From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Sun Nov 19 15:50:33 2000 Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2000 15:27:27 -0800 (PST) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: pat hayes Cc: hpstapp@lbl.gov, A.sloman@bham.ac.uk, bdj10@cam.ac.uk, brings@rpi.edu, brucero@cats.ucsc.edu, ghrosenb@ai.uga.edu, hameroff@u.arizona.edu, Jeffrey M. Schwartz , keith@imprint.co.uk, Kathryn Blackmond Laskey , klein@adage.berkeley.edu Subject: Re: Dennett, Searle, and the quantum. On Fri, 17 Novhis 2000, pat hayes wrote: > Henry, you have already replied to some of this, but apparently I > neglected to send it, so here it is a bit late. > > Pat > --------- Dear Pat, Your response fingers our differing presumptions. I will point them out. Henry > >Dennett, Searle, and the quantum. > > > >DD=Dennett in "A companion to philosophy of mind" Blackwell, 1994, 236-244. > >DD'= Dennet in "An Exchange with Dennett" in "The Mystery of Consciousness" > > 1997 NYREV, inc. pp.115-119 > >JS="The Mystery of Consciousness" > > > >DD: "When mechanical push came to shove, a brain was > >always going to do > >what it was caused to do by current local mechanical > >circumstances." > > > >HPS: This presupposes the adequacy of classical physics. > > OK, so replace 'local mechanical' with 'decoherent quantum > mechanical', and for extra precaution add a rider that there > may be > some very local effects of coherence within neurons, but > there is no > actual evidence that they play any significant role in brain > functioning. > Experiments on brains are not sensitive enough to directly confirm the presence of ALL the quantum effects that quantum theory says are there. But surely many quantum effects are present. Hence in the absence of evidence to the contrary I think the rational presumption must be that quantum theory, which has never failed, is more likely to be valid than classical theory, which does fail whenever it conflicts with quantum theory at a detectible level. Since experiments alone are undoubtedly insufficient to fully determine what the brain-mind dynamics of this complex system is, it is necessary to consider the matters of principle that appear to be relevant. In quantum theory the thing that is the analog of the physical reality of classical physical theory is the quantum state S(t) evolving in accordance with the deterministic Schroedinger equation. In classical approach the deterministically evolving state of the universe is presumed to fix what we experience. But the deterministically evolving quantum state does not determine what we ``see'', or sense, or otherwise experience. Something else is needed: some other process is needed. Physicists disagree on what that this other process is, mainly because no ``crucial'' experiments have been performed that would distinguish between several quite different alternative possibilities. There is one possibility, the one put forth by von Neumann and Wigner, that makes the extra needed process an interaction between experiential realities and the physical properties of the supporting brain. This particular possibility is the most parimonious one: no entities are needed besides our known experiences, and the quantum state, which is the mathematical entity that represents our currently best theoretical description of the physical aspects of reality. So it is simply not a rational option, fundamentally, to say that quantum effects that are nearly classical are the only quantum effects that matter. One must show how that could come about. The study of decoherence effects are a first step in this direction, but they are not sufficient, as Zurek's reviews in Progress of Th. Physics and Trans. of the R. Soc, show. > >DD: "The appreciation of meaning---their detection and > >discrimination--- > >is central to to our idea of consciousness, but this > >conviction that > >*I*, on the inside, deal directly with meanings turns out > >to be something > >like a benign `user illusion. " > > > >HPS: Within classical physical theory 'meanings', per se, > >cannot > >'really' be efficacious: what is going to happen is fixed > >already by > >the local current circumstances, and hence any higher-level > > structure > >can make no dynamical difference. The higher-level > >description is just > >an alternative (and more efficient) way of describing what > >could in > >principle be described in purely locally causal terms. > > If this is intended to be an argument it is a nosequiteur. > True, the > higher-level description is an alternative way of describing > something, but so is the lower-level description. There are, > in > general, many alternative ways of describing almost any > system, and > each description may allow one to make predictions about > it in that > vocabulary which cannot be made in some other vocabulary. > Biologists > make biological predictions which cannot be reduced to > physics > (though they may be informed by physics), and cosmologists > make > predictions which cannot be reduced to biology, and so on > and on. > None of these ways of describing has any primacy over any > other way. > It is true that a given thing can often be described in many useful ways. But if the principles of classical physical theory were true