From stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Wed Feb 28 07:54:47 2001 Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2001 13:47:17 -0800 (PST) From: stapp@thsrv.lbl.gov Reply-To: hpstapp@lbl.gov To: pat hayes Cc: Aaron Sloman , hpstapp@lbl.gov, Stanley Klein , Kathryn Blackmond Laskey , brucero@cats.ucsc.edu, Jeffrey M. Schwartz Subject: Re: Experiential and nonexperiential thoughts (a Chinese On Fri, 16 Feb 2001, pat hayes wrote: > > > >[Henry, to Pat:] > > > The discussion > > > with Stan was predicated, first of all, on the agreed-up > > > on > > > premise (which Stan accepts, though you do not) that the > > > experiential feeling is not identically the very same > > > thing as > > > a feature of the activity of the (classically conceived) > > > brain. > > [Aaron:] > > > A feeling of toothache or sexual pleasure is not identical > > with any > > kind of brain activity, because, for example, feelings > > have semantic > > content (they refer, e.g. to spatial locations, among > > other things) > > and physical activity involves only physical states, > > properties, > > processes, events, which does not include semantic > > relations. > > Let me disagree with Aaron here and say why. I suspect that > on every > point but this one, we are in agreement; as we might be > even on the > substance, but not the letter, of this point itself. > > The basic issue here is how we individuate things. Henry > and Aaron > and Stan, in somewhat different ways, all seem to accept > the premis > that individuation criteria for physical things and > feelings are so > different that it is impossible to identify them with each > other. > Henry concludes that there are disjoint 'worlds' of things > and > feelings, Stan is driven to adopt epiphenomenalism of > feelings on > their NCCs, and I am genuinely not quite sure what Aaron > concludes. > But it seems to me that this premis is quite unwarranted > and is > almost certainly false. > Dear Pat, You have my reasons wrong! My reasons for claiming that feelings cannot be identical to features of a classically conceived brain is not that their "individuation criteria" are so different, if by "individuation criteria" you mean the criteria by which we identify things. There are many-many cases where one thing is identified in very different ways in different contexts or circumcumstances. In fact, almost every physical thing is like that. So I have in this forum *repeatedly denied* that differences of that kind were the basis of my claim that feelings (and, more generally, elements in a stream of conscious human events) are not features of a classically conceived conception of physical reality. The `morning star' and the `evening star' have different appearances, but these different appearances are different appearances of the same physical entity because one physical collection of micro-elements *causes* the two different appearances. The `heat' of thermodynamics and the mean kinetic energy of statistical mechanics are the same thing because the empirical manifestations of each (i.e., the appearances caused by them) are both caused by the same collection of micro-elements. In analyses of the sameness of things we distinguish the `appearances' by which we recognize things from theoretical concepts about the causes of these appearances. "Appearances" are, by definition, exactly what they seem to be: they are the "seemings" that are all that we directly know. They are the rudimentary "knowings". We can be mistaken about their causes, and in our later recollections of them, but they are the immediately given realities, and, as such, are our sole windows on reality. On the other hand, the concepts of classical physics are elements of a *mathematical/logical construct* that we have built on postulated micro-elements that possess only elementary mathematical properties. By postulate they interact with nearest neighbors according to specified deterministic laws. There is no basis within these classical principles for any feature of a complex conglomerate of micro-elements that constitutes a human brain to be identical to an "appearance" or "feeling". The logical gap between a classical physical system and an appearance/feeling arises not from a big difference in criteria of identity: it comes from a difference in logical type. A classical physical system is, on the one hand, something that does not really exist: it is the supposed reality in which we are imbedded and that conforms to the principles of classical physical theory, but we know, on the basis of scientific analysis of empirical data, that the reality in which our streams of consciousness are imbedded does not conform to the principles of classical physics. "Seemings", on the other hand, really do exist: they are the realities upon which we base our lives and our scientific theories. So seemings/appearances/feelings differ in kind from the postulated reality of classical physical theory: the former really exist, and constitute our immediate knowings, whereas the latter cannot exist, but is the purely ficticious supposed reality with specified postulated classical properties in which our seemings are imagined to be imbedded. Moreover, even if the postulated classical physical reality did exist, it would be a structure whose every property is a rational consequence of the postulated elementary properties. The postulated basic entities are idealized microscopic limits of objects with extension: they are invisible microscopic