > [Jonathan Edwards] 10-13-06 > > So Henry Stapp's comments are just about observing. It is the choosing > process which seems to me supernatural because it seems to obey laws that > have nothing to do with known physics and as far as I can see is > unverifiable..... not conscious realities, but non physical chooser that > for me is the ghost! HPS: Orthodox QM requires (experimental) choices, and these choices are not specified in terms of the physically described variables by any known laws. Since all seem to agree that experiences themselves are realities, how can one rationally dismiss the possibility that the choices depend causally/functionally upon these realities. I follow Wm. James's dictum: "The thought itself is the thinker" I introduce no ghosts, but recognize that science is based on things we can describe, and our descriptions of our conscious experiences CAN, and in orthodox quantum theory DO, enter into the calculations of our predictions about the phenomenal realities. In the claasical approximation all causation is reduced to physical causation (causation that is completely expressed in terms of purely physically described variables), but there is no reason to insist that, or believe that, this restiction must hold within the more general quantum theory. 5B> [Joseph Polanik ] Mon, 16 Oct 2006, > > What is Quantum Interactive Dualism? Is it Chalmers, one 'stuff' > matter/energy; with two sets of properties -- the physical & experiential > properties or Descartes two fundamental substances, matter/energy and mind > stuff? Some argue that he had three sets of properties:. physical > properties, mental properties and experiential properties of sensory > awareness from the union of body and mind/soul. > > [Henry Stapp] 10-19-20 > > It uses two kinds of descriptions: One is psychological description (Bohr, > 1962, p.3). The other is the quantum description in terms of mathematical > properties assigned to space-time points..which represent "potentialities" > for psycho-physical events to occur. These events are the > most "real" things ... The one underlying "stuff" is an evolving state of > "information", which is characterized as a structure, different aspects of > which can act upon each other to influence the development of the whole. > Certain parts "interpret" other parts, and the whole changes as a result > of that interaction. > > Each of these two properties has a certain persisting "essence", though > neither is a "substance" in the normal/usual everyday sense of the word > The > physically described and psychologically described properties constitute > QM > Interactive Dualism. > > [Philip Benjamin] > > So there are in fact four Things to consider: 1. Physical properties 2. > Psychological properties 3. Information 4. A persisting essence. Henry > Stapp > states: **None of these is a substance in the normal/usual everyday sense > of > the term **. What could be this extra ordinary substance? Could it have > mass, charge, spin? How is this essence PERSISTING , since there is > constant > and complete recycling of matter in the cells (electrons, protons, > neutrons), some within minutes, especially in the brain? Should not these > same four stuff do the same *tricks* in rocks or plants or animals as in > humans, particularly since genetically they are all very close (except the > rocks)? > HPS: If one thinks in process terms terms then there is one process, which has aspects that we can speak about. And we can construct useful theories that relate those aspects that we can speak about. > [Henry Stapp] > > The point is that in conventional quantum theory the quantum mathematical > description becomes a description merely of possibilities or > potentialities, > not, in general, of an evolving experientable (experiential) reality > itself. > Yet this quantum state is precisely the quantum theoretical generalization > of the classical-physics description of physical reality itself. So where > did the "physical reality" itself go? > > What is the rational basis of the claim that the physical description is > causally closed when the classical physics description, from which the > notion of the causal closure of the physical arose, dissolves into mere > potentialities, and the only realities---as opposed to > potentialities---that > are to be found in the phenomenally validated conventional quantum theory > are described in psychological rather than physical terms? > > [Philip Benjamin] > > Let me paraphrase this, to see if I understood it correctly. Classical > physics can describe physical reality. HPS: This is not a para phrasing! Classical physics described what classical physics postulated to be physical reality. But conventional quantum physics claims that the classical conceptualization was profoundly incorrect at the basic level, even though it is useful as a way of speaking about the structure of our perceptions. According to conventional quantum theory the classical description gets replaced by a quantum mathematical description that, ontologically speaking, is a description of *potentialities* for the occurrence of percetpual events that are described "in everydasy language supplemented by the terminology of classical physical theory." > Classical physics comes under quantum > theoretical generalization. So physical reality cannot disappear from the > quantum state of possibilities