then I do not think that higher-level descriptions would be logically on a par with the description in terms of the basic microvariables. That is because high- level descriptions are condensed: they bring out certain pertinent features at the expense of leaving out most of the information that is contained in the micro-description. Thus the high-level description does not contain ALL the information contained in the micro description, but the micro-description does contain ALL the information captured by the high-level description, to the extent that the high-level description is a description of physical features that are expressible in terms of the basic micro-variables. A high-level description of a biological or cosmological property might be characterized directly in terms of how it experienced by trained biologists or cosmologists, or how measuring devices are responding and recording observable information. But these properties are properties that are expressible in terms of observable spacetime shapes and locations of regions that are conceived of, within classical physical theory, as defined by collections of moving particles and changing EM and GRAV fields. It is this feature that allows biology and cosmology to be fit, in principle, into the unity of science. I am not challenging the belief that the ideas of classical physical theory might be wrong: in fact I know that they are wrong, and that is my point. But to the extent that one is accepting the precepts of classical physical theory as the basis of one's approach to the mind-brain, and its evolution, one should approach biology and cosmology from that standpoint. And in that case the biological and cosmological properties should be manifestations of complex physical properties, which are built out of the micro motions of the particles and fields. The micro-level description is thus complete in a sense that the high-level descriptions are not. Hence one cannot rightly say, within the classical physics framework, that the high-level descriptions are on a logical par with the basic micro-physical description. > Meanings can be (and indeed are) efficacious in computers, > for > example, in ways which do not depend in any interesting > way on the > quantum-theoretic description of the innards of the > thin-film > transistors. Computers are particularly interesting case > because, > uniquely among artifacts, they can construct their own > descriptions > of nature and utilise them, and indeed their own behaviour > depends on > these representations (not on our representations of those > representations, I would add, for emphasis.) > You seem to be arguing against Dennett's claim that dealing directly with meanings is an illusion. > >But within quantum theory things such as meanings > >CAN be genuinely efficacious: they CAN make a real > >dynamical difference > >that is not describable in purely local causal terms. > > > >DD: "There are two different strands of realism that I > >have tried to > >undermine: > > > >(1) realism about the entities...such as beliefs, desires, > > pains ... > > > >(2) realism content itself --- the idea that there have to > > be events > >or entities that *really* have intentionality (as opposed > >to events > >and entities that only behave *as if* they had > >intentionality." > > > >Against (1) I have wielded various arguments, analogies..." > > > > > >HPS: Arguments by *analogy* that "pains" are not real > >founder > >on the fact that in the putative analogies are non-analogies. > > > >The putative analogies involve the replacement of certain > >entities > >that have been hypothesized to explain certain features of > >our experiences > >by other entities have been hypothesized to explain > >features of > >experiences. Thus the replaced entity is of the SAME KIND > >as its replacement: > >both entities are hypothetical theoretical constructs have > >been introduced > >to explain features of our experience. > > > >It would beg the question to claim that the existence of > >experiences, such > >as PAINS, are *analogous* to the existence of hypothetical > >theoretical > >entities that have been invented to explain experience. > > If I follow your point here, it is that all of science > consists of > hypotheses whose purpose is to explain human experiences. > I guess if > that really is your view of science, Well, there are also the empirical aspects, and the applications, of course. > then your position has > some > internal consistency. I find it a ludicrous view of science, > however, > and probably (I do not know the exact history here) one > based on very > bad philosophy, stemming from Kant. > Prior to the recognition, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, that the principles of classical physical theory, based on the ideas of Newton and Maxwell, were FUNDAMENTALLY INCORRECT, one could rationally support the idea that the classical conception of reality was indubitably correct, because of the voluminous empirical support, even though questions could be raised at the philophical level as to the `certainty' of this conclusion. But with the complete demolition of the classical premises by quantum phenomena (now extending over distances of more than 10 km) one is really forced to