From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Wed Jan 15 16:40:43 2003
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2003 16:34:23 -0800 (PST)
From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov
Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov
To: Nathan Sharfman <nsharfman@hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: An examination of the concept 'free will'; I'm desperate for a
    resolution

On Wed, 15 Jan 2003, Nathan Sharfman wrote:

> Mr.Stapp,
> 
> First, I'd like to say that I greatly enjoyed reading the Mindful Universe 
> and appreciate what you're attempting to do with your theory of 
> consciousness and volition; as we embark on the 21st century, it is 
> imperative that we jettison all atavistic beliefs that impair the ability to 
> cultivate social and individual values worth having, and promulgating the 
> falsity of those scientific hypotheses that were having a deleterious impact 
> on the 'meme pool' deserves nothing but my adulation and respect.
> 
> That being said, a problem still remains with the concept of libertarian 
> freedom despite the possible 'wiggle room' within quantum theory for the 
> mind to exercise a causal influence on the physical. If it wouldn't be too 
> much trouble, I'd like to discuss this with you (it's been causing me 
> distress since I discovered  the quiddity of the problem a few short years 
> ago - I'm 19, now).
> 
> To get the ball rolling (I'll trust that you've agreed to discuss the issue 
> with me), I'll outline why I think freedom cannot possibly exist in any 
> 'meaningful' sense even if we reject determinism and indeterminism, and thus 
> settle on 'self-determination'.
> 
> For the sake of perspicuity, let's examine an ideal case: A deity-like 
> character that can be said to be exercising 'self-determination'; it is 
> emerging from a substance that is homologous to 'nothingness', that is to 
> say, it is emerging from a substance that is free of any and all constraint 
> and thus cannot be coerced into doing anything that is contrary to its 
> nature by anything outside of itself. The problem arises immediately, and it 
> is:
> 
> Why would this Self emerge one way, and not another? What values are 
> governing the decision its making? Even if we ignore the problems generally 
> associated with creation 'ex nihilo' and focus only on those issues 
> pertinent to 'free will', a problem still remains: If there isn't a reason, 
> the decision itself was meaningless; if there was a reason, then the Self 
> cannot be said to be exercising 'freedom of the will' as it is commonly 
> conceived, for it would be compelled to act in accordance with its 'value 
> system'.
> 
> If my mind is presented with an infinite number of options, it must weigh 
> those options according to a value schema (and act accordingly), else the 
> decision is capricious and without meaning; but if I'm weighing the options 
> according to a definable, already existing value schema, then the decision 
> itself was not free. This problem remains unresolved even if we suppose that 
> the Self is capable of manipulating its own value system since the 
> 'meta-values' governing the dynamism of the original value system would 
> decide what changes would need to be made; if there is no 'meta-value 
> schema', then the decision to re-configure in such and such a way cannot be 
> said to be meaningful (an infinite regress here: 'meta-meta value schema 
> governing the dynamism of the 'meta-value' schema' and so on; we'd 
> eventually have to settle on valuations that were 'given', and if they were 
> 'given', the entity cannot be said to be free in the libertarian sense).
> 
> Now, I've read a great deal of philosophy in my short life, but I have yet 
> to encounter any examination of the concept of freedom itself; no one has 
> taken a close look at what the implications of 'self-determination' would 
> really be and whether or not it, too, abrogates libertarian freedom. This 
> may be a little presumptuous of me, but I think my 'problem' is extremely 
> relevant to modern philosophy (it may not have been explained as well as I 
> like, but hopefully you'll understand what I'm trying to say - if not, just 
> ask and I'll try to my best to explicate further).
> 
> Thank you for your consideration.
> 
> Sincerely,
> -Jason Young
> (Nathan Sharfman is a pseudonym I use on occasion)
> 
> 
> 
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Dear Jason,

I think you correctly perceive the problem.

My solution is this:

Quantum theory gives "freedom of choice" in a very specific
and limited sense: it only says that the laws of contempory
physical theory do not fix these choices pertaining to intention
and attention. It does not say that nothing at all determines
these choices. For the reasons you give it is important that
a person's deep judgements, based at least in good part upon 
his own mental history, enter into the determination of his
Free (from mechanical coersion) Choices. Because the operator
P can access the entire brain, and perhaps even a store of
the formerly existing mental realities, a person's choices can 
depend upon what they ought to depend upon, namely his whole 
person, taken as a whole, rather than the mechanical motions 
of mechanical parts.

I hope this helps you.

Henry