8. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL THEORY AND “WILL.”

I have concentrated so far on what is basically new: on the crucial 
difference between classical physics and quantum physics that allows 
our thoughts to be an essential player in the causal description of 
brain process.  This new element needs to be placed in the context of 
what I take to be otherwise a fairly standard psycho-physical theory, 
perhaps the orthodox theory to the extent that any such thing exists.

As already mentioned, I follow William James and take all conscious 
experiences to be essentially “feelings” of one kind or another. 
Experiencing a major chord “feels different” from experiencing a 
minor chord. The exhilarating experiencing of a rapid piano run up the 
scale feels different from the tip-toe-y feeling of a lightly fingered 
sequence of high notes, or the satisfying feeling of the final chord of a 
work of Beethoven or Wagner. Einstein described the feeling of his 
theoretical reflections in terms of muscular feelings, and a 
mathematician knows his proof is valid because of a deep feeling that 
all bases have been well cover: there is no feeling of discord, or 
incompleteness, or incursion of doubt.

A person’s thoughts are dynamically linked to patterns of brain 
activity that are his brain’s representations of his physical body and 
its relationship to the world around him. Called the body-world 
schema, this momentary brain representation is, during wakeful 
periods being continually updated by the brain on the basis of its 
interpretation of clues provided by the sensory apparatus, and it is 
closely tied into his bodily actions and their sensed connections to the 
outer world. His actions are controlled by activating patterns in the 
body-world schema, and he learns through experience the 
relationship between his felt intentions and the subsequent feed-back 
in terms of sensed experiences. The body-world schema is the 
intermediary physical link. The dynamical interplay between these 
intentional acts, the body-world schema, and sensory feedback tunes 
the connection between mind and brain, and links the felt quality of 
the intentional act to a mental image of the intended consequences. 

A person’s experiential life is a stream of conscious experiences. The 
person’s experienced ‘self’ is part of this stream of consciousness: it 
is not an extra thing that is outside or apart from the stream. In 
James’s words “thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not 
look beyond.” The “self” is a slowly changing “fringe” part of the 
stream of consciousness. It provides a background for the central 
focus.
  
The physical brain, evolving mechanically in accordance with the 
local deterministic Process II does most of the work, without the 
intervention of Process I. It does its job of creating, on the basis of its 
interpretation of the clues provided by the senses, a suitable 
response. But, due to the wave nature of its component parts, the 
brain necessarily generates an amorphous mass of overlapping and 
conflicting templates for action, formulated in terms of possible 
structures for the body-world schema. Process I selects from among 
these possibilities, on the basis of high-level coherency and stability 
criteria that access the entire structure of the brain as a whole, the 
possible state PSP, which is the ‘Yes’ branch of the state S’ = PSP + 
(I-P)(S(I-P) created by Process I.

Intentionality acts by controlling attention. Intention activates a 
Process I event that grasps a state PSP in which attention is focused 
on actualizing the intended state. The corresponding physical state is 
built around a projected body-world schema.  The body-world 
schema is created by interaction between intention and feed-back, 
and a sustained persistence of a projected body-world schema tends 
to initiate the appropriate motor actions, monitoring actions, and 
follow-up events. 

The phenomena of “will” is understood as a condition in which an 
initial Process I event leads to the occurrence of a very rapid 
sequence of follow-up events defined by very nearly the same P: a 
“mental effort” causes a rapid repetition of Process I events with 
almost identical projection operators P. Then the quantum equations 
of motion have the effect of preventing any transitions of ‘Yes’ states 
to ‘No’ states. The state is held in a state of the form PXP, with fixed 
or slowly changing P, in spite of all sorts of disruptive and distracting 
mechanical influences that would otherwise cause a wandering of 
attention. The mental effort is thereby causing a large deviation of 
brain activity from it would otherwise be. Mental effort is importantly 
influencing brain process. 

Does this theory of the connection between mind and brain explain 
anything?