retreat to a more secure position. It was the conflict with *empirical data* that forced the retreat to a more secure philosophical position, not "bad philosophy". > >DD:"... the choice between `eliminative materialism' or > > `identity theory'. > >is not a matter of which `ism' is right but...." > > > >HPS: In either case he seems to be denying the reality of, > >say, > >a PAIN as anything but or beyond a construct based > >exclusively upon > >"local mechanical circumstances", which are themselves the > >sufficient > >cause of all behavior. > > > >Indeed, Searle accuses Dennett of an outright denial of > >the existence of > >experience, including pains. > > Searle does accuse him of this, but Searle is just plain > wrong. > Dennett is arguing against a certain kind of philosophical > identity, > and Searle seems unable to understand the distinction that > Dennett is > making. To deny the identification of experiences with > qualia is not > to deny the reality of experience. > I think Searle is maintaing that the qualia `a pain' IS the painful experience itself: the existence of either is equivalent to the existence of the other. Of course, `a pain' is connected to various theoretical ideas that might make your pain different from the pain experience by a untutored native, but I think Searle is talking basically about a presumed primitive core aspect of pain that is pretty much common to all human beings, and primates, and dogs and cats. This "core pain" is what Searle is pointing to, and what he argues is real, and what a theory of conscious must say something about. Dennett seems to think that a theory of consciousness can avoid or evade talking about this `core consciousness' by arguing that some *other* notion of `a pain' has no associated reality. His book, "Consciousness Explained" seems to prance around, without ever coming to grips with, the central problem of the status of "core pain". You, Pat, seem much clearer, and to the point, by simply straight-forwardly adopting the identity theory. You seem to be willing to simply bite the bullet. But Dennett seems much more covered and, it seems to me, evasive about the central problem of "core pain". I think he sees the difficulty of defending the proposition that a core pain, which is a raw feel, is *identical* to some pattern of motion of a set of particles. > >JS: "Dennett ... keeps the vocabulary of consciousness > >while denying its > >existence." p. 111 > > > >JS: " subjective feelings are the *data* that a theory > >of consciousness > >has to explain. ... He( Dennett) denies the existence > >of the data."p.99 > > Feelings cannot be data for a science, since experiments on > feelings > cannot be publicly replicated. (Interestingly, however, > experiments > on *classes* of experiences can be replicated.) Reports of > feelings > can be data, and we can adopt as a principle the assumption > that > reports of feelings are veridical (not that the feelings > are, but > that the reports are.) Which is exactly Dennett's principle > of > 'heterophenomenology'. This does not deny the reality of > feelings, > but acknowledges that, being intrinsically first-person, > they cannot > be the subject of scientific investigation directly. It also > acknowledges that the only final authority on someone's > feelings is > the person who experiences them. > Yes. Those are all good points. And, indeed, Bohr emphasized these points when he based his interpretation of quantum theory on descriptions that could be communicated among scientists. This is the essential difference between Bohr's more pragmatic position and that of von Neumann and Wigner. Bohr stopped at the pragmatic level, whereas von Neumann and Wigner wanted to move toward a more complete theoretical formulation. The issue is--- given the fact that scientific practice is based of what scientists can communicate to each other---whether our personal experiences, as contrasted to the observable reports about them, are nevertheless real aspects of the totality of all things, and hence things that ought to be included in our dynamical theory of reality. They are the realities that people make reports about. "Electrons" are not reports, but they are, in classical physical theory, regarded as realities that lie behind our experiences. They, and other realities like them, are the realities that the THEORY is based upon. So THEORY can, at the basic dynamical level, involve realities other than communicable reports. This is a feature of physical theory where vN/W concur with the classical position, not with Bohr's: a `better' theory should be primarily about the realities behind the reports, not just the reports. But classical physical theory does not seem to be able to explain the "feels" that we report. Dennett, if you are right, does admit to the existence of personal first-person experiences, but wants to leave them out of the THEORY. That might be reasonable and justifiable if these experiences were just built in some way out of the physical structures alone, or at least were completely fixed by that physical structure alone, as classical physical theory would seem to say. For then any dynamical effect of these personal expriences could be effectively replaced by purely physical structures