-)|0>, $$ where $|0>$ is the photon vacuum state and $$ Q(k) = (a_k + a^*_k)/\surd 2 $$ and $$ P(k) = i(a_k - a^*_k)/\surd 2. $$ The $q(k)$ and $p(k)$ are two functions defined (and square integrable) on the mass shell $k^2=0$, $k_0\geq 0$, and the inner product of two coherent states is $$

=\exp -(+ +2i )/4. $$ The coherent states $|q,p>$ can, for various mathematical and physical reasons, be regarded as the ``most classical'' of the possible states of the electromagnetic quantum field.[19] In the present model they will be the possible `actual' states: i.e., the particular states into which the electromagnetic field inside the brain cavity can jump in a quantum actualization event. Thus the $i$th conscious event is represented by the transition $$ |\Psi_i (t_{i+1})> \longrightarrow |\Psi_{i+1}(t_{i+1})>=P_i|\Psi_i(t_{i+1})>, $$ where $P_i= |q,p;i> <0_k|\exp-(iq_k P_k-ip_k Q_k). $$ Here meaning can be given by quantizing in a box, so that that the variable $k$ is discretized. Equivalently, $$ I=\int d\mu (q,p) |q,p><\Psi|$ were to jump to $|q,p><\Psi|q,p>$, the resulting mixture would be $$ \int d\mu (q,p) |q,p><\Psi|q,p><\Psi|q,p> = <\Psi|\Psi>. $$ Let the state of the electromagnetic field restricted to the modes that represent consciousness be called $|\Psi (t)>$. (Stricly speaking, one must use a density matrix formulation, but the generalization is trivial). Using the decomposition of unity one can write $$ |\Psi (t)> =\int d\mu (q,p) |q,p>. $$ Hence the state at time $t$ can be represented by the function $$, which is a complex-valued function over the set of arguments $\{ q_1, p_1, q_2, p_2, ... , q_n, p_n \}$, where n is the number of modes associated with $|\Psi>$. This formula expresses the state $|\Psi (t)>$, which in this model is the part of the state of the brain that corresponds to consciousness, as a superposition of states $|q,p>$. Each of these latter states $|q,p>$ is a maximally classical quantum state, and is supposed to a possible body-world schema; a representation of an experiencable picture of the body-world. Each state $|q,p>$ is like a musical one-thousand-note chord, and is one of the possible states into which $|\Psi (t)>$ can jump. For each allowed value of $k$ the pair of numbers $(q_k,p_k)$ represents the state of motion of the $k$th mode of the electromagnetic field. Each of these modes is defined by a particular wave pattern that extends over the whole brain cavity. This pattern is an oscillating structure something like a sine wave or a cosine wave. Each mode is fed by the motions of all of the charged particles in the brain. Thus each mode is a representation of a certain integrated aspect of the activity of the brain, and the collection of values $q_1,p_1,...,p_n$ is a compact representation of certain aspects the over-all electrical activity of the brain. The state $|q,p>$ represents the conjunction, or collection over the set of all allowed values of $k$, of the various states $|q_k,p_k>$. The function $$ V(q,p,t)=<\Psi (t)|q,p> $$ satisfies $0\leq V(q,p,t) \leq 1$, and it represents, according to orthodox thinking, the ``probability'' that a system that is represented by a general state $|\Psi (t)>$ just before the time $t$ will be observed to be in the classically describable state $|q,p>$ if the observation occurs at time $t$. In the absence of interactions, and under certain ideal conditions of confinement, the deterministic normal law of evolution entails that in each mode $k$ there is an independent rotation in the $(q_k,p_k)$ plane with a characteristic angular velocity $\omega_k = k_0$. Due to the effects of the motions of the particles there will be, added to this, a flow of probability that will tend to concentrate the probability in the neighborhoods of a certain set of ``optimal'' classical-type states $|q,p>$. The reason is that the function of brain dynamics is to produce some single template for action, and to be effective this template must be a ``classical'' state, because, according to orthodox ideas, only `classical' states can be dynamically robust control states in the room-temperature brain [20]. According to a semi-classical description of the brain dynamics, only {\it one} of these classical-type states will be present, but according to quantum theory the state $|\Psi (t)>$ will usually be a superposition of many such states, unless collapses occurs at lower (i.e., microscopic) levels. The assumption here is that no collapses occur at the lower brain levels: there is absolutely no empirical evidence, or theoretical reason, for the occurrence of such lower-level brain events. So in this model the probability will begin to concentrate around various locally optimal coherent states, and hence around the various (generally) isolated points $(q,p)$ in the $2n-$dimensional space at which the quantity $$ V(q,p,t)=<\Psi_i (t)|q,p> $$ reaches a local maximum. Each of these points $(q,p)$ represents a ``locally-optimal solution'' (at time $t$) to the search problem: as far as the myopic local mechanical process can see the state $|q,p>$ specifies an analog-computed best `template for action' in the circumstances in which the organism finds itself. According to an orthodox (Heisenberg-type) statistical idea there must eventually be a transition to a `classically describable' state, and the selection of this state will be governed by `pure chance', with the probability of the jump from the state $|\Psi (t)>$ to the possible classically describable state $|q,p>$ being given by the function $V(q,p,t)=<\Psi (t)|q,p>$. For reasons given earlier the aim here is construct, instead, a {\it causal} theory in which the selecting agent is not pure chance, but rather a conscious thought. To create a causal quantum theory in which our conscious experiences control the brain activity we shall replace the above-mentioned statistical rule for the selection of the actual state by a causal dynamics in which the most `optimal' (from a personal perspective) of these virtual experiences actualizes itself by actualizing the state $|q,p>$ that represents it. There is in this model a natural mathematical definition of `optimal', namely the function $V(q,p,t)$ defined above. The various conditions and constraints that characterize the overall situation in which the organism finds itself are dynamically expressed as the conditions that cause $V(q,p,t)$ to increase for arguments $(q,p)$ that correspond to `good solutions', as defined by the organism itself, to the problems that the organism faces, and to remain small for unsatisfactory solutions. Note that the arguments $(q,p)$ correspond to global features of the brain, and that each argument $(q,p)$ specifies a possible experience. Thus a dynamics that is controlled by the function $V(q,p,t)$ is a nonlocal dynamics that is expressed in terms of the variables that identify certain indivisible experiential entities, our conscious thoughts. To specify the dynamics let a certain time $t_{i+1}> t_i$ be defined by an (urgency) energy factor $E(t_{i+1}, t_i)= \hbar(t_{i+1}- t_i)^{-1}$. Let the value of $(q,p)$ at the largest of the local-maxima of $V(q,p,t_{i+1})$ be called $(q(t_{i+1}),p(t_{i+1}))_{max}$. Then the simplest possible reasonable causal selection rule would be given by the formula $$ P_i= |(q(t_{i+1}),p(t_{i+1}))_{max}><(q(t_{i+1}),p(t_{i+1}))_{max}|, $$ which entails that $$ |\Psi_{i+1}><\Psi_{i+1}|/ <\Psi_{i+1}|\Psi_{i+1}>= |(q(t_{i+1}),p(t_{i+1}))_{max}><(q(t_{i+1}),p(t_{i+1}))_{max}|. $$ This dynamics could produce a tremendous speed up of the search process. Instead of waiting until all the probability gets concentrated in one state $|q,p>$, or into a set of isolated states $|q_i,p_i>$ [or choosing the state randomly, in accordance with the probability function $V(q,p,t_{i+1})$, which could often lead to a disastrous result], this simplest selection process would pick the state $|q,p>$ with the largest value of $V(q,p,t)$ at the time $t=t_{i+1}$. This process does not involve the complex notion of picking a random number, which is a physically impossible feat that is difficult even to define. It is a causal process, even though it is formulated in the space of variables $(q,p)$ that label the person's possible conscious thoughts. One important feature of this selection process is that it involves the state $\Psi (t)$ as a whole: the whole function $V(q,p,t_{i+1})$ must be known in order to determine where its maximum lies. This kind of selection process is not available in the semi-classical ontology, in which only one classically describable state exists at the macroscopic level. That is because this single classically describable macro-state state (e.g., some one actual state $|q,p,t_{i+1}>$) contains no information about what the $V(q,p,t_{i+1})$ associated with the other alternative possibilities would have been if the collapse to this state $|q,p,t_{i+1}>$ had not occurred. There is no rational reason in quantum mechanics for such an earlier micro-level event to occur. Indeed, the only reason to postulate the occurrence of such premature reductions is to assuage the classical intuition that the action-potential pulse along each nerve ``ought to be classically describable even when it is not observed'', instead of being controlled when unobserved, as quantum theory normally requires, by the local deterministic equations of quantum field theory. The validity of this classical intuition is questionable if it severely curtails the ability of the brain to function optimally. A second important feature of this selection process is that the actualized state $\Psi_{i+1}$ is the state of the entire aspect of the brain that is connected to consciousness. So the feel of the conscious event