This theory was already in place when a colleague, Dr. Jeffrey 
Schwartz, brought to my attention some passages from ``Psychology: 
The Briefer Course'', written by William James. In the final section of 
the chapter on Attention James writes:

``I have spoken as if our attention were wholly 
determined by neural conditions. I believe that 
the array of things we can attend to is so determined.
No object can catch our attention except by the 
neural machinery. But the amount of the attention 
which an object receives after it has caught our 
attention is another question. It often takes effort 
to keep mind upon it. We feel that we can make
more or less of the effort as we choose. If this 
feeling be not deceptive, if our effort be a spiritual
force, and an indeterminate one, then of course it 
contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions
to the result. Though it introduce no new idea, it
will deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness
of innumerable ideas which else would fade more
quickly away. The delay thus gained might not be 
more than a second in duration---but that second
may be critical; for in the rising and falling 
considerations in the mind, where two associated 
systems of them are nearly in equilibrium it is 
often a matter of but a second more or less of 
attention at the outset, whether one system shall 
gain force to occupy the field and develop 
itself and exclude the other, or be excluded 
itself by the other. When developed it may 
make us act, and that act may seal our doom. 
When we come to the chapter on the Will
we shall see that the whole drama of the 
voluntary life hinges on the attention, slightly 
more or slightly less, which rival motor
 ideas may receive. ...''  
 
In the chapter on Will, in the section entitled ``Volitional effort is effort 
of  attention'' James writes:

``Thus we find that we reach the heart of 
our inquiry into volition when we ask by 
what process is it that the thought of any 
given action comes to prevail stably in the
mind.'' 

and later

``The essential achievement of the will, 
in short, when it is most `voluntary,' is to 
attend to a difficult object and hold it fast 
before the mind.   ...  Effort of attention is 
thus the essential phenomenon of will.''

Still later, James says:

``Consent to the idea's undivided presence, 
this is effort's sole achievement.''...
``Everywhere, then, the function of effort is 
the same: to keep affirming and adopting the 
thought which, if left to itself, would slip away.''
  
This description of the effect of mind on the course of mind-brain 
process is remarkably in line with what had been proposed 
independently from purely theoretical consideration of the quantum 
physics of this process. The connections specified by James are 
explained on the basis of the same dynamical principles that had 
been introduced by physicists to explain atomic phenomena. Thus 
the whole range of science, from atomic physics to mind-brain 
dynamics, is brought together in a single rationally coherent theory of 
an evolving cosmos that consists of a physical reality that is 
constituted not of matter but of tendencies for Process I events to 
occur. 

Much experimental work on attention and effort has occurred since 
the time of William James. That work has been hampered by the 
apparent nonexistence of any physical theory that rationally explains 
how our conscious experiences could influence activities in our 
brains. The behaviorist approach, which dominated psychology 
during the first half of the twentieth century, and which essentially 
abolished in this field the use not only of introspective data but also of 
the very concept of consciousness, was surely motivated in part by 
the fact that consciousness was excluded from any role in brain 
dynamics by the physics of the preceding century 

The admitted failure of the behaviorist programs led to the 
rehabilitation of ``attention'' during the early fifties, and many 
hundreds of experiments have been performed during the past fifty 
years for the purpose of investigating empirically those aspects of 
human behavior that we ordinarily link to our consciousness. 

Harold Pashler's 1998 book ``The Psychology of Attention'' [32] 
describes a great deal of this empirical work, and also the intertwined 
theoretical efforts to understand the nature of an information-
processing system that could account for the intricate details of the 
empirical data. Two key concepts are the notions ``Attention'' and of a 
processing ``Capacity''. The former is associated with an internally 
directed selection between different possible allocations of the 
available processing ``Capacity''. A third concept is ''Effort'', which is 
linked to incentives, and to reports by subjects of ``trying harder''.