that would somehow be equivalent to them. But that approach is seriously undermined if the non-validity of classical physical theory is taken into account, along with the fact that the first-person experiences whose existence Dennett accepts, if you are right, do enter into the von Neumann/Wigner quantum theory as dynamically independent elements, that enter co-equally into mind/brain dynamics. So the idea that one can leave these admitted realities out of the dynamics is certainly questionable: why should these first-person realities---whose existence Dennett admits--- play no dynamical role in the course of physical events in human brains? Their lack of efficaciousness in classical physical theory is insufficient grounds for concluding that they themselves, as something apart from the quantum state vector that represents the objective aspects of reality, cannot enter into the dynamics. > >JS:" he thinks conscious states, as I have described them, > >do not > >exist, and that there is nothing there but a brain > >implementing a computer > >program." p.100 > > D. thinks that conscious states do exist, and that they are, > or can > be, constituted by a brain implementing a computer program. > Searle > has *defined* 'conscious state' to exclude this possibility, > so he is > the one using the theory-laden language here. > I am trying to get away from this theory laden-ness by focussing on the primitive core aspect of a pain that is stripped of theoretical overlays. The pain experienced by a small child, for example. I think it is evasive to use the admitted theory-laden-nees of all ideas to deny the idea of primitive pain. The issue is whether that primitive pain is real, and, if it is real, whether that reality enters into brain dynamics in the way needed to resolve the gaps that quantum theory otherwise leaves in the dynamics of the brain. > >"Dennett does not believe that the brain causes inner > >qualitative > >conscious states, because he does not believe that there > > are any such > >things."p.111 > > > >Quoting Dennett "Even if mental events are not among > >the data of science ... "p.112 > > See above. It is one thing to agree that things exist, > another to say > that they are among the data of science. > > >HPS: Contemporary science (QT) recognizes that our > >experiences are the > >primary reality upon which all of science is based: what > >is fictional > >are the hypothetical micro-realities of classical physical > >theory, not > >the experiences that those fictions were designed to explain. > > A small minority of theoretical physicists 'recognize' this, > not all > of contemporary science. In taking this stance they are > positioning > themselves against the entire western tradition of scientific > investigation, and claiming to render meaningless almost > all science > done by almost all other investigators in almost all > disciplines. Not in any way is the rest of science rendered meaningless. Quantum theory explains why the classical concepts work in those other realms of science. The mind-brain system is particularly sensitive to quantum effects. > Fortunately, the rest of the world seems content to go > about its > business without paying them a great deal of attention. > Personally, I > am more convinced that the external world exists than I am > that I > exist, let alone my experiences, and the idea that human > experiences > are the 'primary reality' seems ridiculous. > In vN/W QT, unlike Copenhagen QT, human experiences are not the `primary reality', although they are very important in the dynamics of human brains. vN/W quantum theory has an objective reality that is the analog of the physical world of classical physical theory, and human experiences are not the "primary reality". The evolving universe existed before human beings and human experiences. But human experiences are part of the contemporary reality, and reports pertaing to them are the data of all of science, which is the human endeavour to find rational order in this manifold of reports. But finding the order within this manifold of reports is likely to involve bringing into the theory the features of the brain that are the CAUSES of these reports. But that brings one to the critical issue of the causal structure of mind-brain dynamics. Given our understanding of quantum theory there is no reason to believe, or suspect, that the concepts of the fundamentally false classical theory should be able to provide a correct account of this causal structure. > >HPS: Dennett replies to the charge that he hiding the > >fact that > >he is throwing out the data, and retaining the fictions > >that were > >once brought in to explain the data by saying that he > >warned the > >reader about this early on, in his parable of the madman > >who says there are no animals. (CE p.43-44). What he says > >is that he will continue to use the word "consciousness". > >but > >that our conscious experiences are completely unlike what > >most > >people now think they are: He assigns the word a new > >meaning. > >So Dennett really is denying that "pains", as they are > >usually > >understood, do not exist. > > > >Searle asserts: "If it seems to me exactly as if I am > >having conscious > >experiences then I am having conscious