Subject: Re: RBH on Schwartz, Stapp and Beauregards BBS paper. On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 Mszlazak@aol.com wrote: > Hi Dr. Stapp, > > I thought I'd pass on what RBH says in a couple posts about your up coming > paper. Somethings he misses entirely but here' s the thread: > > > http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-6-t-000445-p-2.html > > Mark Szlazak > Dear Mark, Many thanks for sending this interesting and useful thread. It will be useful to me to express my own thoughts on the matters raised. They can be organized around Peterman's reference to the idea that "the entities WITHIN REALITY have intrinsic properties" in combination with the idea that "Each level of analysis has its own set of fundamental realities with their own `intrinsic properties'. " The question is then: "What are the relationships between the `intrinsic properties' at the different levels. Are we supposed to think that all the `intrinsic properties' on all the levels are intrinsic properties MITHIN REALITY? Are we talking about all of these real intrinsic properties, on all of these levels, which scientists working in different disciplines have diligently *discovered*? Or is it more like different approximate ideas that that are useful in different contexts and fields of science. In the former case there should be precise connections between the properties at the different levels: the atoms are precisely built of the quarks, the neurons are precisely constructed out of atoms, and our conscious pains are precisely constructed out of neurons. The other view would be that in the totally of nature there are many types of structure that enjoy a certain measure of stability under appropriate conditions, and scientists working in different disciplines have identified the quasi-stable structures around which the phenomena in their field can be usefully organized, but that the "entities" at one level cannot be strictly said to be built out of the lower ones because the higher level structure can involve aspects of nature's totality that have not come into play at the lower level, and are not identifiable in the lower-level properties, which involve basically some approximations that mask the existence of certain features of nature that are revealed at the higher level. One might want to describe this "emergence" of higher-level properties, not strictly deducible from the lower-level level properties, by saying that the lower level entities have some unmanifested qualities that are not expressed in their low-level description, but which can become manifest under the conditions of the high-level phenomena, or, instead, that the low-level concepts describe structures that are pertinent for the low-evel phenomena, but arise from approximations to the complex totality. Either way, one is led to the conclusion that the potentiality of consciousness is within nature from the start, be it in the proto- consciousness at the basal level or the nature of ambient reality. I think this second view (emergence/approximations) is the only workable one: the idea that consciousness is literally/precisely built out of "entities WITHIN REALITY [that] have [the] intrinsic properties" characterized as "solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable particles" of Newtonian physics is, I believe, unreasonable and unfathomable. (The problem under consideration is the connection betweem consciousness and classical-physics based concepts.) These introductory remarks provide a background for my comments on the posting of RBH, that you brought to my attention. RBH mentions that it is at the basal QM level where consciousness is put in. But the main point of SSB (Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard) is that QM puts consciousness in directly at the top. It may well be that from an ontological point of view some sort proto-cosciousness has to be there at the basal level, so that its developed known-to-us form can come out at the top. But the central point of SSB is that QM, as practiced, puts consciousness in at the top --- right at the level of psychologically described data. It sidesteps the issue of the ontological roots of consciousness by basing itself on practically useful rules (conceptual structures) that directly relate psychologically described data to physically described data. So RBH's question: "What explanatory leverage is gained by positing an "(as yet unknown) consciously generated proto-phenomenon" at the basal level of analysis? is not relevant to SSB: SSB use QM in the way that it is actually used by atomic physicists, and this is to relate psychologically described data to physically described data, without trying to settle ontological issues that cannot be tied to practical or testable consequences. [RBH did not suggest that his remark cited above pertained to SSB. But it is worth answering anyway] RBH then quotes a passage from SSB stressing the inadequacy of a science that tries to treat the well-established phenomenon of self-directed neuroplasticity solely in terms of brain mechanisms. This particular passage in SSB pertains to the practical problems of communication between experimenter and subject: use of psychological terms is essential to the description and execution of the experiments. That argument of SSB could be viewed as directed against only the most extreme and narrow kind of