will involve that aspect of the brain, taken as a whole. The ``I'' part of the state $\Psi (t)$ is its slowly changing part. This part is being continually re-actualized by the sequence of events, and hence specifies the slowly changing background part of the felt experience. It is this persisting stable background part of the sequence of templates for action that is providing the over-all guidance for the entire sequence of selection events that is controlling the on-going brain process itself. The experiential aspect of the mind/brain dynamics is closely tied to the matter-like aspect represented by the wave function, in the sense that the various virtual experiences and their dynamical consequences are expressed in terms of the wave function and its evolution via the Schroedinger equation. But there is also the choice, or selecting, aspect of the thought, which is not reducible to the Schroedinger dynamics. A somewhat more sophisticated search procedure would be to find the state $|(q,p)_{max}>$, as before, but to identify it as merely a candidate that is to be examined for its concordance with the objectives imbedded in the current template. This is what a good search procedure ought to do: first pick out the top candidate by means of a mechanical process, but then evaluate this candidate by a more refined procedure that could block its acceptance if it does not meet specified criteria. This alternative proposed dynamics may seem overly sophisticated. But the generation of a truly random sequence is itself a very sophisticated (and indeed physically impossible) process, and all that the physical sciences have understood, so far, is merely the mechanical part of nature's two-part process. Here it is the not-well-understood selection process that is under consideration. I have imposed on this attempt to understand the selection process the naturalistic requirement that the whole process be expressible in natural terms, i.e., that the universal process be a causal self-controlling evolution of the Hilbert-space state vector in which all aspects of nature, including our conscious experiences, are efficacious. No attempt is made here to show that the quantum statistical laws will hold for the aspects of the brain's internal dynamics controlled by conscious thoughts. No such result has been empirically verified. The validity of the statistical laws for events in the inanimate world is regarded as a consequence of our ignorance of the actual causes, and of certain a priori probability distributions. This is discussed in section 13. \noindent {\bf 10. Thoughts as Causes of Physical Effects.} It might be argued that even though the dynamics is expressed in terms of the variables $(q,p)$ that specify our possible conscious thoughts, and although the dynamical process is what would follow from the idea that the `optimal' virtual thought, acting as a unit, actualizes the corresponding quantum state, it would nevertheless also be possible to assert that the nonlocal causal process simply proceeds according to the nonlocal dynamical laws, with consciousness being merely an epiphenomenal consequence of the actualization process, instead of a bona fide cause of it. In the classical-mechanics case the laws were formulated directly in terms of local properties, and all behaviour was therefore directly explainable, in principle, in terms of local causes. No dynamical property was given to any complex functional construct beyond what was explainable in principle by local physical properies acting in concert. Thus in the classical case one is able to `see through' any complex physical entity down to the local causes, and recognize that all actions flow directly from the local properties, without a need to identify any causes other than these local causes. The neural correlates of thoughts, just like pistons and driveshafts, are seen as, fundamentally, nothing but high-level mechanical consequences of local causes. But the in mind/brain dynamics described above consciousness is intrinsic: the model was constructed so as to complete quantum theory in a way that naturally brings conscious experiences, of the kind we actually experience, into the quantum theoretic description of the human mind/brain. In this model the functional constructs associated with conscious thoughts obey new laws that are not reducible to local laws, and these laws neither contravene, nor overide, or nor merely re-express, the local laws. Consequently, one can not see behind the quantum collapse any cause other than the conscious thought itself: if a `causal' theory is demanded then one cannot, as in the classical case, `see through' the functional entity, which in this case is an actualization event, and identify some other cause. Since conscious thoughts are known to exist, and, in any reasonable construal of the evidence, are the