experiences." > > I do not think Dennett would disagree with this. > > >" ...the experience of feeling a pain is identical with a > >pain in a way > >that experience of seeing a sunset is not identical with > >a sunset." > > But he might with this (and so would I). The problem is > that word > "identical", which carries a very strong weight in these > discussions. > If one were to say instead: "...the experience of feeling > a pain is > identical with THE EXPERIENCE OF a pain in a way that > experience of > seeing a sunset is not identical with a sunset." I would > agree. > Searle is identifying a pain - which is at least in part > a bodily > phenomenon, having for example a medical cause and being > measurable > even when the subject is asleep - with an experience, > which is > arguably 'purely' phenomenological. That identification > is a crucial > error; it cuts the cord which binds our mental to our > bodily states > and lets experiences float away into a dualistic lala-land. > I do not think Searle is saying that a pain exists when the person is in a deep dreamless sleep: He often says that consciousness is NOT present when the subject is in such a state. I read him as maintaining that consciousness (and experiences OF PAIN, e.g., painful experiences) are caused by bodily causes but are ontologically and qualitatively different from the body. They ARE ``phenomenological". But I doubt that someone suffering with pain would admit that there is anything lala about pain because it is phenomenological. And if it is "caused" by bodily states then there is no implied cutting of the cord that links the pain to the body. > >I think this is basically why Dennett FAILS to show that > >pains, as they > >are usually understood, do not exist. > > He never claims that pains don't exist. On the contrary, in > fact. (He claims that pain-qualia do not exist, and there > I agree with him; but > this case has nothing to do with pain, but arises from a > logical > analysis of the term 'qualia', which turns out to be close to > incoherent.) > So Dennett's position depends on the difference between a "pain" and a "pain-qualia"?? The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines Qualia as "The subjective qualities of conscious experience. Examples: ... the way it feels to stub your toe." I think for most people a "pain" is a "feeling of pain" is a "conscious experience of pain" is a "painful experience" is a "pain-qualia", given the above definition. Denntt's move reminds one of the Clintonesque move of questioning what the meaning of 'is' is. Dennett's maneuver is an example of the extremes that philosophers have been driven to when trying to force mind-brain into a classical-physics framework into which it will not fit. In any case Dennett himself in DD says that he has tried to undermine "realism about entities purported described by our everyday mentalistic discourse---what I dubbed FOLK PSYCHOLGY (1981)---such as beliefs, desires, pains, the self;" Perhaps this translates into not denying the reality of "pain", but only "pain-qualia". But I think that in everyday mentalistic discourse `the way it feels to stub your toe' is a painful feeling is an experiencing of pain. Whatever you call it, it is real, but its existence is not entailed, BY VIRTUE OF ITS DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS AND THE PRINCIPLES CLASSICAL PHYSICAL THEORY, by the character of the motions of the particles in a person's brain. > >---------------------------------------------------------- > > > >Searle's central claim is that consciousness is a feature > >of the brain in the same sense that digestion is a feature > >of the stomach. JS p.xiv > > > >But digestion as a biological phenomenon is compatible with > >an identity theory of digestion: digestion is indeed just a > >feature of the stomach. > > > >But a brain is different, because it provides DATA that, according to > >Searle's argument against Dennett, is NOT the very same thing as any > >property of the brain (e.g., the existence of a feeling of a pain) > >whereas every aspect of digestion is a feature of the stomach. > > > >Thus Searle's position also seems flawed. > > Yes, do not make the mistake of thinking that Searle is a quantum > mysterian. He is a classically grounded as most everyone else, and > has about the same opinion of the relevance of QT to consciusness as > myself and Aaron: what he finds silly is the idea that consciousness > could emerge from computation, not that it could emerge from biology > by 'classical' means. > At the recent Tucson conference Searle did seem to open the door to the possibility that quantum theory might be relevant, because it might provide a way for subjective first-person conscious experience to ACT BACK on the world in a way that would allow it to evolve in step with the evolving brain. Searle needs such a back action, even though classical identity theorists do not. > >----------------------------------------------------------------- > > > >If consciousness is regarded as an "emergent" property > >of the brain within the framework of classical physical theory, > >then one must say whether the emergence is a "natural > >emergence" that simply involves the relevance and utility > >of novel concepts