eliminatism, one that totally excludes psychological terms even in psycho-physical experiments. A more reasonable physicalism would accept physically instantiated words of all sorts as parts of the physical causal structure. Within that broader framework of materialism, the neuroplasticity data shows that psychologically described effort "apparently causes" neural changes. A good scientific theory of the brain must explain how this works. If one adopts the classical materialist view that the whole world, including all brains, is essentially compatible with classical physical theory, and has a complete deterministic causal structure based solely on classically conceived matter, then one of must explain what a conscious effort is. It is conceptually impossible for a conscious effort to be built out of the mindless causally complete stuff of classical physics, whose conceptual structure was expressly created by the founders of classical physics to be purely "extentive", as opposed to thoughtlike. But if the conscious effort is not built out of matter, then how can it affect this causally complete mindless stuff. The classical conceptual structure does not cohere properly, and one is thus reduced to the position of saying that the foundation of our lives, the causal efficacy of our conscious efforts, is an illusion. Arguments (always eventually showable to be specious, as far as I have seen) have been advanced against the claim that the conceptual structure of classical physics is inadequate in principle, and hence supportive of the policy that we should wait for the classical-physics-based solution to be worked out. But is it reasonable, in view of the "in your face" difficulties, to wait for a classical-physics-type of materialist solution to appear when *the basic concepts* of classical physics were found long ago by physicists to fail for systems that depend sensitively on atomic-level processes. Quantum physicists found a better way: Recognize that in the end what is important for science is action rules work, as contrasted to ontological speculations that make no practical or testable difference. Science is understanding that can be put to work, in the sense of informing us about how we can act on objects of attention in order to achieve desired ends. The bottom line in science is knowledge about how to act to achieve desired ends, and how to explain to others how they can do the same. The essential departure of QM from prior ontology-based-science is that it "cuts to the chase": It does not pass off to engineer's and doctor's the problems of "how to do it", and how to communicate to others "how to do it" Because of the breakdown at the atomic level of the whole idea of normal physical ontological reductionism, the physicists shifted their aim, and oriented their sights on effective action and communication. Given that this can be successful---that rules can be found that allow us to do these things---coupled with the existence of persuasive arguments that no ontological elaboration can ever allow us to do these things better than those rule themselves allow us to do, the quantum physicists (our at least most of them) opted for pragmatic rules, in place of squabblings about things that can (apparently) make no practical or testable difference. RBH claims that Schwartz's argument that good science requires not just materialist description of the brain but also psychologically described action terms "is equivalent to the observation that it does not make good sense to `explain and describe' the burning of hydrogen in the presence of oxygen solely in terms of quarks." He says that the applicability of the chemical explanation "does not render oxidation inexplicable in material terms: it says the level leap from quarks to oxidation is too great." RBH's analogy is not sound. The quark-level descriptions and atomic-leval descriptions are both of the same kind: both are physical descriptions. Both are in terms of numbers assigned to spacetime points. Both give equations that specify the contributions to energy and to momentum arising from each point. But how does one extract from a psychological description of a pain or a joy or an effort ALONE an assignment of energy and momentum to points in the brain. We are not talking about a mapping. The complete description of the atomic system ITSELF is in terms of "numbers assigned to points" that specify the distribution of momentum and energy. Thus there is a difference IN PRINCIPLE between the quark-atom connection and the matter-effort connection. RBH says that SSB infer from the fact that human beings must use words like "will" confers ontological reality upon these "things", and that SSB "interpret this to mean that the effects of that language in the recipient cannot in principle be explained by appeal solely to neural phenomena." This characterization of the SSB argument is inaccurate. SSB take, say, a Will/Volition/Effort to be a reality because it is present in someone's stream of consciousness. It is a primary given. It is not the fact that an effort "exists" that means "that the effects of that language in the recipient cannot in principle be explained by appeal solely to neural phenomena." It is the laws of physics! The physical effects of spoken words upon the brain of the recipient will follow from the action of Process 2, the Schroedinger equation, in close analogy to what