Pashler organizes his discussion by separating perceptual processing 
from post-perceptual processing. The former covers processing that, 
first of all, identifies such basic physical properties of stimuli as 
location, color, loudness, and pitch, and, secondly, identifies stimuli in 
terms of categories of meaning. The post-perceptual process covers 
the tasks of producing motor actions and cognitive action beyond 
mere categorical identification. Pashler emphasizes [p. 33] that ``the 
empirical findings of attention studies specifically argue for a 
distinction between perceptual limitations and more central limitations 
involved in thought and the planning of action.'' The existence of 
these two different processes, with different characteristics, is a 
principal theme of Pashler's book [p. 33, 263, 293, 317, 404].

In the quantum theory of mind-brain being described here there are 
two separate processes. First, there is the unconscious mechanical 
brain process governed by the Schroedinger equation. As discussed 
at length in my earlier book, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, 
this brain processing involves dynamical units that are represented by 
complex patterns of neural activity (or, more generally, of brain 
activity) that are ``facilitated'' by use, and such that each unit tends to 
be activated as a whole by the activation of several of its parts. The 
activation of various of these complex patterns by cross referencing, 
coupled to feed-back loops that strengthen or weaken the activities of 
appropriate processing centers, appears to explain the essential 
features of the mechanical part of the dynamics. 

The function of the brain is to create and direct courses of action 
appropriate to the circumstances in which the organism finds itself. 
Accordingly, the brain ought to create a template for a possible plan 
of action. Detailed examination of the quantum uncertainties 
associated the motion in nerve terminals of incoming calcium ions 
from the ion channels to the triggering sites for the release of vesicles 
of neurotransmitter entail [MM&QM, p.152] that a host of different 
possibilities will emerge. This mechanical phase of the processing 
already involves some selectivity, because of the enhancing and 
inhibiting feedback loops. But the essential point is that the evolution 
of the brain according to the Schroedinger equation must generate 
not just one single template for action, but a host of alternative 
possibilities. Hence the action of the second process, von Neumann's 
Process I must come into play in order to select what actually 
happens from the continuum of alternative possibilities generated by 
the mechanical aspect of the full quantum dynamics. But Process I 
involves the element of freedom that feeds into the Quantum Zeno 
Effect.

This conception of brain dynamics seems to accommodate all of the 
perceptual aspects of the data described by Pashler. But it is the 
high-level processing, which is more closely linked to our active 
mentally controlled conscious thinking, that is of prime interest here. 
The data pertaining to this second process is the focus of part II of 
Pashler's book.

Mental intervention has, according to the quantum-physics-based 
theory described here, several distinctive characteristics. It consists 
of a sequence of discrete events each of which consents to an 
integrated course of action presented by brain. The rapidity of these 
events can be increased with effort. Effort-induced speed-up of the 
rate of occurrence of these events can, by means of the quantum 
Zeno effect, keep attention focussed on a task. Between 100 and 300 
msec of consent seem to be needed to fix a plan of action. 

Effort can, by increasing the number of events per second, increase 
the mental input into brain activity. Each conscious event picks out 
from the multitude of quasi-classical possibilities that comprise the 
quantum brain the sub-ensemble that is compatible with the 
conscious experience. 

The correspondence between the mental event and the associated 
physical event is this: the physical event reduces the prior physical 
ensemble of alternative possibilities to the sub-ensemble compatible 
with the mental event. This connection constitutes the core postulate 
of Copenhagen quantum theory: the physical event reduces the prior 
state of the system to the part of it that is compatible with the 
experience of the observer.

Examination of Pashler's book shows that this quantum-physics-
based theory accommodates naturally all of the complex structural 
features of the empirical data that he describes. He emphasizes [p. 
33] a specific finding: strong empirical evidence for what he calls a 
central processing bottleneck associated with the attentive selection 
of a motor action. This kind of bottleneck is what the quantum-
physics-based theory predicts: the bottleneck is precisely the single 
linear sequence of mind-brain quantum events that von Neumann 
quantum theory is built upon. 