to deal with novel complex arrangements > >of the classical micro components, but no actual breakdown > >of the local mechanical laws of motion, or whether the emergence > >is something more fundamental, such as the coming into being of > >real elements that are truly different than > >just novel complex functionally pertinent arrangements > >of the simple micro-parts. > > You obviously take 'real' and 'truly' to mean something like 'visible > at the grain size of particle physics'. Not necessarily. > Would you say that the following phenomena were "naturally emergent": > fluid flow, tensile strength, photosynthesis, the shape of an oak > leaf, digestion? Yes, I think these are examples of "natural emergence": they can be regared as just complex arrangements of the micro elements. > If so, you are saying that these phenomena do not in > fact really exist, They do really exist. >but are only "novel concepts to deal with novel > complex arrangements of the classical micro components" ? replace this `but are only' by `and are'. > > It seems to me to be extremely likely that consciousness does not > involve the coming into being of anything "truly different" in your > sense. What makes you think it does? Do you have any evidence, even a > shred, to suggest that it does? Within vN/W QT nothing new is needed: this theory has consciousness put in at the start in order to make a coherent and consistent theory. So as far as the real situation is concerned nothing truly new is added. But the discussion is about whether fundamentally false classical physical theory can account for consciousness without bringing in something beyond just complex arrangements of the classical micro-elements. Within this restricted theoretical framework, which we know is fundamentally false, digestion is very different from consciousness. (That is why Searle needs quantum theory.) > > >If the latter option is what is being considered, then > >the it would seem totally unnatural if such real things were to > >come into existence but be absolutely causally inert; > >What would be the point of nature creating such truly new > >kinds of realities if they cannot do anything? > > > >But if the new entities are NOT causally inert then > >how can one reconcile there existence with the known laws > >of physics? Does consciousness violate the laws of > >physics? > > No, because it does not involve any new non-physical entities. > At this point I am considering "the latter option" which is the option in which conscious experience is regarded as something "new": this is NOT the identity-theory option. Identity theory avoids this pitfall: that is its great virtue. > >If one is going to pursue the idea of some actual > >modification of the laws of classical physical theory, > > I see no rational need to do so, so your conclusion is irrelevant. > Here I am considering Searle's quandry: he seems to recognize that conscious experience is not "reducible" to the purely physical: that it is qualitatively different from the brain activity that "causes" it. But then *he*, but not you, must consider how to accomodate the needed TWO-WAY causal connection. I think HE needs quantum theory. That is what I am saying here. > >then surely the most reasonable and rational thing to try > >is the rationally coherent and empirically validated modification > >that physicists have created to account for observed failures > >of the classical physical theory, namely quantum theory. > > > > > >Quantum theory involves, fundamentally, an interplay between > >a local `mechanical' process and a nonlocal process. The nonlocal > >process is closely linked, in practical applications of quantum theory, > >to human conscious experience, > > Actually I take issue with this claim. I have yet to see ANY clear > link made between any quantum-theoretical process and any aspect of > consciousness. Most of quantum theory makes no reference to > consciousness at all, except in a vague metaphorical sense in which > every 'experiment' is considered to be somehow posed by a > 'consciousness'; but the quantum-theoretic calculations go on quite > independently of any hypotheses about this 'consciouness' other than > it is whatever poses questions to nature, ie it is the > pre-theoretical 'source' of the experimental hypothesis. It is > *impossible* to draw *any* conclusions about the nature, content or > structure of consciousness from any part of quantum theory, unless it > is extended by a large number of ad-hoc extraphysical assumptions > involving details of brain structure, mental schemas and other > non-quantum-theoretical exotica (most of which bear a suspicious > resemblance to the kinds of mental structure which are positied by > non-quantum thinkers about the structure of mentality, so would seem > to come under the same criticisms that you apply to them.). > The point that I am making here is that in practical experiments that involve quantum measurements the actual language and practice is described (in the Journal Articles) in terms of what we can know and find out about the quantum system being examined. The natural and practically useful language is the one devised by the founder's. Now it is perfectly true that one can make attempts to reformulate things in