happens in classical physical theory. SSB is based on the *successful* laws of physics, which reproduce all of the empirical successes of classical physics, and achieve that result by using laws that are similar to the classical laws,but not the same. The spoken words will activate the neural correlates of the psychological consequences of those words, just as the materialist (e.g., F Crick) would expect. But there is a hitch. The uncertainty principle allows, and in principle mandates (at least sometimes), that the NCC's of a host of diffent conscious experiences will be generated by Process 2. It was hard-headed physicists, not philosophers or psychologists who, *very reluctantly*, brought our conscious choices--- with specified physical effects---into basic physical theory, in order to resolve this extremely grave predicament. In order to resolve a grave mathematical/logical predicament, and incidentally to lift physical theory out of the bog of metaphysical controversy, orthodox quantum theorist dodged the ontological puzzles by formulating rules that directly enforce *specific causal influences* of psychologically characterized conscious choices on the physically described world. This causal action is, within the orthodox quantum framework, no "illusion". It elevates the "apparent causes" of the neuroplastic effects to "actual causes" stemming from the basic laws of physics. RBH asks for information about the quantum Zeno effect. His question strikes at the heart of the problem. How is one to talk about and think about these quantum measurment situations in a rationally coherent and consistent way when what people do has such a profound effect on what they will see? A rationally coherent formulation was deemed is essential for good science. The Copenhagenites had to struggle hard to come up with a way of talking and thinking that avoided perilous traps, and allowed scientists to know how to apply the rules. Their solution was a bit bizzare. They considered "the observer- experimenter" to include not only the brain and body of this agent but also his measuring devices. Bohr mentions how a tightly held cane, which probes the environment, seem to the subject to become part of himself. So the devices and observer are considered to be one. The observer/agent's conscious choice controls the whole experimental arrangement. He or she can choose to probe the atomic system with a rapidly that he or she controls. The apparatus is regarded in quantum theory as an extention of the consciousness of the agent. He or she makes the crucial choice of how the probing is to be carried out. This conceptual stance work well enough for practical purposed. But one must, I think, go to the von Neumann limit, where the agent's mind acts on his brain, to get the most coherent formulation. In the Copenhagen case it is the rapid apparatus probings that count as "observations" on the atom: this is "the observer" probing the atom. An occasional observation of some memory store is pertinent to his communications to others, and to himself, but is not the observation of the atom that he or she, possible in concert with many other agents with whom he or she is communicating, is carrying out. In the vN scenario each agent's conscious choice affects directly only his or her brain, which however sets in motion the actions that specify (or contribute to) the experimental set up that controls what the atom does. But in all cases all classical descriptions of an actual prober and what he or she seeks to learn, must be tracable to agents. This is because definite actual classical properties are not generated by the Process 2 directed evolution. It is the fantastic power of "the choice" to pick a discrete classically described measurement/probing action from the continuous morass of possibilities generated by the deterministic Process 2 that constitutes the sine qua non of quantum theory. The course of world history is shaped by these powerful choices. Evolutionary considerations entail that whereas conscious process must, in the SSB model, involve QZE-based control, various unconscious, subconscious and preconscious processes must also be able to exploit it. Exploitation of QZE is deemed to be a natural phenomenon. SSB is specifically concerned about the causal efficacy of conscious effort, not with the similar control properties exercized by its precursors. SSB focuses on the pragmatically formulated orthodox theory devised by physicists. It concerns human knowledge, and rests on the properties of human conscious. To place this theory in an ontological setting able to deal with questions about the evolution of consciousness, subconscious processes, and the like, I think it best to adopt an "emergentist" position that holds that the Process 1 choices needed to make natural process proceed involve an aspect of nature that can come into play at different levels of complexity, but can come into play at a certain level, or quality, only insofar as there are physical systems functionally able to support that level. The qualities characteristic of human consciousness can come into play only in association with structures possessing various functional properties of human brains. This would permit, in the workings of a human brain, subprocesses that exploit Process 1 via QZE and have a proto-conscious quality, but that do not rise to the level of human consciousness.