From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Wed Feb 14 09:40:59 2001 Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2001 09:30:12 -0800 (PST) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: Jeffrey Schwartz Cc: Dr Robert Ilson Subject: Re: Searle Talk On Fri, 9 Feb 2001, Jeffrey Schwartz wrote: > Dear Robert, > Stapp and/or I have thought about each of these points in > detail and have considered rejoinders. You will very probably get to > hear mine on the phone and in direct conversation with Honderich at > some point -- Henry Stapp is *much* more of an e-mailer than me and > may be willing to respond directly to some of your points. For > starters I will attach (in Word 6 format) a relevant section from > James Principles of Psychology, the end of ChapV, "The Automaton > Theory." Let me know if you have a problem opening it. Will call > soon, as I'd like to get there in the next month or so -- Had nice > chat with Dinah Lord of BBC1 last week -- Jeff > > > > 9 February 2001 > >Dear Jeffrey, > > I, too, took in the Searle Talk (which Honderich chaired). It was > >delivered very well, with a pleasing absence of stuffiness and the > >encouragement of questions afterwards. It was about Free Will and > >Determinism. > > Searle doesn't know which is right. He inclines to Determinism, but in > >that case why has Evolution made us feel free ? Perhaps he got that problem > >from you -- though for me it is not problematic at all. > > Searle repeated several times that Quantum Indeterminacy was NOT an > >explanation of Free Will. I don't know why he was so insistent; nor do I > >remember him justifying his assertion. > > Thinking about the problem before his talk, I had concluded that Free > >Will seemed somehow to entail the notion of a Self and would therefore be > >incompatible with Anatta. To my amazement, Searle made that very point > >repeatedly and emphatically (though without, of course, mentioning Anatta). > > Free Will does seem to be a problem for admirers of Buddhism. > > Yours ever, > > Robert > [From Stapp] Dear Jeff, You know well that I also insist that that quantum indeterminacy is NOT the answer to free will, and that I emphasized this point in our conversation with John. Quantum indeterminacy is a random effect, and if one wants to maintain the quantum princples it must remain random. Hence it is effective noise, whereas human volition must be purposeful and directed, not random. Quantum indeterminacy is normally associated in quantum theory with "Nature's" choice, not with human volition, and that remains true also in the von Neumann/ Wigner (vN/W) formulation that I am pursuing. Human volition is associated in vN/W quantum theory with the exploitation by biological systems of a quite different causal gap in the dynamics, namely the absence of any features within the standard dynamics that determines which question is put to nature (a question that nature must then answer "randomly") and when this question is put to nature. These two question of WHAT Yes-or-No question is put to nature, and WHEN it is put to nature is the place where human volition can enter. It allows only a very restrictive sort of influence, which of course leads to very structured kinds of effects. The empirical support that we have amassed for the restriction in fact of the effects human volition in the way demanded by vN/W can be construed as evidence in favor of the theory. Of course, you, Jeff, know all of this very well, and it is all spelled out in detail in papers of mine. So this letter is really just a summary directed more at Dr. Ilson than to you. Best regards, Henry P.S. Jeff, maybe some abstracts from my recent dialogs with Pat, Aaron, and Stan would help Dr. Ilson see the relevance of the free will question within science: I come at the problem from scientific considerations, not from Buddhism.