or potentialities. It must be one of those > potentialities. This position is accepted as a quantum mystery. > The deterministic classical laws result from an approximation: the approximation of setting the physically non-zero value of Planck's artificially to zero. The old "physically reality" turns into a "potentiality" for "an experiencible event" to occur. I do not think that the fact that classical physics fails, and needs to be improved, fundamentally, is a bona fide mystery: there never was a solid reason for it to be right in the first place. Once one grants that the prime realities of a scientific theory are our conscious experiences. I do not think that the proposition the conscious realities are real can be denied. And if they are real it would be a mystery if they had no effects. > Equating events with essence is a category mistake. HPS: Yes, I think the whole line of approach that is based on substances rather than process is unhelpful, and I avoid using that terminology. The useful focus is on relationships between the psychologically describable aspects of the world process and a mathematical model. > > Is there a gratuitous intrusion into quantum physics of personal > mysticism, > fortified by Eastern peer-camaraderie? [Once in the early 50~Rs, I stood > as a > tourist in the same place where Carl Jung, was on record as an apprentice > and practitioner of sorcery for 18 months. Jung was a much senior and very > influential contemporary of many young Quantum theorists of his day, > especially Heisenberg]. HPS: Jung's connection to Pauli, later on, is well documented. But Bohr went out of his way to disassociate quantum theory with mysticism of any kind by emphasizing its deep and secure root in empirical/experimental practice. Quantum theory is the simplest, and only known, way to make verifiable predictions about a certain large class of phenomena. Human person's enter the theory in the way that they do in actual scientific practice, as agents that set up conditions and observe/perceive outcomes. These person's are not ghosts, or mystical figments. And their conscious choices are highly efficacious. The fact that in the classical approximation every physically efficacious cause is physically describable does not entail that the causal basis must be restricted in this way when the uncertainties mandated by the uncertainty principle become important. Properties that hold in an approximation often do not hold in general. > Best regards > > Philip Benjamin > medinuclear@hotmail.com > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > From: "Henry P. Stapp" > > Reply-To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com > > To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com > > Subject: [jcs-online] Re: Stapp/Atmanspacher and To what is conscious > > presented? > > Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2006 14:51:13 -0800 (PST) > > > Polanik: "enduring insight: the distinction between a property and > > > that > > which has or exhibits that property." > > > > HPS: Conscious experiences belong to stream's of conscious > > experiences, and these streams are part of nature's proceess. > > This process has aspects that are described in psychological language, > > in terms of thoughts, ideas, or feelings which have various qualities > > that have been given names by persons. Each person constitutes an aspect > > of nature's process that possesses a stream of consciousness. One can > > properly say, therefore, that a stream of conscious thoughts has > > psychologically described properties. What "has" a psychologically > > described property is primarily a conscious experience; secondarily > > the stream of conscious experiences to which the experience belongs; and > > tertially the person (an aspect of nature's process) the "has" this > > stream > > of consciousness. > > > > Polanik: "The next question is: If there is experience occuring; then > > to what is that experience occuring?" > > > > HPS: "To what?" I guess the correct question is "In what?", and the > > answer > > is "In a stream of consciousness!" > > > > Polanik: "...it follows that there is something real to which > > experiences > > occur." > > > > HPS: This may be harking back to "I assume that the presentee > > is whatever entity in the brain experiences consciousness." (See > > Hameroff, Oct 29) The idea the something in the brain "experiences > > conscious" goes far beyond what science says. Nor does science tell us > > that some immaterial entity "experiences consciousness". Experiences > > occur > > in streams of conscious, which are aspects of nature's psycho-physical > > process, and "to" a "person" by appearing in that person's stream of > > consciousness. Each human person is an aspect of nature's process with > > both physically described and psychologically described aspects. The > > physically described aspects specify *potentialities* (objective > > tndencies, in Heisenberg's words) for certain psychophysical events to > > occur. Von Neumann has spelled out the currently known rules for the > > known > > (to science) connection between the physically and psychologically > > described aspects of nature's process. > > > > Mondor: "But in 1952 David Bohm published an interpretation of QM > > that... > > was completely deterministic." > > > > HPS: But, in spite of massive intense