perfectly objective language, but I think it is correct to say that no such effort has been successful, in the eyes of experts other than those that are putting forth that proposal. This does not entail or imply that no objective theory is possible. But it does raise, as a possibility that at least ought to be examined, the possibility that the "reductions" are actually connected in some way to human consciousness, as the the language and practice of the practical applications suggests, and more generally to the precursors of human consciousness and other similar things. That, basically, is the approach tried by von Neumann and Wigner. The judgement of its worth must rest on what it is able to explain or predict, beyond what the competing options are able to explain or predict. It is a rationally coherent possibility whose consequences need to be spelled out in enough detail so that its scientific worth can be evaluated. Philosophically it has the merit of allowing conscious experiences to be ontologically non-identical to the objective "physical" features of nature that are represented by the evolving, but identical, instead, to the aspects of nature that we call our feelings and knowings, and yet be able to stand in a two-way causal relationship to that physical aspect of nature. > > but it can be naturally extended to more > >primitive precursors of human conscious experience. > > There isnt much evidence that such things even exist. > It would be unnatural for consciousness to `spring forth with all her armor', without predecessors, > >The nonlocal process > >involves elements of indeterminism that allow thoughts, and their > >precursors, to influence behavior: the causal connection > >between the local process and the nonlocal processes is a two-way link > >that can account both for the efficacy of our thoughts in guiding > >our behavior AND the linked-evolution of brains and consciousness. > > > >What could be better? > > Well, for a start, an actual theory of HOW thoughts influence > behavior would be better. That is what we already have. > For example, it seems clear that ideas from > cybernetics are central to understanding the dynamics of thoughts > and actions. What does quantum theory have to say about feedback and > stability? Much of this will be carried over from the classical level (see below). > Or, on a different tack, how is the content of our > thoughts related to the quantum behavior of the brain states which > represent those contents? I believe that the link between the body-world schemata and quantum collapse accounts to this relationship. To be sure the details need to be filled in, but the empirical basis of a detailed understanding of brain activity is under rapid development. The brain is a complex system, and the utility of a quantum, as opposed to classical, model remains to be seen. First, the general outline must be given. I have done a lot of this in my book, and in my many articles, and am continuing to spell out more details. > To put it another way, how does the content > of our thoughts influence the content of the questions our brains put > to nature? The latter, in your account of the QZE, have to do with > matrices in Hilbert space representing infinite collections of > particle momenta. However, speaking now for myself, I find that that > is rarely, if ever, the content of my own actual thoughts. How does > my brain translate, say, a worry about whether the recent flooding > means I should set off earlier than planned in order to catch my > flight from London, into a question about Hilbert space? > To first order the brain dynamics is similar to what one would obtain in a classical physics model. Survival consideration will have produced a brain well endowed with functional capacities to create, from clues provided by sensors, a brain representation of the body of the organism and its environment (the body-world schema) and a higher level process that creates a plan of action expressed in terms of a "projected" body-world schema. [I have given much more detailed descriptions in many places. See also my paper in progress "The emergence of consciousness".] Quantum theory differs in that the quantum state of the brain is a mixture of many evolving quasi-classical possibilities each similar to some classical possibility. Some selection among these quasi-classical possibilities must be made. Each of these possibilities has a "feel". This "feel" is not identical to the possible state, but is "caused" by that state, and is a high-level functional "value" of that state. This "value" is used in the selection of which possible state is put to nature for possible actualization. All that you experience is this ``feel'' of the possible state, in case nature actualizes that state. I have given here just the barest bones of the theory. [Maybe the technical details I usually add obscure the central idea.] I have spelled out elsewhere how the quantum zeno effect allows these "feels" to be causally efficacious. Henry > Pat > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > IHMC (850)434 8903 home > 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office > Pensacola, FL 32501 (850)202 4440 fax > phayes@ai.uwf.edu > http://www.coginst.uwf.edu/~phayes >