limits of objects with observable shapes and relative locations, and all of the physical consequences of the postulated structure are rational consequences of the trajectories of the elementary micro-entities, and of the electromagnetic and gravitational fields associated with these trajectories. Although many high-level properties and relationships, describable in appropriate high-level terminology, can be said "emerge" from these basic micro properties, as rational consequences of the postulated basic micro-properties, [think of a `wheel' or a `hurricane'] these emergent properties are, in the end, just rational consequences of constraints on the space-time dispositions of conglomerates of the postulated micro-entities. But constraints of this kind provide no rational basis for understanding how physical feature of a brain activity could be *the same thing* as an appearance/feeling. There is a logical gap that arises not from gross differences between two kinds of appearances that might be caused, within the classical theory, by the same conglomerate of micro-elements, but arises rather from a difference in kind, within classical theory, between a presumed thing-in-itself that conforms to postulates based fundamentally on the idea of extension, and an immediate knowing. This situation is not analogous to the many oft-cited cases in which one physical system can cause several very different physical manifestations. For in these cases the concepts of physics provide a basis for understanding how one physical system could have different physical manifestations. But classical physical theory provides no analogous understanding of the connection between the directly known appearances and the postulated physical reality that is supposed to cause them. > Most things that we know anything about have the characteristic that > the properties that we use to identify them are not all the > properties that they have. If it were otherwise, all of science would > simply be inspection. Everything would wear its true, ultimate nature > on its sleeve, as it were: just by recognising it, we would know it > totally and utterly, and it would have no further secrets. In fact, I > would claim that our overwhelming experience of nature, almost > without exception, is that *nothing* is like this. (The only > exceptions might, indeed, be the elementary particles.) Almost every > entity in the universe, and certainly every reasonably complex or > human-scale entity, has properties which are not apparent at first > glance, and many of them have properties which are extremely > difficult to determine, often requiring the combined efforts of the > best minds on the planet for many, many years, and enormous > expenditures of time, energy and effort. Often - perhaps always - it > is the case that some of these properties are invisible to the > unaided human perceiver, and can only be determined indirectly by > using special equipment. Think for example of the ease with which a > disease like measles can be recognised and contrast that with the > knowledge needed to describe the action of the immune system to that > disease. Or, more mundanely, contrast the information about a certain > tree that enables someone to recognise it by sight, with a complete > description of the position and momentum of every leaf on the tree at > some moment. > > Now, apply this commonplace observation to 'feelings'. Henry, > Stan > and Aaron all seem to agree that since 'feelings' have > 'non-physical' > properties - by which I mean only properties that cannot be > stated in > the language of physics - that they must BE non-physical > in their > very nature. That is not the argument at all! The issue is not language! The language of the physical sciences includes the language of physiology, botany, biology, neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, etc. and it can be extended to physical systems that can be usefully described in terms of economic laws, and computer e ngineering, game theory, etc. etc.. Complex physical systems can have "emergent properties", which we describe by enlarging our scientific language. A complex classically describable system can have aspects that are connected to each other according to special constraints, and have, consequently, special physical features that call for an extention of our language. But insofar as these complex systems are conceived to be built out of the classical micro-elements interacting in accordance with the standard classical local laws, these constraints, and the languages introduced to more usefully describe these constrained systems, do not take one out of the realm of physical manifestations of the classical microelements govern by the postulated classical laws. In the case of biological systems all sorts of adaptive high-level behavioural patterns can be expected to emerge, but it does not then follow from the classical principles that consciousness or feelings would necessarily be present. The orthodox classical principles simply do not have the power to entail that "feel follows function": Function could occur with no concommitant feel without contradicting the orthodox principles of classical phhysics. Nor does the utility of an extention of scientific language logically force "appearances" to arise or occur. Some extra principle, beyond the logically complete classical physical theory, would be needed to specify the conditions under which appearances/feelings occur. Thus there is a *logical