cause of the actions that the theory says they cause, the most parsimonious and reasonable ontological assumption is that they are in fact the causes of these events: there are no other natural candidates for the cause of these events, once pure chance is excluded. \noindent {\bf 11. Consciousness and Survival} The earlier section 6, on quantum searching and survival, is applicable to room-temperature brains independently of the particular interpretation of QM, or way that mind enters into the completed quantum ontology. But in the causal model described above there is another effect of quantum superposition: the causal quantum selection process can actually counteract the adverse effects of chance fluctations introduced into the quantum dynamics by interaction with the thermal environment. The causal mechanism not only does not bring in a specifically quantum element of chance, it also acts as a sort of `anti-chance' process that tends to neutralizes classical fluctuations that are caused by other uncertainties and uncontrollable elements. The point is that quantum diffusion effect (the spreading out of the wave functions) tends to expand each classical possibility into a spread-out cloud of virtual images, each one being a classical possibility. If there is, {\it anywhere in the cloud}, a very good solution to the problem that the organism is facing, then this solution, being unblocked by negative feed-backs, will tend to rise up out of the quantum soup of possibilities and become the state selected by the causal selection process. So within this model it is not necessary to make a `direct hit': the quantum diffusion effect makes a `near miss' almost as good as a direct hit. Thus the uncontrollable thermal fluctuations, which might have the tendency to make a `direct hit' unlikely, is to some extent counteracted by the causal quantum mechanism in this model. \noindent {\bf 11. Free Will?} How does this model cope with the problem of free will. The problem is that in a causal theory there can be no freedom, yet in a theory in which our choices are controlled by `pure chance' the situation is even worse. For to be governed by mere whimsy, and complete lack of reason, is to be even less in personal control of our lives than in a world where consequence prevails. The present model is causal: it does not involve any irreducible element of chance. On the other hand, the causality is not of the local-reductionistic type: actions are directly controlled by whole thoughts that are complex entities that are represented in the mathematical formalism by nonlocal (brain-wide) structures that contain, in a functionally effective form, the full content of the conscious thought. And these thoughts themselves are not determined by any lower-level realities or mechanisms, but they essentially extract themselves, in their wholeness, out of a quantum soup of virtual `possibilities for what they might be'. And this extraction is effected by a nonlocal process that is controlled by the ongoing thought process itself, and that is honed, over the life of the organism, to elevate to actualness those thoughts that serve the needs that the organism itself defines with increasing precision over the course of years. This high-level sort of causality is very different from a local-reductionistic causality where everything is controlled fundamentally by microscopic events, and the high-level whole entities, our thoughts themselves, stand impotently outside the dynamical process. \noindent {\bf 13. Quantum Statistics.} If the process of selection and actualization of ``the actual'' in human brains is governed by a nonlocal causal process, rather than by pure chance, then one must naturally expect analogous causal processes to be occurring elsewhere in nature. If we assume that the selection process is in all cases controlled by a causal process then it must be explained why the statistical rules of quantum theory hold in those cases where they have been tested and validated. An explanation can be constructed as follows. Consider an n-dimensional Hilbert space of points $(z_1,z_2, ...,z_n)$, where, each for each $i$, $$z_i=x_i+iy_i= r_i \exp i\theta_i$$ is a complex number, and $r_i\geq 0 $. This space can be imbedded in a 2n-dimensional real space of points $(x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, ...,x_n, y_n)$, and each unitary transformation in the Hilbert space generates an orthogonal transformation in the real space. The volume in the real space defined by the intersection of the unit ball centered at the origin with the collection of rays from the origin that pass through a region $R$ on the unit sphere is invariant under any orthogonal transformation, and hence also under the image in real space of any unitary transformation in the Hilbert space. Thus the volume (=surface area) of any region $R$ of the unit sphere in the real space is invariant under the image of any unitary transformation in the Hilbert space. Since dynamical evolution, and most symmetry operations in the the Hilbert space, are generated by unitary transformations, the a priori probability density of unit vectors in Hilbert space should be invariant under unitary transformations. Thus it is reasonable to assign to any region $R$ on the surface of the real unit sphere an a priori probability equal to the volume (=surface area) of that region $R$. This a priori probability rule can be used in the following way. Suppose that, as in our brain case, there is, for a given state $\Psi_i$, a rule that specifies a candidate projection operator $P_i$, and that if the passage from state $\Psi_i$ to state $P_i\Psi_i$ is not ``blocked'' then the transition proceeds. If $P_i=I$, where I is the identity operator, then the passage is not blocked, since a change into itself is no change at all, and if $P_i=0$ then the passage must be blocked, since a transition to the null state is not allowed. But then what is the rule that determines whether the passage is blocked? According to the idea behind the present theory everything that enters into the dynamics is represented in Hilbert space: nothing dynamically significant stands outside the Hilbert space of the universe! And the dynamics is to be specified in terms of the state of the universe, or perhaps in terms of the full history of states $$(...,\Psi_{i-2}, \Psi_{i-1}, \Psi_i).$$ The simplest form for the ``blocking rule'' is that the states $\Psi_i$ and $P_i\Psi_i$ determine a state $\Phi$ of unit norm that lies in the complex 2-dimensional subspace generated by $\Psi_i$ and $P_i\Psi_i$, and that the transition from the state $\Psi_i$ to the state $P_i\Psi_i$ proceeds unless for some representative of the state $\Psi_i$, which is defined only up to a phase factor, the direct path from $\Psi_i$ to some representative of $P_i\Psi_i$ intersects the ray $\Phi$ The geometric situation is this. The state $\Psi_i$ can be represented in the 2-dimensional Hilbert space generated by $\Psi_i$ and $P_i\Psi_i$ by the continuum of pairs of complex numbers $$(z_1, z_2)=(\exp i\phi , 0); 0\leq \phi \leq1,$$ and the state $P_i\Psi_i$ can then be represented by the continuum of pairs $$(\cos^2 \theta \exp i\phi, \sin \theta\cos \theta \exp i\phi \exp i\chi)$$ with $0\leq \phi \leq 2\pi$ and $0\leq \chi \leq 2\pi$. The overall phase factor $\exp i\phi$ drops out of all computations and can be set to unity. The phase factor $\chi$ reflects an arbitrary choice of the phase of the basis vector associated with the component $z_2$, and it is assumed that there is a representative of $P_i\Psi_i$ for each value of $\chi$. The ``direct path'' from a representative of $\Psi_i$ to a representative of $P_i\Psi_i$ can be traced out by allowing the value of $\theta$ to run from zero to its actual value. Allowing $\theta$ to run from zero to $\pi /2$ and $\chi$ to run from zero to $2 \pi$ generates a 2-dimensional spherical surface $S_{1/2}$ of radius $1/2$ centered at $z_1 = 1/2$. The vectors $\Phi$ are defined as the set of unit-normed vectors from the origin $z_1=z_2=0$, or as the equivalent parallel vectors of norm $1/2$ from the center of $S_{1/2}$. A uniform distribution of the unit-normed vectors $\Phi$ on the unit 2-sphere is equivalent to a uniform distribution of points on the spherical surface $S_{1/2}$. Notice that a point $$(\cos^2\theta', 0,\sin\theta'\cos\theta'\cos\chi', \sin\theta'\cos\theta'\sin\chi')$$ on $S_{1/2}$ blocks some direct path in $S_{1/2}$ from the representative $(1, 0, 0, 0)$ of $\Psi_i$ to some representative of $P_i\Psi_i$ if and only if $\theta'$ satisfies $0\leq \theta' \leq \theta$ In some situations, namely those in which the realities that are governing the second process are human conscious experiences, we have direct knowledge of what the governing realities are: they are exactly the conscious experiences that are controlling the second process. But in cases where the collapse of the wave function is associated with, say, an event in a Geiger counter, we are not privy to the form of the controlling realities. So in these cases we must fall back to statistical considerations. According to the model described above, there is a vector $\Phi$ that determines whether or not the collapse will occur, but we are ignorant of what it is. But the a priori probability distribution for the location of the vector $\Phi$ corresponds to a uniform distribution over the spherical surface $S_{1/2}$. The probability that the transition from $\Psi_i$ to $P_i\Psi_i$ will be blocked is then equal to the fraction of the surface area of $S_{1/2}$ that is covered as $\theta'$ runs from zero to $\theta$. This probability is $1-\cos^2\theta$. Hence the a priori probability that the transition will