ON ONTOLOGY Dear Jeff and Mario, I have some thoughts about ontology. They arose from reflecting upon a recent query from John Searle about my ontological position, and upon your question, Mario, concerning the origin of consciousness. Let me gather a few threads. Searle said: “I think that all conscious states are caused by brain processes. But my impression is that you think that consciousness is a primitive part of nature, not explained by brain process. And you think this because it is necessary to postulate consciousness in order to make sense out of quantum mechanical process. Am I right about this?” The question asked by Mario was: “With regard to Neo-Darwinism (i.e., biological evolution): how does consciousness emerge? Where does it come from?” I told Searle that he had gotten it right. But I cautioned that my position of science was basically pragmatic, and it shied away from ontological commitments. Ontology is speculative, by its very nature [On further reflection I find Searle’s statement of my position to be not quite right!] My answer to Mario’s question was similar: data on prehuman consciousness is scant. Yet I stressed to Mario that we had to answer his question because, unanswered, it was the principal objection to the von Neumann-based neuropsychological theory we were promoting. Also, Jeff raised the issue of the opposing Many-Worlds View, which is that the collapse idea had to be abandoned as nonsense, along with the subjectivist Copenhagen philosophy of science. I pointed out that the Many-Worlds view was not a real problem. It not only has (seemingly irresolvable) technical difficulties, but is rejected by most physicists as too far removed from the validated practical theory that is the empirical base, and too over-populated with unobservable entities that have no effect on our actual experiences. So where does that put us? We can stick to the pragmatic stance and say that we are interested in the neuropsychology of the human brain-mind connection. This is where data is available, and will soon be coming in torrents. We can simply reject ontological speculation and commitment. This is the safe and sane approach, and it won the day in atomic physics, in spite of protestations about its subjective human-based character. However, curious human minds want more than just a set of practical rules tied to human beings, even if that is all that can really be rationally supported by scientific evidence. And *I* really want more, even if I know that it cannot be as scientifically solid as the pragmatic theory. Moreover, we must deliver more, to make the pragmatic theory more palatable and more broadly accepted. Even quantum theory, successful as it was, continued to have detractors. Many human minds demands more. However, an ontological theory need only be plausible and reasonable: it can never be proved and certain. The right starting point is the structure of the pragmatic theory that works. The ontology should arise from, and give a reasonable supporting structure for, the empirically successful practical theory, not from preconceived principles and categories, such as Descartes’ cleavage of mind and matter. To illuminate this principle, let me contrast what I shall do with what the Many-Worlders do. They looked at the pragmatic theory that worked, and rejected it because it did not fit their idea that mind is distinct from matter, and can do nothing to matter. They took the classical-physics Cartesian concepts as more primary than the theory that describes the phenomena. I shall do just the opposite: create an ontology that fits and naturally imbeds the pragmatically successful theory, and gives plausible answers the questions of Searle and Beauregard. The first step is technical: tie the collapses to the concepts of classical physics. Bohr often stressed that our individual experiences are compatible with the concepts of classical physics: we see the (center of the) moon in one place, not smeared over the entire sky. In a series of papers in the mid-eighties I developed an idea of how to do this. [See: “On the unification of quantum theory and classical physics” in Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1985, eds, P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt, World Scientific, Singapore, pp.213- 221. “Gauge Fields and Integrated Quantum-Classical Theory” in Annals of the New York Academy of Science 480, New Techniques and Ideas in Quantum Measurement theory, ed. D. Greenberger, The New York Academy of Science, New York New York 1986. “Light as Foundation of Being” in Quantum Implications: Essays in Honor of D, David Bohm, eds, B.J. Hiley, and F. D. Peat, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, pp. 255-266.] The idea is to express the projection operators P of von Neumann’s rules in terms of the “coherent states” of the quantum electromagnetic field. This has many nice features, which I shall not go into here. The important thing, here, is that it allows the projection operators P to be described in terms of the concepts of classical physics. Then there needs to be some physical criteria, described in terms of these classical variables, for when a Process I event occurs, and what the associated operator P is. These objective rules, expressed in terms of physical variables, can govern Process I before consciousness appears, or when and where consciousness is not present. Now, one can take an antiseptic view of these happenings: when the conditions are satisfied the Process I question just pops up, and the Process 3 collapse then occurs. Nothing “makes” these things happen: it is simply in the nature of things that when the conditions are satisfied these things occur. But from an ontological perspective there is something odd about this huge collapse simply happening by itself, without something making it happen. Remember, we are seeking not just practically useful rules here, but a *conception* of what is really going on. I suggest that something is making these things happen, and that what is needed to satisfy our curious minds is a rationally coherent conception of what that something is. What are its properties. We are not totally in the dark about this! What we have to go on is the detailed structure of a complex theory that works! What we want is the simplest most natural conception of what it is that makes that work. We have a lot to go on. We have the form of von Neumann’s three Processes. What I propose is that Nature be conceived of as a Process that encompasses von Neumann’s three processes, but that can work when human consciousness is not around. What is the nature or character of “The Process?” The answer is not trivial. The Process has four important features: 1) It is: it has physical features described by the quantum state vector. 2) It knows: it has epistemological/experiential features actualized by certain collapse events. 3) It feels: it evaluates, in order to trigger collapse events. 4) It does: it restructures itself at each collapse event. The Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter is dissolved. The quantum state vector generalizes the mathematical description of classical physics, but is supposed to represent not material substance, but knowledge, potentiality, probability, propensity and information, which all have idea-like aspects. These properties can exist objectively, as features of The Process, but not apart from the reality represented by the evolving state vector. These idea-like p0roperties are married to the evolving state. Accordingly, the missing law, the one that evaluates, in order to trigger the Process I, need not be formulated wholly or exclusively in terms of physically described aspects: the triggering law could very well be a complex law that involves all of these aspects of reality. The answer to Mario’s question is that although consciousness as we know it probably depends on the complexities of our brains, The Process does not. As brains developed the aspect of reality that triggered Process 1 events in animate life came to be aspects more usefully, and perhaps ncessarily, described in psychological terms than physical terms. The mental aspects would not be there if they were not actually doing something. But before they came into being they were not needed: other features made the evaluations in simpler systems. Searle’s question was: : “…my impression is that you think that consciousness is a primitive part of nature, not explained by brain process. And you think this because it is necessary to postulate consciousness in order to make sense out of quantum mechanical process. Am I right about this?” What I claim is that orthodox contemporary quantum theory does not specify when a Process 1 event will occur, or exactly what it will be (what the projection operator P will be). Some further rule is needed. At the practical level what determines these things is often a conscious choice on the part of the observer/experimenter, and this choice is not fixed by the contemporary laws of physics, even when the entire physical universe is included in the “physical world.” Some other process is needed, and there is no reason why this process cannot draw upon both the physical and mental aspects of reality. The physical need not determine (or cause) the mental; collaboration is probably the general rule. It does not follow from this that consciousness is more primitive, or prior to, brains. Human consciousness probably requires human brains. And anything resembling human consciousness probably requires something resembling a human brain. So I do not hold that consciousness is more primitive than brains. Mind and brain are partners, or two inseparable aspects of a whole that is more than either alone. Consciousness is not more primitive than brains. They co-exist. Brains are necessary for consciousness, and cannot function optimally without consciousness. That is, at present, what I think.