Pashler [p. 279] describes four empirical signatures for this kind of 
bottleneck, and describes the experimental confirmation of each of 
them. Much of part II of Pashler's book is a massing of evidence that 
supports the existence of a central process of this general kind.

This bottleneck is not automatic within classical physics. A classical 
model could easily produce simultaneously two responses in different 
modalities, say vocal and manual, to two different stimuli arriving via 
two different modalities, say auditory and tactile. The two processes 
could proceed via dynamically independent routes. Pashler [p. 308] 
notes that the bottleneck is undiminished in split-brain patients 
performing two tasks that, at the level of input and output, seem to be 
confined to different hemispheres.

The queuing effect for the mind-controlled motor responses does not 
exclude interference between brain processes that are similar to each 
other, and hence that use common brain mechanisms. Pashler [p. 
297] notes this distinction, and says ``the principles governing 
queuing seem indifferent to neural overlap of any sort studied so far.'' 

The important point here is that there is in principle, in the quantum 
model, an essential dynamical difference between, on the one hand, 
the unconscious processing carried out by the Schroedinger 
evolution, which generates via a local process an expanding 
collection of classically implementable possible courses of action, 
and, on the other hand, the process associated with the sequence of 
conscious events that constitutes a stream of consciousness. The 
former are not limited by the queuing effect, because all of the 
possibilities develop in parallel, whereas the latter do form elements 
of a single queue. The experiments cited by Pashler all appear to 
support this clear prediction of the quantum approach.

An interesting experiment mentioned by Pashler involves the 
simultaneous tasks of doing an IQ test and giving a foot response to 
rapidly presented sequences of tones of either 2000 or 250 Hz. The 
subject's mental age, as measured by the IQ test, was reduced from 
adult to 8 years. [p. 299] This result supports the prediction of 
quantum theory that the bottleneck pertains both to `intelligent' 
behavior, which requires conscious processing, and to selection of 
motor response.

Another interesting experiment showed that, when performing at 
maximum speed, with fixed accuracy, subjects produced responses 
at the same rate whether performing one task or two simultaneously: 
the limited capacity to produce responses can be divided between 
two simultaneously performed tasks. [p. 301]

Pashler also notes [p. 348] that ``Recent results strengthen the case 
for central interference even further, concluding that memory retrieval 
is subject to the same discrete processing bottleneck that prevents 
simultaneous response selection in two speeded choice tasks.''

In the section on ``Mental Effort'' Pashler reports that ``incentives to 
perform especially well lead subjects to improve both speed and 
accuracy'', and that the motivation had ``greater effects on the more 
cognitively complex activity''. This is what would be expected if 
incentives lead to effort that produces increased rapidity of the 
events, each of which injects into the physical process, via quantum 
selection and reduction, bits of control information that reflect mental 
evaluation.

Studies of sleep-deprived subjects suggest that in these cases ``effort 
works to counteract low arousal''. If arousal is essentially the rate of 
occurrence of conscious events then this result is what the quantum 
model would predict. 

Pashler notes that ``Performing two tasks at the same time, for 
example, almost invariably... produces poorer performance in a task 
and increases ratings in effortfulness.'' And ``Increasing the rate at 
which events occur in experimenter-paced tasks often increases 
effort ratings without affecting performance''. ``Increasing incentives 
often raises workload ratings and performance at the same time.'' All 
of these empirical connections are in line with the general principle 
that effort increases the rate of conscious events, each of which 
inputs a mental evaluation and a selection or focussing on a course 
of action, and that this resource can be divided between tasks.

Additional supporting evidence comes from the studies of the effect of 
the conscious process upon the storage of information in short-term 
memory. According to the physics-based theory, the conscious 
process merely actualizes a course of action, which then develops 
automatically, with perhaps some occasional monitoring. Thus if one 
sets in place the activity of retaining in memory a certain sequence of 
stimuli, then this activity can persist undiminished while the central 
processor is engaged in another task. This is what the data indicate. 