occur is $\cos^2\theta$. This is the same as $|P_i\Psi_i|^2/|\Psi_i|^2$, which is what quantum theory predicts. So in this model the statistical predictions of quantum theory would arise from a combination of our ignorance of the true causes, with an a priori uniform probability distribution over an appropriate 2-sphere of the real image of a Hilbert space vector $\Phi$ that determines whether the transition to a specified state occurs or not. \noindent {\bf 14. Two Final Remarks } 1. Quantum brain theory has been characterized as ``A solution in search of a problem''. A first question, in this connection, is whether a semi-classical model of the brain---e.g., a model in which the action potential on every neuron is regarded as a well-defined classically describable electromagnetic pulse---is capable of generating solutions to search problems as quickly as the brain actually does it, or whether a quantum mechanism such as the hydrodynamic effect, or the picking of the `optimal' solution discussed above, is needed. The way in which a classical brain could search for suitable templates for action (or recognize patterns) is not known at present in enough detail to make an estimate of the classically allowed rapidities possible . But it seems reasonable that nature would make use of the quantum possibilities for speeding up the search processes, and hence that the semi-classical model will, in the end, not be able to adequately explain the speed at which the brain makes its top-level choices. 2. This question of speed is, however, not the only relevant consideration. Even if a semi-classical model were fast enough the question would arise why a dynamically inert psychical element is present at all in nature. Wigner emphasized that in the rest of physics every action of one thing upon another is accompanied by a reaction of the second back on the first. A dynamically inert psychic reality could have no survival value, hence no physical reason to exist. Yet it seems absurd to think that something so different from its supposedly classical physical foundation could arise just by accident. \noindent {\bf References} 1. N. Bohr, See ref.15 p. 61/64. 2. A. Einstein, in A. Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. P.A. Schilpp, Tudor, New York, 1951. p.81. 3. W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper Row, New York, 1958, Chapter III. 4. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 463, (1957). 5. W.H. Zurek, in New Techniques and Ideas in Quantum Measurement Theory, ed, Daniel M. Greenberger, Annals of the New York Academy of Science {\bf 480} p.96 6. E. Joos, in New Techniques and Ideas in Quantum Measurement Theory, ed, Daniel M. Greenberger, Annals of the New York Academy of Science {\bf 480} p.12 7. M. Gell-Mann and James B. Hartle, Classical Equations for Quantum Systems, UCSBTH-91-15 8. R. Omnes, The Interpretation of Quantum Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994, p.348. 9. John Bell, in Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty: Historical, Philosophical, and Physical Inquiries into the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, ed. A.I. Miller, Plenum Press, New York and London. 10. A. Einstein, in A. Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. P.A. Schilpp, Tudor, New York, 1951. p.667-673. 11. Wm. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol I, Dover, New York, 1950 (Reprinting of 1890 text) p.139 12. D. Mermin, Amer. J. Physics, {\bf 62}, 880, (1994); D. Bedford and H.P. Stapp, Synthese 102, 139-164, 1995; H.P. Stapp, Phys. Rev. A49, 4257, 1994; Ref.15, p.6. 13. N. Bohr, See ref. 15, Chapter 3 14. R.P. Feynman, The Feynman Lectures in Physics, R.P. Feynman, R.B. Leighton, and M.Sands, Addison-Wesley, (1965) Vol. III, Chapter 21. 15. H.P.Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Spinger-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1993. Chapter 6. 16. H.P.Stapp, Phys. Rev. D28, 1386 (1983) 17. T. Kawai and H.P. Stapp, Phys. Rev. D52, 2484-2532, (1995) 18. Philip L. Stocklin and Brian F. Stocklin T.I.T. J. of Life Sci., 1979, Vol 9, pp. 29-51; and Evidence for Endogenous Standing Microwaves as a Substrate for Consciousness. (Paper delivered at the conference ``Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness, University of Arizona Tucson ,AR, 1994 ); Physical Basis for Pattern Processing in the Human Brain, 1992 19. R.J. Glauber, in Quantum Optics, S.M. Kay and A. Maitland, eds. Academic Press, London and New York, 1970; T.~W.~B. Kibble in ibid;\\ H.P. Stapp, in Quantum Implications: Essays in Honour of David Bohm, B.J. Hiley and F.David Peats eds., Routledge and Paul Kegan Ltd., London and New York, 1987. 20. H.P. Stapp, in Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1990, P.Lahti and P. Mittelstaedt eds., World Scientific, Singapore. Sec. 3. \end{document}