effort, this result has not > > been able to be carried over to the domain of special relativity, > > where particle creation becomes important. [cf. Pearle, > > quant-ph/0205069] > > And when, trying to generalize his ideas, Bohm was led to an infinite > > tower of guiding fields each being guided by a higher one. > > [Bohm 1990: A new theory of the relationship between mind and matter, > > Philosophical Psychology 3, 371-286] Logical closure was lost. > > > > Edwards: "When I say von Neumann believed in fairies I do not do so > > lightly. Fairies are supernatural beings the existence of which we can > > neither observe nor infer,... Abstract Egos seem to be that." > > > > HPS: The account I have given above about the place of consciousness > > in nature and in physics is essentially my understanding of von > > Neumann. I find no fairies there. The term "abstract ego" highlights > > the fact that reality contains psychologically described aspects that > > are tighly tied to the physically described aspects of brains, but are > > not fixed by specifying the prior physically described (quantum) state > > of the universe. The quantum state of the universe fixes only the > > potentialities for (collapse/reduction) events that---and this is the > > key to the pragmatic success of quantum theory---are closely connected > > to increments in human knowledge. The events have psychologically > > described aspects, which are what we observe/experience, or, more > > precisely, *are* the empirical data They are not superhatural or > > unobservable, but are rather a core part of the quantum mechanical > > description, and the only part of nature unequivocally known to be real. > > But nature's overall process needs a (sub)process that partitions > > the continuum of potentialities into some set experiencable parts. > > At least that is how conventional (Copenhagen/vN) QM works in real > > scientific practice. In that theory there is a psychologically described > > aspect that is an intgral part of the whole dynamical structure, and > > that > > continues to be essential (in connection with process 1) when the brain > > is > > made part of the aspect of nature that is described on quantum physical > > terms. > > > > > > > > > > Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > Use your PC to make calls at very low rates > https://voiceoam.pcs.v2s.live.com/partnerredirect.aspx > > > > > > Yahoo! Groups Links > > <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jcs-online/ > > <*> Your email settings: > Individual Email | Traditional > > <*> To change settings online go to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jcs-online/join > (Yahoo! ID required) > > <*> To change settings via email: > mailto:jcs-online-digest@yahoogroups.com > mailto:jcs-online-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com > > <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: > jcs-online-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com > > <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > From hpstapp@lbl.gov Sun Nov 12 03:14:17 2006 Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2006 03:14:16 -0800 (PST) From: Henry P. Stapp To: jcs-online@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [jcs-online] Mondor, Polanik, Lofting, Edwards, Nunn & the Stapp/Atmsanspacher dialogue On Thu, 9 Nov 2006, Ray Mondor wrote: > Through a fortunate and fortuitous connection I am able to forward Dr. Basil Hiley's reply to some of Dr. Stapp's remarks. > > Ray Mondor > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > ----- > > Sent: 07 November 2006 14:00 > Subject: Reply to Henry Stapp's Comments on QM and consciousness > > I find it very difficult to enter into a discussion that has been > going on between two other parties. One misses the main thrust of the > argument and often raise different points that may not be central to the > discussion. However I will comment on the paragraph:- > > As Wigner ("Remarks on the Mind-body Question"; cf. Wheeler and > Zurek p. 169) said: "it was not possible to formulate the laws of Quantum > Mechanics without reference to the consciousness." Also > Heisenberg: "The laws of nature that we formulate mathematically > in quantum theory deal no longer with the particles themselves but with > our knowledge of the elementary particles." "no longer the behaviour of > the elementary particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior" > > These quotes are certainly correct and even though Wigner and > Heisenberg were outstanding physicists (incidentally I did have the > privilege of discussing some of these issues with both these men) these > are merely opinions. As descriptions of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory that is used in actual scientific practice these are more than just opinions. The mathematical formalism of quantum theory is construed, within that interpretation, as merely a procedure for making predictions about relationships between perceptions, and that is the justification given by Wigner for his assertion. [See Wigner in the cited reference] I acknowledged and stressed that there are opposing viewpoints, including promimently, the one of David Bohm. > They are opinions that have always troubled me. I find it difficult to > reconcile them with the historic origins of quantum mechanics. Remember > it all started from our