Pashler remarks that ''These conclusions contradict the remarkably 
widespread assumption that short-term memory capacity can be 
equated with, or used as a measure of, central resources.''[p.341] In 
the theory outlined here short-term memory is stored in patterns of 
brain activity, whereas consciousness is associated with the selection 
of a sub-ensemble of quasi-classical states. This distinction seems to 
account for the large amount of detailed data that bears on this 
question of the connection of short-term-memory to consciousness. 
[p.337-341]

Deliberate storage in, or retrieval from, long-term memory requires 
focussed attention, and hence conscious effort. These processes 
should, according to the theory, use part of the limited processing 
capacity, and hence be detrimentally affected by a competing task 
that makes sufficient concurrent demands on the central resources. 
On the other hand, ``perceptual'' processing that involves conceptual 
categorization and identification without conscious awareness should 
not interfere with tasks that do consume central processing capacity. 
These expectations are what the evidence appears to confirm: ``the 
entirety of...front-end processing are modality specific and operate 
independent of the sort of single-channel central processing that 
limits retrieval and the control of action. This includes not only 
perceptual analysis but also storage in STM (short term memory) and 
whatever may feed back to change the allocation of perceptual 
attention itself.'' [p. 353]

Pashler describes a result dating from the nineteenth century: mental 
exertion reduces the amount of physical force that a person can 
apply. He notes that ``This puzzling phenomena remains 
unexplained.'' [p. 387]. However, it is an automatic consequence of 
the physics-based theory: creating physical force by muscle 
contraction requires an effort that opposes the physical tendencies 
generated by the Schroedinger equation. This opposing tendency is 
produced by the quantum Zeno effect, and is roughly proportional to 
the number of bits per second of central processing capacity that is 
devoted to the task. So if part of this processing capacity is directed 
to another task, then the applied force will diminish.
 
Pashler speculates on the possibility of a neurophysiological 
explanation of the facts he describes, but notes that the parallel 
versus serial distinction between the two mechanisms leads, in the 
classical neurophysiological approach, to the questions of what 
makes these two mechanisms so different, and what the connection 
between them is. [p.354-6, 386-7]

After analyzing various possible mechanisms that could cause the 
central bottleneck, Pashler [p.307-8] says ``the question of why this 
should be the case is quite puzzling.'' Thus the fact that this 
bottleneck, and its basic properties, follow automatically from the 
same laws that explain the complex empirical evidence in the fields of 
classical and quantum physics means that the theory has significant 
explanatory power.

Of course, the fact that this theory seems to work so well does not 
mean that it is the only theory that can work. But in the past science 
has been well served by the endeavor of trying to understand various 
complex high-level processes in ways that all fit together coherently 
with basic physical theory. The brain is a physio-chemical structure 
that rests in principle on quantum processes, and the quantum 
principles lead in a completely natural way to a specified kind of 
dynamical linkage between the aspects of the mind-brain that are 
described in psychological and physical terms. All classically 
described features are accounted for in the quantum description, 
which however provides also a natural dynamical place for mind 
whereas classical physics does not.

Quantum theory automatically accounts for all the successes of 
classical physical theory. So the fact that classical ideas work well in 
neuroanatomy and for other large scale phenomena is not evidence 
that classical physics will work in domains where quantum effects 
ought to come in, such as the migration of calcium ions inside of 
nerve terminals. The quantum description becomes necessary only 
when treating subtle dynamical effects, which, however, can have 
important large scale effects. The effect of mental effort to hold ideas 
in place longer than classical computations would predict seems to 
be the most crucial dynamical difference between the classical and 
quantum models. This effect could eventually become important in 
neuroscience, but it immediately entails a major revision in the 
scientific conception of  human beings.