gap* in classical physical theory with respect to the occurrence of appearances and feelings. > But this simply does not follow. I do not claim, as you appear to surmise, that "since feelings have... properties that cannot be stated in the language of physics--that they must BE non physical in their very nature." That is not my argument at all! All sorts of physical systems have properties that are not stated in the language of the physicists. Physical biological systems have properties associated with words like "homeostasis", "reproduction", "membrane", "cell", "death", etc. that are not found in typical physics textbooks. But those biological systems have various properties that are understandable in terms of "extensions" of conglomerates of micro-elements: the appearance of these systems involve appearances of extensions, and these appearances of extension are presumed, within the classical theory, to be caused by the extensions of the conglomerates that constitute that biological system. All sorts of connection between various physical manifestations can be studied. But the connection between a physical manifestation and an associated phenomenal manifestation---an appearance---is not explained within orthodox classical physical theory. So your conception of my position is completely off the mark. My position does not revolve around differences in the languages used to describe various aspects of the physical manifestations of conglomerations of classically conceived micro-elements. It is based rather the logical gap between (1), the kinds of properties that could follow rationally from the postulated properies of the micro-elements of classical physical theory and (2), the immediately given appearances/feelings. The conception of the body a human being's being something like a huge array of pulleys and springs, and ducts and fluids and valves, and memory stores, and information processors processing all sorts of data, entails the utility of special biological and computational terminology. But it does not rationally entail the existence of feelings: one can easily accept the former but deny any occurrence of the latter without creating any logical contradiction. > It would follow only if > one assumes either that physical things cannot have > non-physical > properties, which is evidently false, or that these > non-physical > properties somehow exhaust the properties that these > feeling-things > can possibly have; but, as I have argued, not only is such an > assumption quite unwarranted, but it would also be an > extraordinary > assumption. > It amounts to a claim that these feeling-things are > totally different in their *logical* structure from > everything else > in nature. We at not discussing nature as it is, which beautifully integrates the physical and psychical aspects of nature. We are discussing the classical approximation, which systematically obliterates, by taking the limit in which Planck's constant is set to zero, the causal connections between these two dynamically intertwined aspects of nature. > Why would anyone even take such a premis seriously, > without having overwhelming evidence in its favor? > The premise of the `reductio ad absurdum argument' is the notion that classical physical theory is adequate in this study of the mind-brain problem, and the `absurdum' that this leads to is the conclusion that mind is dynamically disconnected from matter. > Look what happens when you do not make this extraordinary > assumption: > the feeling-things are now allowed to have properties which > are > different in kind from those by which we recognise them It is important in the study of a problem to have a vocabulary that allows potentially or seemingly different things to have different names. Physical things can manifest various physical properties, and the various manifested physical properties can produce associated "appearances/feelings". Each of these appearance/feelings is what it is, and is nothing other than what it is. A feeling is not the unfelt and unknown, and it can be distinguished, at least *ab initio*, from its unfelt causes. A "feeling" is, by definition, different from what is not felt, and this difference must be recognized terminologically. Each such appearance/feeling can be a knowing or recognition of a manifested physical property, and hence a recognition of some aspect of the physical cause of the manifested property. Hence *physical things* are certainly "allowed to have properties that are different in kind from those by which we recognize them" in the sense that a physical entity P may produce an appearance/feeling A that is different in kind from P: the appearance A(S) of a star S might be different in kind from the star S that produces that appearance. But an "appearance" is not different in kind from the appearance by which we recognize it. An "appearance" IS the appearance by which we recognize it. This is just a matter of definition: in order to avoid drawing conclusions based on prejudicial language one should have a word for this appearance itself. > (in > particular, they may have physical properties) and moreover > they > might be altogether more complex than they seem to be. > For example, > consider a pain in one's toe. It has characteristics by > which one > recognises it for what it is: those include the painfulness > of the > 'feel'. But, contra Henry's oft-repeated assumption, these > characteristics by which we recognise this pain might not > exhaust the > properties that the pain may have, any more than the color > of a rose > is all that there is to be said about the rose. The rose is a physical entity and it produces an appearance which has various aspects, one of which is color. But the appearance is the appearance, nothing more. Likewise a pain is exactly that pain, nothing more. Of course, the physical situation that is `causing' the pain may have many properties other that of producing this pain. Although one can define things in various ways, I follow James and use the terms "appearance", "feeling", "thought", "consciousness" "experience", "idea", "pain" to denote an element in a stream consciousness, not any unexperienced aspect. Since we are discussing my position we should, if this discussion is to lead to clarification, agree to use words in the same way. Let us give to your expanded meaning of "pain" the name "pain+p", where the "+p" is the physical part that is not experienced. You said: > the feeling-things are now allowed to have properties which > are > different in kind from those by which we recognise them > (in > particular, they may have physical properties) and moreover This singling out of the different-in-kind "properties... by which recognize them" seems to be a reversal of your long-held identity-theory position that the experiencial aspect is identically the same thing as a feature of the physical brain, and hence that all properties are physical, and thus of that same lind. In any case, it is this experiential property by which we know it that is what I call the "pain". > The pain may > have > other properties; and indeed, if you talk to any competent > doctor, > they will tell you that pains do have many properties of > which the > sufferers are not aware. (Very few people are able to tell > you how an > analgesic works, for example; but the analgesics still work > on them, > nevertheless.) The "pain" the I am speaking of is exactly the experiential aspect, not the unexperienced realities that lie beyond it. > Stan wants to say that there must be two things here: > the pain and the pain's NCC, but this is to make the same > mistake. > There might indeed be two things, but a much simpler > hypothesis is > that there is one thing with several aspects. Well, it is the felt aspect that I call the "pain". Within quantum theory one might with good reason say that the "pain" and its physical counterpart, `the collapse' are two aspects of the one psycho-physical event: the theory ties them inextricably together. But in the classical ontology there is nothing of which the physical and psychical aspects are two inseparable parts: they are distinguishable by the fact that one is an immediate knowing/feeling whereas the other is in principle unknown. > Following Stan's > strategy in other domains would lead one to hypothesise two > rabbits > where most of us would see one: the animal-rabbit and its BCA > (Biological Correlate of Animalness). The animal-rabbit and its BCA are both the same physical conglomerate: they are both conceived to be the same collection of physically describable micro-elements. And all the properties of this conglomerate are understood to be in principle rational consequences of the postulated properties of the microelements and their spacetime arrangements. > And indeed one could do that: > but it would be a poor ontological strategy, I suggest. > > So, to sum up, I am arguing that all three of you guys are > making > what amounts to a basic logical error, and for much the > same reason: > you just cannot accept the simplest premis of all, which is > that > mental 'things' ARE physical (as well as mental, of course.) > Feelings ARE bodily states, and what makes them so special > to we who 'inhabit' our bodies is that we have uniquely > personal ways to individuate them, being in a uniquely > privileged position of observation. This > extraordinary observation post from the inside gives us > unique access > to some kinds of thing, one that we cannot possibly have > for other > kinds of thing or even for other instances of the same > kind of thing; > but it is a logical error to think that this privileged > kind of > observational access makes the things themselves > extraordinary, or > puts them into a different realm, or requires that they be > distinguished in kind from anything describable in > physical terms. > > Pat Hayes > The logical error appears to be yours: you are confusing the situation by using one name to stand for two aspects of reality that need to be given different names, ab initio. This terminological telescoping causes a logical error. The physical "+p" aspect of "pain+p" can located in the physical world described by classical physical theory, but the principles of that theory do not tie the "pain" part to that physical part. What is this "we who `inhabit' our bodies" of which you speak? What is this "observation" of which you speak? These are concepts that do not arise from the principles of classical physical theory as rational consequences of the postulated properties of the micro-elements. You are brushing under the rug the problem that is bothering the rest of us. It is exactly the problem of how our "observations" are rationally tied to the physical principles, if one insists on using an approximation to the actual dynamics that, by setting Planck's constant to zero, cuts the dynamical link between the physical aspects of reality and the appearances/feelings that constitute our "observations". Henry