inability to explain the distribution blackbody > radiation and the stability of matter in terms of classical physics. > Without the stability of matter there would be no life forms in which > consciousness could be exhibited (not even Hoyl's Black Cloud). To use > consciousness to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics seems circular, > unless of course you assume some kind of universal consciousness lying at > the centre of being as is proposed by certain forms of Hinduism. > The issue of what has caused the laws of nature to be what they are, with their fantastic suitability for life, including not least of all the fact that they yield the fantastic properties of DNA, is very interesting question. Are there, as string theory is supposed to entail, some 10 to the 500th power possible worlds which could all exist, and that some of them accidently have all of the properties that exist in our universe? If so, then that is why life exists in our universe. Consciousness could be a property of our universe without its being a cause or prerequisite of it. Because our universe has evolved in such a way as to produce conscious living organisms whose psychologically describable properties exist in a symbiotic relationship with physically describable properties, a symbiotic relationship that we can describe, and that we can use to make predictions about correlations between our perceptions, does not entail that consciousness is a prerequisite or cause of the stability of matter. Consciousness exists on our universe, and hence the potentiality for consciousness must be something that inheres in the structure of our universe, but the potentiality for human-type consciousness presumably did not become actualixed until human-type organisms appeared. > Most physicists would expect to account for the stability of matter in > a way that is independent of consciousness and certainly of human > consciousness. Well, human consciousness probably depends on the stability of matter. > HPS:"Some physicists (eg. Bohm, and Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber---and Philip Pearle) have tried > to eliminate consciousness but all have failed to accommodate relativistic > > QM with particle production." > > is just not correct. You can do it. The mathematics gets very messy but > you can do it. > The Dirac field has proved difficult but some of the results of the work > by Lasenby and some of my more recent work shows that this is now possible > but much is left to be done. > This admission that "much is left to be done" is worrisome. A more complete statement of my position on Bohmian Mechanics can be found in my book "Mindful Universe" p.78. I say there, among other things: "Over and beyond these problems with consciousness there is the technical problem that a Bohm-type deterministic model apparently cannot be made to accommodate particle creation and annihilation, which is an important feature of the actual world in which we live. Completing the dynamically incomplete physical [Process 2] description provided by quantum theory by adding a classically conceived deterministically specified physical world, instead of choices made by agents and by nature, has never been achieved, except in an idealized non-relativistic world in which there is no creation and annihilation of particles." The key qualifiers are 'deterministic' and 'deterministically specified'. One of the most dedicated "pro Bohmian model" groups the the Munich group of D. Duerr et.al. In their paper http://arxiv.org/quant-ph/0208072 they conclude that determinism cannot be maintained: the inclusion of particle creation and annihilation leads to stochastic elements. I know of no published paper that claims to be able to carry the Bohmian model deterministically over to our basic quantum theory: quantum electrodynamics. > All of this, of course, is about providing an ontology based > interpretation without > invoking consciousness and without invoking references to 'our knowledge'. > However it still leaves open the intriguing question of the relationship > between mind and matter. There are those who feel quantum theory has > nothing to offer in discussions on this subject. Here I whole heartedly > agree with Henry Stapp. You will not come to understand this relationship > without the lessons coming from quantum theory. Where we have > differences, they involve a discussion of what are the precise lessons we > should carry over. .... > > Basil. > With respect to that point what I said on p.78 was: "Bohm certainly appreciated the need to deal more substantively with the problem of consciousness. He wrote a paper on the subject (Bohm, 1986, 1990), which ended up associating consciousness with an infinite tower of pilot waves, each one piloting the wave below. But the great virtue of the original pilot-wave model, namely the fact that it was simple and deterministic with cleanly specified solvable equations, became lost in this infinite tower." If Basil agrees that consciousness involves quantum aspects then does he believe that this consciousness must be an idle spectator having no role in our lives. If Bohmial determinism fails then consciousness could enter causally in much the way I have proposed, since electrodynamics is the key physics in the brain, and the creation and annihilation of photons is a huge part of the action. Henry